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on Central and South America |
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Issue of 2018‒05‒14
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Roberto Álvarez; Aldo González |
| Abstract: | Este trabajo realiza una comparación de precios de medicamentos entre las seis principales economías de América Latina. Se emplea un modelo econométrico de panel con efecto fijo por país que controla por un variado conjunto de características de los fármacos, abarcando un total de 19.741 unidades que fueron comercializadas en el período 2010 - 2015. La comparación se efectúa tanto a nivel mayorista como en venta final a público y también por tipo de medicamento –innovador, similar y genérico. A nivel agregado y en salida de farmacia, el ranking de país más barato a más caro es el siguiente: 1° Perú, 2° México, 3° Argentina, 4° Chile, 5° Colombia y 6° Brasil. En innovadores, Argentina y luego Perú serían los países con menores precios a público final. En productos similares o genéricos de marca los precios más bajos a público se encuentran en México y Argentina, mientras que para genéricos puros, Perú y luego Chile serían los más baratos. El orden de los países en el ranking no cambia sustantivamente si la comparación se realiza con precios a salida de laboratorio. |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp462&r=lam |
| By: | Ricardo Schechtman; Tony Takeda |
| Abstract: | In order to provide higher incentives for loan loss provisions (LLP) of Brazilian banks when bad times were looming ahead, the discretionary excess in loan loss reserves was recognized temporarily as regulatory capital, in a sort of countercyclical policy. This study explores this regulatory change to investigate the capital management incentives of LLP of Brazilian banks. Results show that banks with less regulatory capital increased relatively more discretionary LLP during the regulatory change but not outside it, suggesting that capital management through discretionary LLP was relevant only during that period. On the other hand, banks with less earnings made less discretionary LLP throughout the sample period, suggesting earnings smoothing was relevant during the whole period. Results are robust to different realized and forward loan loss controls, different measures of capital before endogenous items, time-varying capital targets, and to the recognition of possible heterogeneous effects of the global financial crisis across Brazilian banks |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:477&r=lam |
| By: | Luis Riveros; Mauricio Cornejo |
| Abstract: | Desde 1956 el Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Chile ha estado realizando Encuestas Trimestrales de Ocupación y Desocupación por encargo del Banco Central de Chile. Manteniendo similar metodología, ha producido una significativa información que ha servido para el análisis coyuntural de la economía como asimismo para la realización de muchos estudios académicos sobre el mercado laboral chileno. En este trabajo se describen las principales características de las Encuestas y se discuten algunas líneas de investigación que han sido desarrolladas sobre su base. |
| Date: | 2018–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp461&r=lam |
| By: | Fairfield, Tasha |
| Abstract: | Structural power is a critical variable that merits more extensive and more explicit attention in Latin American political economy and in comparative politics more broadly. Assessing structural power in conjunction with its counterpart, instrumental power, can provide strong leverage for explaining variation in policy outcomes that affect business interests. However, structural power must be carefully defined and operationalized in order to capture its core attributes and nuances. This task requires wedding the concept's “structural†underpinnings with policymakers’ perceptions and anticipated reactions. Moreover, the relationship between structural power and instrumental power must be carefully theorized. While these concepts encompass distinct channels through which business exerts influence, the two types of power may be mutually reinforcing. I argue that business interests shape policy outcomes when either their structural power or their instrumental power is strong, yet business influence will be more extensive and more consistent when structural power and instrumental power are both strong. However, electoral incentives, and more importantly, popular mobilization, can counteract business power. I illustrate these theoretical points with a case study of Chile's 2014 tax reform proposal, a major policy initiative with important distributive consequences that received international press attention. |
| Keywords: | Governance, |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idq:ictduk:13718&r=lam |