|
on Accounting and Auditing |
|
Issue of 2020‒07‒20
nine papers chosen by |
| By: | Klimanov, Vladimir (Климанов, Владимир) (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration); Kazakova, Sofia (Казакова, Софья) (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration); Mikhailova, Anna (Михайлова, Анна) (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration); Yagovkina, Vita (Яговкина, Вита) (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration) |
| Abstract: | The papers determines the role of state financial control in the socio-economic development of the state, as well as identifies the main directions of the transformation of this institution at the present stage; identifies the main problems of the functioning of the system of bodies of state financial control and ways to solve them; analyzes of the practice of organizing the functioning of state audit bodies in countries of the world, and gives recommendations for the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation. Directions for improving the activities of state financial control bodies in the Russian Federation have been worked out. |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rnp:wpaper:032046&r=all |
| By: | European Commission |
| Abstract: | This report contains a detailed statistical and economic analysis of the tax systems of the Member States of the European Union, plus Iceland and Norway, which are Members of the European Economic Area. The data are presented within a unified statistical framework (the ESA2010 harmonised system of national and regional accounts), which makes it possible to assess the heterogeneous national tax systems on a fully comparable basis. |
| Keywords: | European Union, taxation |
| JEL: | H23 H24 H25 H27 H71 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tax:taxtre:2019&r=all |
| By: | Bischof, Jannis; Laux, Christian; Leuz, Christian |
| Abstract: | This paper examines banks' disclosures and loss recognition in the financial crisis and identifies several core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. Our analysis suggests that, going into the financial crisis, banks' disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks' exposures had arisen in markets. Similarly, the recognition of loan losses was relatively slow and delayed relative to prevailing market expectations. Among the possible explanations for this evidence, our analysis suggests that banks' reporting incentives played a key role, which has important implications for bank supervision and the new expected loss model for loan accounting. We also provide evidence that shielding regulatory capital from accounting losses through prudential filters can dampen banks' incentives for corrective actions. Overall, our analysis reveals several important challenges if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability. |
| Keywords: | Banks,Financial crisis,Financial stability,Disclosure,Loan loss accounting,Expected credit losses,Incurred loss model,Prudential filter,Fair valueaccounting |
| JEL: | G21 G22 G28 G32 G38 K22 M41 M42 M48 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:283&r=all |
| By: | Kim, Hyonok; Fukukawa, Hironori; Routledge, James |
| Abstract: | This paper compares management and auditor going concern risk disclosures. It exploits a unique regulatory change in Japan that impacted the going concern risk disclosure practice. Prior to 2009, managers were directed to make financial statement note disclosures if they considered there was substantial doubt about the going concern status. The note disclosures were required to be audited. After 2009, substantial doubt disclosures by management are not audited and can be considered voluntary. We test whether going concern risk disclosure is enhanced by requiring managers rather than auditors to make the disclosure voluntarily. Analysis shows increased overall levels of going concern risk disclosure after the 2009 regulatory change, which is substantially attributable to voluntary disclosure in the Business Risk section of annual reports. The results are of interest to regulators because they suggest that it is appropriate for managers to be assigned primary responsibility for going concern risk disclosure. |
| Keywords: | going concern, business risk disclosure, voluntary disclosure |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hmicwp:234&r=all |
| By: | Nora Paulus (Department of Economics and Management, Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | On July 16th 2016 the Economic and Financial Council of the European Union adopted the Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive (ATAD). The proposed controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rule in the ATAD requires a minimum tax rate in the host country of a multinational's controlled foreign subsidiary in order to avoid the reattribution of the subsidiary's income to the country of its parent company. The Directive allows member states to remain free to set the CFC threshold autonomously by laying down a minimum standard. Member states can thus either opt for a loose CFC rule by setting the minimum required control threshold (i.e. 50% of the country's own corporate income tax rate) or impose a tight CFC rule by applying a higher threshold. Against this background, the present paper analyzes the effect of CFC rules on tax competition for foreign direct investments. It appears that, although CFC rules are effective in curbing offshore profit shifting, they can induce non-havens to compete aggressively for mobile capital. In this context, CFC rules can exacerbate capital outflows from the large to the small country to a larger extent than in standard models of tax competition. Moreover, the paper highlights that governments choose between two extreme options when deciding on their CFC rule. Either they opt for the lowest or the highest possible control threshold. |
