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on Gender |
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Issue of 2025–10–27
four papers chosen by Jan Sauermann, Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk Utvärdering |
| By: | Catherine C. Eckel (Texas A&M University); Lata Gangadharan (Monash University); Philip J. Grossman (Monash University); Miranda Lambert (Texas A&M University); Nina Xue (WU Vienna University of Economics and Business,) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the stereotype that women are more cooperative and less competitive, we investigate how the institutional environment impacts the gender leadership gap. An experiment tests leaders’ impact on earnings under competitive (“winner take all”) versus cooperative (equal earnings distribution) incentive schemes. All leaders enhance efficiency similarly, but a gender gap emerges in the competitive context where women receive lower evaluations for identical advice. This bias disappears in the cooperative context where female leaders are evaluated 50% higher, suggesting that congruence between the environment and gender stereotypes has important policy implications. Men are more willing to lead, regardless of context. |
| Keywords: | gender, leadership, institutional environment, performance evaluation, lab ex- periment |
| JEL: | C92 D91 J16 J71 M14 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2025-13 |
| By: | Hernán Bejarano (CIDE/Chapman University); Matías Busso (IDB); Juan Francisco Santos (IDB) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies trust, reciprocity, and bargaining using a large-scale online experiment in six Latin American countries. Participants were randomly assigned to play trust and ultimatum games under conditions that either disclosed or withheld the gender of their counterpart. On average, gender disclosure did not affect behavior. However, disaggregated results show systematic differences. Men displayed higher levels of trust and reciprocity, particularly when interacting with women, and offered larger shares to women in bargaining. Women, by contrast, reciprocated more when paired with men. These findings show how gendered interactions can influence economic behavior, even when counterpart information is conveyed minimally. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Reciprocity; Bargaining; Gender; Latin America |
| JEL: | C92 D91 J16 O54 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:375 |
| By: | Badalyan, Sona (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; CERGE-EI) |
| Abstract: | "This paper exploits a unique norm-shifting setting - a German pension reform that equalized retirement ages across genders - to examine how old-age employment propagates through workplace networks. The reform raised women’s earliest claiming age from 60 to 63 for cohorts born in 1952 onward. Using the universe of workgroups from social security records, I compare women whose peers were just above or below the reform cutoff. I find that women are more likely to remain employed at older ages when their peers do, with stronger effects in the regions of former West Germany, with its traditional gender norms. Gender-neutral pension reforms thus amplify their impact through peer influence, fostering regional convergence in late-career employment patterns." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
| Keywords: | IAB-Open-Access-Publikation |
| JEL: | D85 H55 J14 J16 J22 J26 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025–10–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabdpa:202513 |
| By: | Kawata, Keisuke (University of Tokyo); Komura, Mizuki (Kwansei Gakuin University) |
| Abstract: | This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and the related outcomes. Specifically, we analyze two aspects: First, we investigate the marriage patterns of only children, examining whether people choose mates in a positive or negative assortative manner regarding only-child status. We find that, along with being more likely to remain single, only children are more likely to marry another only child. Second, we measure the matching premium or penalty using the difference in partners’ socioeconomic status, measured by years of schooling, between only-child and non–only-child individuals. Our estimates show that among women who marry an only-child husband, only children are penalized, as their partners’ educational attainment is 0.63 years lower. Finally, we discuss the potential sources of this penalty along with our empirical findings. |
| Keywords: | gender, only children, marriage matching, machine learning |
| JEL: | J11 J12 J16 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18198 |