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on Discrete Choice Models |
| By: | Henrik Petri; Kai Wang |
| Abstract: | We study how advertised products (e.g., Top Picks, Recommended, Featured) affect consumer choice on digital platforms and retail interfaces by extending the Luce (1959) (or multinomial logit) model. A consumer either focuses on the advertised items or considers the full menu, then chooses among the considered alternatives according to the Luce/logit rule. We characterize this model and show that its underlying primitives are uniquely identified from choice data. We also study a managerially important advertisement-design problem, in which a platform or retailer chooses the advertised subset to maximize expected profit, and we derive implementable design rules. We then introduce a richer framework in which advertising can influence both attention and preference. For this more general model, we provide a characterization and show how choice data can be used to separate the attention effect from the preference effect. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.03504 |
| By: | Paramahansa Pramanik |
| Abstract: | We develop a continuous-time stochastic choice theory with endogenous preference evolution. Unlike dynamic random utility, observed behavior affects future preferences through the conditional distribution of latent preference states, generating endogenous distributional feedback. We show that this feedback has observable behavioral implications and characterize stochastic choice by a behavioral representation consisting of contemporaneous choice and continuation behavior. This representation is identified from stochastic choice, yields a rigidity result linking structural preference dynamics to observable behavior, and characterizes exactly when distribution dependent utility is behaviorally reducible to dynamic random utility. We further prove a behavioral impossibility theorem: stochastic choice arrays exhibiting behavioral distributional feedback admit no dynamic random utility representation. On the probabilistic side, we establish existence and weak uniqueness for the underlying conditional McKean-Vlasov system with conditional law feedback. The structure unifies endogenous information, latent preference dynamics, behavioral identification, and stochastic choice within a single continuous-time model. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.06152 |
| By: | Mameno, Kota; Sato, Masayuki; Shoji, Yasushi; KUBO, Takahiro (National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)) |
| Abstract: | Biodiversity credit schemes have gained attention as a mechanism for mobilizing private finance for biodiversity conservation. As primary suppliers of biodiversity outcomes in agricultural landscapes, farmers’ willingness to participate is critical to the success of these schemes. However, little is known about farmers' preferences for biodiversity credit designs, particularly regarding metrics used to certify biodiversity outcomes and the spatial scales at which biodiversity credits are implemented. To our knowledge, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence on how certification metrics and implementation scales influence farmers' preferences for voluntary biodiversity credit schemes. A discrete choice experiment with a latent class model were applied to examine Japanese farmers' preferences for alternative biodiversity credit schemes. The results showed substantial heterogeneity in farmers' willingness to participate in biodiversity credit schemes, with approximately half of the farmers belonging to a participation-averse group. In both groups, implementation scale was the primary determinant of participation decisions. Farmers preferred individual farmland scale implementation over coordinated participation. Certification metric exerted limited influence on participation decisions, suggesting that ecosystem-based credits can be implemented without substantially reducing farmers' willingness to participate. Additional bonuses increased participation among farmers already willing to participate, but had little effect on initially reluctant farmers . Membership analysis indicated that willingness to participate was positively associated with biodiversity policy awareness, biodiversity-friendly farming practices, pro-biodiversity attitudes, and expectations of branding-related benefits. Expanding voluntary biodiversity credit markets, therefore, requires not only financial compensation but also information provision, demonstration projects, and communication of potential market benefits. |
| Date: | 2026–08–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:43yg5_v1 |
| By: | Mohlin, Erik (Swedish Defense University); Rigos, Alexandros (University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We present a model of how an individual’s preference for a specific behaviour can evolve as an adaptation to her social environment. Our key assumptions are that the decision maker (DM) (i) is boundedly rational in her ability to process information and evaluate which actions yield the highest payoff and (ii) can develop a subjective preference for actions. A stronger preference for an action reduces the probability of not taking it when it is optimal (omission error), but it also increases the probability of taking the action when it is suboptimal (commission error). The optimally adapted preference strikes a balance between these errors and depends on the DM’s environment. DMs are typically better off (in objective terms) if they are endowed with subjective preferences that deviate from maximisation of expected objective payoff. Importantly, if DMs can evaluate actions perfectly, they do not develop such biases. The results extend in an intuitive manner to n-player, two-strategy supermodular games. Our framework can be used to interpret preferences for specific actions or strategies (e.g., conditional cooperation, truth-telling, or norm-following) as psychological and cultural consequences of material incentives and social organisation. |
| Keywords: | Preference evolution; Bounded rationality; Culture; Cooperation; Cognitive economics; Logit choice; Monotone comparative statics; Supermodular games |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D01 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–09–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2026_008 |
| By: | Claudio Schilter; Thea S. Zoellner |
| Abstract: | Many firms in tight labor markets recruit for highly gender-segregated occupations, leaving them, in effect, drawing from only half the potential labor pool. We study how firms can use fringe benefits to attract workers and influence occupational choice. Unlike occupation-specific recruiting strategies, fringe benefits can be added to any occupation; they are also easily tailored, implemented, and scaled. Using a personalized and incentivized discrete choice experiment, we present participants with job options that match their skills and work task preferences. Within each option, we vary salary, occupation, and fringe benefits that adolescents had classified as gender-neutral, male-typed, or female-typed. We find that fringe benefits are highly valued: their effect is around a third as large as having prior interest in the occupation. Neutral and stereotypical benefits in particular improve perceptions of the firm across multiple dimensions. Furthermore, we find substantial gender differences. Female-typed benefits deter male participants, whereas all other benefit-participant combinations have a positive effect. Female participants value benefits more when those benefits are paired with an atypical occupation, and we find suggestive evidence that this reflects benefits alleviating concerns about limited support in such roles. In addition, male-typed benefits can increase the attractiveness of gender-atypical occupations for female participants. Female participants who consider atypical occupations place relatively higher value on these benefits and tend to exhibit less traditionally feminine preferences. We also find suggestive evidence that anticipated social reactions, particularly from parents, accompany these choices. |
| Keywords: | occupational choice, fringe benefits, gender |
| JEL: | J20 J24 J28 J16 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:educat:0259 |