| Keywords: | Tax Competition, Controlled-Foreign-Company Rules. |
| JEL: | F21 H21 H26 H87 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:20-17&r=all |
| By: | European Commission |
| Abstract: | This report presents the main indicators used by the European Commission to analyse tax policies in the context of the European Semester and substantiates the tax policy priorities of the Commission’s Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy. It also includes an overview of recent tax reforms at both EU and Member State level. |
| Keywords: | European Union, taxation |
| JEL: | H23 H24 H25 H27 H71 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tax:taxsur:2020&r=all |
| By: | Cailin Slattery (Columbia Business School); Owen Zidar (Princeton University and NBER) |
| Abstract: | This essay describes and evaluates state and local business tax incentives in the United States. In 2014, states spent between $5 and $216 per capita on incentives for firms in the form of firm-specific subsidies and general tax credits, which mostly target investment, job creation, and research and development. Collectively, these incentives amounted to nearly 40% of state corporate tax revenues for the typical state, but some states' incentive spending exceeded their corporate tax revenues. States with higher per capita incentives tend to have higher state corporate tax rates. Recipients of firm-specific incentives are usually large establishments in manufacturing, technology, and high-skilled service industries, and the average discretionary subsidy is $178M for 1,500 promised jobs. Firms tend to accept subsidy deals from places that are richer, larger, and more urban than the average county, and poor places provide larger incentives and spend more per job. Comparing "winning" and runner-up locations for each deal in a bigger and more recent sample than in prior work, we find that average employment within the 3-digit industry of the deal increases by roughly 1,500 jobs. While we find some evidence of direct employment gains from attracting a firm, we do not find strong evidence that firm-specific tax incentives increase broader economic growth at the state and local level. Although these incentives are often intended to attract and retain high-spillover firms, the evidence on spillovers and productivity effects of incentives appears mixed. As subsidy-giving has become more prevalent, subsidies are no longer as closely tied to firm investment. If subsidy deals do not lead to high spillovers, justifying these incentives requires substantial equity gains, which are also unclear empirically. |
| JEL: | H20 H25 H71 R11 R30 R50 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:261&r=all |
| By: | Matthew Smith (U.S. Treasury Department); Owen Zidar (Princeton University and NBER); Eric Zwick (University of Chicago and NBER) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States.We build on the capitalization approach in Saez and Zucman (2016) while accounting for heterogeneity within asset classes when mapping income flows to wealth. Our approach reduces bias in wealth estimates because wealth and rates of return are cor-related. We find that the top 0.1% share of wealth increased from 7% to 14% from1978 to 2016. While this rise is half as large as prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as the bottom 90%. However, the“P90-99†class holds more wealth than either group after accounting for heterogeneity.Private business and public equity wealth are the primary sources of wealth at the top, and pension and housing wealth account for almost all wealth of the bottom 90%. Our approach substantially reduces estimates of mechanical wealth tax revenue and top capital income in distributional national accounts, which depend on well-measured estimates of top wealth. From 1980 to 2014, capital income accounts for 2.4 out of 8.1percentage points of the rise of the top 1% income share. |
| JEL: | D31 H22 H23 H24 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:264&r=all |
| By: | Yvon Pesqueux (LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM]) |
| Abstract: | Ce texte est organisé de la manière suivante. Après une introduction qui positionne la question des références, il aborde successivement : les outils de base et les méthodes de la gestion de la qualité ; les référents de la gestion de la qualité (la relation « client-fournisseur », la relation « client-fournisseur ») ; la norme ISO 9001 : 2015 (norme ISO 9001 et management de la qualité, norme ISO 9001 et management de la qualité, les « principes » de la norme, la certification ISO 9001, Conclusion critique) ; les référentiels de la qualité autres que l'ISO 9001 (la logique de l'EFQM, les « Prix qualité », la méthode Six-Sigma, des référentiels concurrents, HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point) ou « Analyse des dangers, points critiques pour leur maîtrise », le référentiel ISO 14 001 et autres…) ; un focus sur le « paquet ISO » (système de management environnemental : ISO 14001 (version 2015), Responsabilité sociétale des entreprises : ISO 26000 : 2010, Management des risques-ISO 31000 (version 2018), Systèmes de gestion de la santé et de la sécurité au travail-ISO 45001 (version 2018), Management de l'énergie-ISO 50001 (version 2018), l'ISO 19011 : 2018-Lignes directrices pour l'audit des systèmes de management) ; management par la qualité totale (TQM) ou la mise en relation des visions de la direction avec les pratiques managériales (le TQM comme perspective culturaliste, le passage de la norme ISO 9001 au TQM). |
| Date: | 2020–05–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02616441&r=all |