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on Gender |
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Issue of 2026–01–26
four papers chosen by Jan Sauermann, Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk Utvärdering |
| By: | Nicoletta Berardi; Benjamin Bureau |
| Abstract: | This paper documents the existence and evolution of a gender gap in bank financing among non-financial firms, disentangling demand- and supply-side effects. Using quarterly panel data for French firms from 2012 to 2023, we find that this gap is driven by the demand side: women-led firms are between 12% and 26% less likely to apply for bank credit, depending on the type of loan. However, conditional on applying, the probability of rejection for women-led firms does not differ significantly from that of men-led firms. Moreover, we find no evidence that the gender gap in credit demand is closing over time. |
| Keywords: | Finance Gender Gap; Bank Credit; Gender Ask Gap |
| JEL: | E51 G30 J16 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:1024 |
| By: | Piotr Denderski; Tim Obermeier |
| Abstract: | An enduring source of gender inequality is that some high-paying ("nonlinear") occupations penalize balancing work and household time commitments, as emphasized by Goldin (2014). We ask how household taxation interacts with these occupational differences to shape gender gaps in hours, wages, and occupational choice, and whether these differences materially affect the impact of tax reforms. We address these questions in a structural Roy model of household labor supply with occupation-specific earnings-hours nonlinearities and progressive taxation, calibrated to US data. We find that a balanced-budget switch to separately filed progressive taxes significantly reduces the gender gaps in hours and occupational choice, while the wage gap declines more modestly. These improvements arise because the reform lowers marginal tax rates for secondary earners and raises them for primary earners. By contrast, proportional taxation yields much smaller reductions in gender gaps. In both reforms, the standard labor-supply channel accounts for roughly two-thirds of the overall taxable- income response, while the convex earnings-hours relationship amplifies these effects and explains most of the remainder. Occupational switching contributes little because those who do switch are negatively selected. |
| Keywords: | household taxation, nonlinear occupations, occupational choice, gender inequality |
| Date: | 2026–01–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp2140 |
| By: | James Alm (Tulane University); Yvette Lind (BI Norwegian Business School) |
| Abstract: | It is increasingly recognized that the individual income tax leads to disparate treatment by race, ethnicity, and gender, even when the statutory tax code is written in a race-, ethnicity-, and gender-blind way. Partly in response to these disparate treatments, there have been many suggestions for moving the income tax to more neutral treatments of taxpayers. In this paper, we focus on a specific aspect of these reform efforts: making the individual income tax gender neutral. We first examine the many sources of gender non-neutrality in the income tax. We argue that gender non-neutrality arises largely because of deviations of "income" in the tax code from "comprehensive income, " deviations that are driven by the many things that we want the tax to achieve, by the ways in which the specific features of the income tax interact with the economic decisions and roles of individuals, and by the differences in these decisions and roles between women and men. We illustrate the results of these tax features on gender non-neutrality with several specific examples drawn largely from Scandinavian tax practices. We conclude that it is possible to make the income tax more gender neutral, so that a gender-neutral income tax is feasible. However, we also conclude that complete gender neutrality would come at the expense of other desired goals; that is, complete gender neutrality is at odds with all that we ask of the tax code, including targeting tax benefits at groups like women who have experienced significant historical inequities in their tax treatment, so that a completely gender-neutral income tax is not desirable because we wish to use the income tax to achieve many other worthwhile goals. Safeguards actively promoting the specific circumstances of women may be necessary, as such biased tax features could be used as a way of moving toward more gender-equal outcomes. In light of these arguments, we suggest that one alternative to promoting complete gender neutrality in the tax code could be to consider affirmative action in some circumstances as a way of fostering gender-neutral outcomes, rather than to aim for a gender-neutral tax code with inequitable outcomes induced by societal and cultural influences. Another option that has proven successful elsewhere could be to actively employ gender budgeting assessments when introducing new tax legislation and budgets. |
| Keywords: | Broad-based, low-rate taxation, comprehensive income, Haig Simons standard, optimal taxation, tax reform |
| JEL: | H2 H7 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tul:wpaper:2508 |
| By: | J. Sebastian Leguizamon (Western Kentucky University); Susane Leguizamon (Western Kentucky University); James Alm (Tulane University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we quantify the ways by which gender, race, and earnings differentials affect the magnitude of the "marriage penalty" or "marriage bonus" in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) using individual micro-level data from the Current Population Survey from 2010 to 2018. Our results show that on average Black couples experience a larger EITC marriage penalty (or a smaller EITC marriage bonus) than white couples. This differential is due mainly to gender differences across race in household income splits, in dependents, and in earnings levels. It is neither surprising nor accidental that these three factors are also the main determinants of the EITC benefit itself. |
| Keywords: | EITC, Marriage, taxable unit, marriage penalty and bonus, race |
| JEL: | H24 J12 J16 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tul:wpaper:2507 |