nep-mst New Economics Papers
on Market Microstructure
Issue of 2025–11–10
six papers chosen by
Thanos Verousis, Vlerick Business School


  1. ABIDES-MARL: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Environment for Endogenous Price Formation and Execution in a Limit Order Book By Patrick Cheridito; Jean-Loup Dupret; Zhexin Wu
  2. When AI Trading Agents Compete: Adverse Selection of Meta-Orders by Reinforcement Learning-Based Market Making By Ali Raza Jafree; Konark Jain; Nick Firoozye
  3. Price dislocations: insights from trade repository data By Menkveld, Albert J.; Saru, Ion Lucas; Yu, Shihao
  4. Deviations from Tradition: Stylized Facts in the Era of DeFi By Daniele Maria Di Nosse; Federico Gatta; Fabrizio Lillo; Sebastian Jaimungal
  5. An Impulse Control Approach to Market Making in a Hawkes LOB Market By Konark Jain; Nick Firoozye; Jonathan Kochems; Philip Treleaven
  6. Option market making with hedging-induced market impact By Paulin Aubert; Etienne Chevalier; Vathana Ly Vath

  1. By: Patrick Cheridito; Jean-Loup Dupret; Zhexin Wu
    Abstract: We present ABIDES-MARL, a framework that combines a new multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methodology with a new realistic limit-order-book (LOB) simulation system to study equilibrium behavior in complex financial market games. The system extends ABIDES-Gym by decoupling state collection from kernel interruption, enabling synchronized learning and decision-making for multiple adaptive agents while maintaining compatibility with standard RL libraries. It preserves key market features such as price-time priority and discrete tick sizes. Methodologically, we use MARL to approximate equilibrium-like behavior in multi-period trading games with a finite number of heterogeneous agents-an informed trader, a liquidity trader, noise traders, and competing market makers-all with individual price impacts. This setting bridges optimal execution and market microstructure by embedding the liquidity trader's optimization problem within a strategic trading environment. We validate the approach by solving an extended Kyle model within the simulation system, recovering the gradual price discovery phenomenon. We then extend the analysis to a liquidity trader's problem where market liquidity arises endogenously and show that, at equilibrium, execution strategies shape market-maker behavior and price dynamics. ABIDES-MARL provides a reproducible foundation for analyzing equilibrium and strategic adaptation in realistic markets and contributes toward building economically interpretable agentic AI systems for finance.
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.02016
  2. By: Ali Raza Jafree; Konark Jain; Nick Firoozye
    Abstract: We investigate the mechanisms by which medium-frequency trading agents are adversely selected by opportunistic high-frequency traders. We use reinforcement learning (RL) within a Hawkes Limit Order Book (LOB) model in order to replicate the behaviours of high-frequency market makers. In contrast to the classical models with exogenous price impact assumptions, the Hawkes model accounts for endogenous price impact and other key properties of the market (Jain et al. 2024a). Given the real-world impracticalities of the market maker updating strategies for every event in the LOB, we formulate the high-frequency market making agent via an impulse control reinforcement learning framework (Jain et al. 2025). The RL used in the simulation utilises Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO) and self-imitation learning. To replicate the adverse selection phenomenon, we test the RL agent trading against a medium frequency trader (MFT) executing a meta-order and demonstrate that, with training against the MFT meta-order execution agent, the RL market making agent learns to capitalise on the price drift induced by the meta-order. Recent empirical studies have shown that medium-frequency traders are increasingly subject to adverse selection by high-frequency trading agents. As high-frequency trading continues to proliferate across financial markets, the slippage costs incurred by medium-frequency traders are likely to increase over time. However, we do not observe that increased profits for the market making RL agent necessarily cause significantly increased slippages for the MFT agent.
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.27334
  3. By: Menkveld, Albert J.; Saru, Ion Lucas; Yu, Shihao
