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on Gender |
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Issue of 2026–07–13
eight papers chosen by Jan Sauermann, Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk Utvärdering |
| By: | Paul M. Gorny; Petra Nieken; Martin Trenkle |
| Abstract: | Recruitment signals shape applicant pools. Across three studies, we examine whether genderfair (vs. generic masculine) German job titles affect application behavior and job seekers' beliefs about organizational culture. In a large-scale pre-registered field experiment, gender-fair titles increase female applications and clicks in Business & Management where priors are flexible by about 50 %. There is no average effect in categories with less flexible priors consistent with a signaling model. Eye-tracking evidence shows effects reflect belief updating, not visual salience, and an online study supports gender-fair language as a credible equality signal. We find no male backlash. |
| Keywords: | gender, labor, signaling, recruitment, bias, discrimination, gender-fair language |
| JEL: | C93 J16 J20 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12721 |
| By: | David Felipe-Calvo (University of Zaragoza); José Ignacio Gimenez-Nadal (University of Zaragoza); José Alberto Molina (IEDIS, Universidad de Zaragoza) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines within-day work interruptions due to childcare as a candidate micro-level mechanism behind the child penalty. Using time-use diaries from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS, 2003–2023), we apply survival analysis combined with Random Survival Forests, Gradient Boosting, SHAP values, and Accumulated Local Effects plots to model the time until a working parent’s first interruption. Parental gender is the dominant predictor across all methods: fathers face an instantaneous interruption hazard about 61 per cent below mothers’ (HR=0.389; 95% CI: 0.346–0.438), a gap robust to competing-risks decomposition, alternative censoring thresholds, and a stratified specification. Higher education and income are associated with greater, not lower, interruption risk. A cross-national extension to eight countries confirms the universality of the gender gap, with male hazard ratios below one everywhere (0.388 in the United States to 0.657 in Finland). These findings document a high-frequency margin of gender inequality and provide cross-sectional evidence of a daily mechanism that may contribute to explaining the child penalty. |
| Keywords: | Work interruptions; Child penalty; Machine Learning; Gender norms; Gender inequality; Multi-country analysis |
| JEL: | J13 J16 J22 |
| Date: | 2026–07–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:1114 |
| By: | Cota, Marta; Frech, Maria; Morazzoni, Marta; Tallent, Michael |
| Abstract: | This paper studies whether financial literacy shapes gender differences in wealth. Using data from the United States and the Netherlands, we document that women have lower financial literacy and confidence than men, are less likely to manage long-term investments within their households, and hold fewer financial assets, with the largest gaps among married agents. We build a life-cycle portfolio-choice model with endogenous financial literacy accumulation and marital dynamics centered around two wedges: a higher cost of literacy investment for married women and gender-specific perceived returns on risky assets. The calibrated model qualitatively matches untargeted life-cycle patterns in literacy and portfolio choice, accounting for a third of the gender gap in individual financial assets. Counterfactual exercises show that early-life financial education can narrow the gender knowledge gap, and portfolio-allocation rules may offset confidence and marriage-related wedges that education may not undo, lowering the wealth gap by 6%. |
| JEL: | E21 G11 G53 J16 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21394 |
| By: | Buser, Thomas (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | A large literature in behavioral and labor economics documents gender differences in personality traits and preferences, as well as their explanatory power for gender gaps in occupational choice and career success. These studies usually focus on a single trait or personality classification, such as competitiveness, risk preferences, or the Big Five personality inventory. In this paper, I instead ask how much of gender differences in occupational sorting can be statistically explained by a comprehensive range of trait and preference measures jointly. I combine detailed personality and preference indicators elicited in a representative Dutch survey panel and link them to career outcomes for which large gender gaps are observed: the underrepresentation of women in management and math-intensive occupations, and the underrepresentation of men in teaching and caring occupations and the public sector. Correcting for measurement error, differences in preferences and personality can statistically explain a large part – typically half or more – of gender differences in occupational sorting. Traits with a "dark" side – such as willingness to play dirty, externalizing behavior or psychopathy – capture a surprisingly large share of these gaps. |
| Keywords: | gender, occupational segregation, personality, economic preferences, competitiveness |
| JEL: | J16 J24 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18721 |
| By: | Alejandra Villegas (Department of Economics, Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de Mexico); Heidi J. Smith (Department of Economics, Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de Mexico) |
