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on Discrete Choice Models |
| By: | Hugo Kruiniger |
| Abstract: | In this paper we first propose a root-n-consistent Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator for all the common parameters in the panel logit AR(p) model with strictly exogenous covariates and fixed effects. Our CML estimator (CMLE) converges in probability faster and is more easily computed than the kernel-weighted CMLE of Honor\'e and Kyriazidou (2000). Next, we propose a root-n-consistent CMLE for the coefficients of the exogenous covariates only. We also discuss new CMLEs for the panel logit AR(p) model without covariates. Finally, we propose CMLEs for multinomial dynamic panel logit models with and without covariates. All CMLEs are asymptotically normally distributed. |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2103.04973&r=all |
| By: | Yoshitsugu Kitazawa (Faculty of Economics, Kyushu Sangyo University) |
| Abstract: | This paper shows some Monte Carlo results of root-N consistent estimators for the dynamic fixed effects logit model with neither explanatory variables nor time dummies |
| Keywords: | Keywords: dynamic fixed effects logit model with neither explanatory variables nor time dummies ; root-N consistent GMM estimators; Monte Carlo |
| JEL: | C23 C25 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyu:dpaper:82&r=all |
| By: | Jofre-Bonet, M.; Kamara, J.; Mesnard, A. |
| Abstract: | Most governments cannot provide the necessary health services required for their citizens either as a result of scarcity of resources or corruption (Mostert et al., 2012). Lack of credibility and trust in fund managers has been highlighted as one of the reasons why people do not join health insurance schemes in developing countries, especially in Africa (Escobar et al., 2010). This work investigates the impact of corruption on household’s willingness to participate and pay for health insurance in the presence of corruption. To do so, we use (1) a binary logit model to study the relationship between household characteristics and experienced corruption; (2) an ordered probit model to explore how household characteristics are associated to the intensity of corruption perceived; and (3) a Mixed Logit model to estimate the association of corruption and participation and willingness to pay for a health insurance scheme. We find that corruption decreases the willingness to participate and pay for a public Health Insurance Scheme (HIS). Comparing experienced and perceived corruption, we observe that experienced corruption affects less WTP for a HIS than perceived corruption. Households experiencing corruption, are willing to pay more for a public HIS than those that perceive high levels of corruption. The implications of our findings are in line with the literature and stress the perverse spillover effects of corruption. Not only corruption hinders the effectiveness of health care systems and thus health outcomes, but it also undermines the willingness to pay for them and thus imperils the sustainability of health care systems in the countries that are most in need of them. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cty:dpaper:21/01&r=all |
| By: | Arthur Lewbel (Boston College); Jin Yan (Chinese University of Hong Kong); Yu Zhou (School of Economics, Fudan University) |
| Abstract: | We provide a new method to point identify and estimate cross-sectional multinomial choice models, using conditional error symmetry. Our model nests common random coefficient specifications (without having to specify which regressors have random coefficients), and more generally allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity on most regressors, unknown error distribution, and does not require a "large support" "(such as identification at infinity) assumption. We propose an estimator that minimizes the squared di§erences of the estimated error density at pairs of symmetric points about the origin. Our estimator is root N consistent and asymptotically normal, making statistical inference straightforward. |
| Keywords: | Central Symmetry, Exclusion Restriction, Multinomial Discrete Choice |
| JEL: | C14 C35 |
| Date: | 2021–02–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:1028&r=all |
| By: | Victor Champonnois (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - AgroParisTech - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Katrin Erdlenbruch (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | This article analyses the scope for individual adaptation to flood risk in the South of France. We collected data concerning the implementation of individual adaptation measures and the willingness to pay for individual and collective measures in a survey of 418 respondents living in two flood-prone areas. First, we observed the current level of adaptation and compared the willingness to pay for individual versus collective measures. We then analysed the drivers of implementation and of willingness to pay. We then provide a costbenefit analysis of individual adaptation. The survey results show that, despite willingness to pay for reduced risk, few adaptation measures have been implemented. Perceptions of hazards and of damage are important drivers but have different influences: the first favours the implementation of measures; the second increases willingness to pay for measures. Finally, our cost-benefit analysis suggests that completely dry proofing a house up to a height of one metre may not be economically viable. This calls for the promotion of cheaper and more cost-efficient measures. |
| Keywords: | contingent valuation,cost-benefit analysis,damage mitigation,dichotomous choice,flood,France,individual adaptation,willingness to pay |
| Date: | 2021–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03155331&r=all |
| By: | Wellmann, Nicolas; Czarnowske, Daniel |
| Abstract: | This paper quantifies the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction of automobile traffic. By using a new structural approach in a hedonic framework by Bishop and Timmins 2019 we are able to avoid common issues in hedonic studies using instrumental variables. Our analysis is based on data from nine large cities in Germany between 2016 and 2019 and includes 533,402 detailed observations at the apartment level as well as for various points of interest. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to conduct this analysis for Germany. We estimate that the average willingness to pay for a reduction of traffic by city and per year ranges between €30.3-59.2 for a 10% reduction, €93.8-158.3 for a 20% reduction and €190.6-252 for a 30% reduction. The highest willingness to pay for a reduction of traffic is observed in Frankfurt am Main, the lowest in Leipzig. Further, we compute the expected gains for a reduction of traffic at the city level. In addition to the willingness to pay for a reduction of traffic, this considers the composition of the road network as well as for the number of households. Accordingly, these expected gains amount to €163,970-1,019,454€ for a 10% reduction, €484,023-3,261,837 for a 20% reduction, and €1,018,240-6,727,148 for a 30% reduction. The highest expected gains for a reduction of traffic is observed in Munich, the lowest in Leipzig |
| Keywords: | willingness to pay,traffic,air pollution,hedonic price models,rent prices,environmental policy |
| JEL: | O18 Q51 R48 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:361&r=all |
| By: | David Lowing (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We consider multi-choice cooperative games with a permission tree structure. Multi-choice games are a generalization of a cooperative transferable utility games in which each player has several activity levels. In addition, a permission tree structure models a situation in which a player needs permission from another player to cooperate. In this framework, the influence of a permission structure on the possibility of cooperation may have several interpretations depending on the context. In this paper, we investigate several of these interpretations and introduce for each of them a new allocation rule that we axiomatically characterize. |
| Keywords: | Multi-choice games,Multi-choice Permission value,Permission (tree) structures Multi-choice games,Permission (tree) structures |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03121514&r=all |