    Abstract: This paper identifies price dislocation events in EuroSTOXX 50 futures, i.e., periods marked by high absolute returns. Combining public limit order book data with confidential trade repository data collected under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), we analyze market conditions around such dislocations. We find that price dislocations are accompanied by an increase in trading volume, and in the number of trades. EMIR data enables us to identify who participates in these trades, which allows us to tell if the volume increase is driven by fewer investors trading more, i.e., a more concentrated market, or by more investors participating. The latter could be argued to be a sign of a resilient market. We find evidence in support of such resilience, because the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index declines, both on the liquidity-demand and the liquidity-supply side. Our results further show that, contemporaneously, public order book variables explain most of the price dislocation events; adding private EMIR data contributes relatively little. We further find that predicting price dislocations is extremely hard, even after adding private EMIR data to public order book data. JEL Classification: G14, G18
    Keywords: EuroSTOXX 50 index futures, market concentration, price dislocations
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:srk:srkwps:2025152
  4. By: Daniele Maria Di Nosse; Federico Gatta; Fabrizio Lillo; Sebastian Jaimungal
    Abstract: Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) are now a significant component of the financial world where billions of dollars are traded daily. Differently from traditional markets, which are typically based on Limit Order Books, DEXs typically work as Automated Market Makers, and, since the implementation of Uniswap v3, feature concentrated liquidity. By investigating the twenty-four most active pools in Uniswap v3 during 2023 and 2024, we empirically study how this structural change in the organization of the markets modifies the well-studied stylized facts of prices, liquidity, and order flow observed in traditional markets. We find a series of new statistical regularities in the distributions and cross-autocorrelation functions of these variables that we are able to associate either with the market structure (e.g., the execution of orders in blocks) or with the intense activity of Maximal Extractable Value searchers, such as Just-in-Time liquidity providers and sandwich attackers.
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.22834
  5. By: Konark Jain; Nick Firoozye; Jonathan Kochems; Philip Treleaven
    Abstract: We study the optimal Market Making problem in a Limit Order Book (LOB) market simulated using a high-fidelity, mutually exciting Hawkes process. Departing from traditional Brownian-driven mid-price models, our setup captures key microstructural properties such as queue dynamics, inter-arrival clustering, and endogenous price impact. Recognizing the realistic constraint that market makers cannot update strategies at every LOB event, we formulate the control problem within an impulse control framework, where interventions occur discretely via limit, cancel, or market orders. This leads to a high-dimensional, non-local Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Quasi-Variational Inequality (HJB-QVI), whose solution is analytically intractable and computationally expensive due to the curse of dimensionality. To address this, we propose a novel Reinforcement Learning (RL) approximation inspired by auxiliary control formulations. Using a two-network PPO-based architecture with self-imitation learning, we demonstrate strong empirical performance with limited training, achieving Sharpe ratios above 30 in a realistic simulated LOB. In addition to that, we solve the HJB-QVI using a deep learning method inspired by Sirignano and Spiliopoulos 2018 and compare the performance with the RL agent. Our findings highlight the promise of combining impulse control theory with modern deep RL to tackle optimal execution problems in jump-driven microstructural markets.
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.26438
  6. By: Paulin Aubert; Etienne Chevalier; Vathana Ly Vath
    Abstract: This paper develops a model for option market making in which the hedging activity of the market maker generates price impact on the underlying asset. The option order flow is modeled by Cox processes, with intensities depending on the state of the underlying and on the market maker's quoted prices. The resulting dynamics combine stochastic option demand with both permanent and transient impact on the underlying, leading to a coupled evolution of inventory and price. We first study market manipulation and arbitrage phenomena that may arise from the feedback between option trading and underlying impact. We then establish the well-posedness of the mixed control problem, which involves continuous quoting decisions and impulsive hedging actions. Finally, we implement a numerical method based on policy optimization to approximate optimal strategies and illustrate the interplay between option market liquidity, inventory risk, and underlying impact.
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.02518

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