|
on Accounting and Auditing |
|
Issue of 2016‒11‒20
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Engelbert Stockhammer (Kingston University); collin constantine; Severin Reissl |
| Abstract: | The paper proposes a post-Keynesian analysis of the Eurozone crisis and contrasts interpretations inspired by New Keynesian, New Classical, and Marxist theories. The origin of the crisis is the emergence of a debt-driven and an export-driven growth model, which resulted in a rapid increase in private debt ratios and current account imbalances. The reason the crisis escalated in southern Europe, but not in other parts of the world, lies in the unique dysfunctional economic policy regime of the Euro area. European fiscal rules and the Troika impose fiscal austerity on countries in crisis and the separation of fiscal and monetary spaces has made countries vulnerable to sovereign debt crises and forced them to comply. We analyse the role different paradigms attribute to current account imbalances, fiscal policy and monetary policy. Remarkably, opposing views on the relative importance of cost and demand developments in explaining current account imbalances can be found in both heterodox and orthodox economics. Regarding the assessment of fiscal and monetary policy there is a clearer polarisation, with heterodox analysis regarding austerity as unhelpful and large parts of orthodox economics endorsing it. We conclude that there is a weak mapping between post-Keynesian, New Classical, New Keynesian and Marxist theories and different economic policy strategies for the Euro area, which we label Keynesian New Deal, European Orthodoxy, Moderate Reform and Progressive Exit respectively. |
| Keywords: | Euro crisis, European economic policy, sovereign debt crisis, current account balance, fiscal policy, quantitative easing |
| JEL: | B00 E00 E50 E63 F53 G01 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pke:wpaper:pkwp1617&r=acc |
| By: | Luigi Mittone; Fabrizio Panebianco; Alessandro Santoro |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we run a laboratory experiment where the information set is relatively rich, and, in particular, it includes audits on other taxpayers. At the same time, the implementation of the Bayesian updating process for the subjective probability to be audited is fairly simple. By doing so, we are able to elicit a range of consistent but heterogeneous probability beliefs and to distinguish between Bayesian and non-Bayesian subjects. We obtain two major results concerning Bayesian subjects. First, they exhibit strong and robust short-run BoCE. Second, they are seemingly not affected by audits on other taxpayers in their compliance decision. These results are robust to different definitions of Bayesianity and to different specifications. They confl ict with the evidence that Bayesian agents do perceive correctly the chance to be audited. In turn, this suggests that existing explanations of the BoCE are not entirely satisfactory and that alternative theories, possibly based on the Duality approach, are needed. KEYWORDS: Bomb-crater effect, Bayesian Updating, Behavioral Duality. JEL CODES: C91,D81,H26 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:583&r=acc |
| By: | Haselmann, Rainer; Wahrenburg, Mark |
| Abstract: | We provide an assessment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposal to restrict the internal ratings-based approach on bank risk and to introduce risk-weighted asset floors. If well enforced, risk-sensitive capital regulation results in a more efficient credit allocation compared to the standard approach. Thus, the internal ratings-based approach should be maintained. Further, the use of internal ratings-based output floors potentially results in unintended negative side effects. Input floors are likely a valuable tool to achieve risk-weighted assets comparability. Finally, the proposed measures have a potential detrimental impact for European banks as compared to others. |
| Keywords: | internal rating models,floors,banking regulation,BCBS |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewh:43&r=acc |
| By: | Pedro Teles (Banco de Portugal, Universidade Catolica); Juan Nicolini (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis) |
| Abstract: | Should capital income taxes be zero in the long run, as argued by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)? Or should instead capital be heavily taxed as suggested by Straub and Werning (2015)? We revisit the Ramsey literature on the optimal taxation of capital and make again the case for a low, possibly zero, tax on capital income. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed016:1364&r=acc |