| Abstract: | Who pays bribes, and what does that reveal about gendered encounters with the state? Using seven waves of Mexico's National Survey on Government Quality and Impact (2011-2023), this article shows that petty corruption is not experienced evenly across citizens. Women are about 57 percent less likely than men to report paying a bribe in public procedures, while university-educated respondents are about 37 percent more likely. We test whether these patterns are explained by a supply-access-sanction mechanism linking women's education, women's presence in elected municipal office, and state fiscal capacity. Municipal female political access does not reduce reported bribery exposure overall, does not robustly moderate the gender gap, and is not activated by state fiscal capacity. The null survives logit, threshold, and quadratic specifications. Larger municipalities show higher exposure, but scale does not activate the representational mechanism. Petty bribery exposure appears driven less by women's descriptive representation than by gendered, unequal patterns of contact with the administrative state. |
| JEL: | D73 J16 I24 H83 O54 |
| Date: | 2026–07–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smx:wpaper:2026009 |
| By: | Di Nola, Alessandro (University of Birmingham); Wang, Haomin (Cardiff University) |
| Abstract: | Women are more likely than men to work in low-hours jobs, which are associated with lower hourly wages and are disproportionately impacted by minimum wage policies. To quantify the gendered effects, we build and estimate an equilibrium search model that incorporates demographic and firm productivity heterogeneity, as well as jobs differing in both wages and hours requirements. The model replicates observed gender gaps in employment, hours worked, and wages, as well as the positive relationship between hours and hourly wages. We implement the minimum wage in our model with a penalty to address non-compliance. Using this framework, we find that Germany's initial €8.5 minimum wage reallocates women toward higher-hours jobs, reducing non-employment. Firm adjustments, however, dampen this effect by raising wages for low-hours jobs, making them relatively more attractive. Enhanced enforcement of the minimum wage amplifies the upward reallocation for women. Finally, we examine the effects of higher minimum wages, finding that increases up to €14 reduce both the gender wage and hours-worked gaps. At €11, 44.8% of the reduction in the gender income gap is attributable to changes in hours worked. |
| Keywords: | Minimum wage; gender gaps; equilibrium job posting; hours requirement |
| JEL: | J08 J31 J16 E24 E64 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2026/8 |
| By: | Erminia Florio (University of Rome "Tor Vergata" & HEC Montreal); Giancarlo Spagnolo (DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata" & EIEF) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the role of mayors’ gender in shaping public procurement at the local level. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and unique datasets on Italian procurement records, firm-level data, and political information spanning 2013-2019, we explore whether procurement contracts published under female mayors exhibit different outcomes compared to those under male mayors in close elections. The results indicate modest differences in procurement practices between female and male mayors: female mayors rely less on negotiated contracts and more on direct awards. Female leadership is also associated with fewer renegotiations and a (surprisingly) lower likelihood of appointing female procurement officers, while no differences emerge in winner characteristics or other post-award outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Gender, Public Procurement, Regression Discontinuity |
| JEL: | J16 H57 |
| Date: | 2026–07–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:623 |
| By: | Alejandra Villegas (Department of Economics, Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de Mexico) |
| Abstract: | This article examines how social norms are enforced through evaluative behavior in the domain of unpaid domestic labor. I implement an online experiment combining an incentivized coordination task to elicit perceived community norms with a two-round dictator-type allocation task. Participants first allocate lottery tickets to a virtual recipient identified only by sex; they then allocate tickets to the same recipient after observing a domestic-work allocation that either conforms to, exceeds, or falls below the elicited reference norm. The main outcome is the within-evaluator change in transfers, which captures whether norm-relevant information induces evaluative rewards or sanctions. The results show that responses to norm deviation are relational and asymmetric. Evaluative transfers vary with the gender of the recipient, the direction of the deviation from the reference norm, and the evaluator's own normative position. In particular, allocations that reduce women's expected share of domestic work, and therefore move toward a more egalitarian division of labor, tend to elicit more negative responses when associated with male rather than female recipients, especially among evaluators with more traditional views about domestic labor. By experimentally varying norm compliance and linking it to allocation behavior, the paper provides behavioral evidence on how informal enforcement mechanisms may sustain gendered divisions of unpaid work even when egalitarian arrangements are available. |
| JEL: | J16 C91 D91 Z13 J22 D64 |
| Date: | 2026–06–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smx:wpaper:2026005 |