nep-lam New Economics Papers
on Central and South America
Issue of 2021‒10‒04
three papers chosen by
Maximo Rossi
Universidad de la República

  1. The tradeoffs of brokerage in innovation networks: a study of Latin American cities By Carlos Bianchi; Pablo Galaso; Sergio Palomeque
  2. Playing Whac-A-Mole in the Fight against Corruption: Evidence from Random Audits in Brazil By Maximiliano Lauletta; Martín Rossi; Christian Ruzzier
  3. Estimación del Valor Agregado Bruto de la Administración Pública en Uruguay (1870 - 2017) By pablo Marmissolle; Henry Willebald

  1. By: Carlos Bianchi (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Pablo Galaso (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Sergio Palomeque (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)
    Abstract: Brokers play a critical role in the evolution of innovation systems. However, accessing and diffusing knowledge into the system imply costs and requires capacities. Using patent data to analyze inter-city networks in Latin America, we revisit the debate on the benefits and costs of knowledge networks. We identify broker cities, differentiating between intra-regional and extra-regional connections, and we estimate the effects of brokerage on patenting outcomes between 2006 and 2017. Our findings reveal that cities holding a central position in the network show higher patenting activity; however, being broker, particularly bridging Latin America with extra-regional cities, negatively influences patenting outcomes.
    Keywords: inter-city networks, patents, brokerage, innovation systems, Latin America.
    JEL: O31 O54 P48
    Date: 2021–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-21-21&r=
  2. By: Maximiliano Lauletta (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley); Martín Rossi (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres); Christian Ruzzier (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres)
    Abstract: Audits can reduce corruption, but corrupt officials may be able to substitute to alternate forms of corruption when the anticorruption policy controls only certain types of corruption. By exploiting the random assignment of municipalities to a large, successful, audit program in Brazil, we document unintended (and undesirable) consequences of such selective anticorruption monitoring: audited municipalities employ more labor in water provision, and this translates into a more inefficient service. We also provide additional evidence consistent with the idea that local officials may be using their discretion in hiring to substitute between different forms of corruption.
    Keywords: corruption, audits, efficiency, development, employment, water & sanitation
    JEL: D73 D78 H42 K42 L95
    Date: 2021–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sad:wpaper:157&r=
  3. By: pablo Marmissolle (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Henry Willebald (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)
    Abstract: We present estimates of the gross value added of the public administration in Uruguay, in current and constant prices, for the period 1870 - 1955. Our estimations, based on previous efforts to estimate the value added of the sector, allow us to correct the previous series and, based on these corrections, open the possibility of adjusting the Gross Domestic Product series for the period before the national accounts system. Splicing the estimated historical series with the official series from 1955 to the present, continuous series were obtained that cover the period 1870 - 2017. These series are made available to the research community for its consideration, criticism and review.
    Keywords: public administration, national accounts, Uruguay
    JEL: E01 H11 N46
    Date: 2021–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-20-21&r=

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