nep-ure New Economics Papers
on Urban and Real Estate Economics
Issue of 2007‒05‒04
five papers chosen by
Steve Ross
University of Connecticut

  1. Impact of Sports Arenas on Land Values: Evidence from Berlin By Gabriel Ahlfeldt; Wolfgang Maennig
  2. Da integração territorial às aglomerações econômicas: a organização espacial e as políticas regionais nos Estados Unidos (1800-2000) By Ricardo Machado Ruiz
  3. A smart market for passenger road transport (SMPRT) congestion: an application of computational mechanism design By Sheri Markose; Amadeo Alentorn; Deddy Koesrindartoto; Peter Allen; Phil Blythe; Sergio Grosso
  4. NFL Governance and the Fate of the New Orleans Saints: Some Observations By Robert Baade; Victor Matheson
  5. Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks By Alan Kirman; Sheri Markose; Simone Giasante; Paolo Pin

  1. By: Gabriel Ahlfeldt (University of Hamburg); Wolfgang Maennig (University of Hamburg)
    Abstract: This paper develops a hedonic price model explaining standard land values in Berlin. The model assesses the impact of three multifunctional sports arenas situated in Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg which were designed to improve the attractiveness of their formerly deprived neighbourhoods. Empirical results confirm expectations about the impact of various attributes on land values. Sports arenas have significant positive impacts within a radius of about 3000 meters. The patterns of impact vary, indicating that the effective impact depends on how planning authorities address potential countervailing negative externalities.
    Keywords: Stadium Impact, Land Gradient, Hedonic Regression, Spatial Autocorrelation, Berlin
    JEL: L83 R31 R53 R5
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spe:wpaper:0703&r=ure
  2. By: Ricardo Machado Ruiz (Cedeplar-UFMG)
    Abstract: The paper summarizes and analyses the spatial organizations of US and their regional development policies. The first part describe the evolution of the US economy during the period 1800-2000, and the second part presents the regional policies and agencies that shape the regional development. The US regional policy was split into three periods. In the first period the regional policy was fully connected to the national development strategy. In the second period the regional policy turned to the regions that did not developed by their own: the so-called “regional problems”. In the third period, the regional policies showed a clear decline, they became more local and social-aid geared, and less structuralist or systemic.
    Keywords: US; industrial belt; TVA; regional policy; Appalachia
    JEL: R58 R11 O14 O18 O25
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdp:texdis:td305&r=ure
  3. By: Sheri Markose; Amadeo Alentorn; Deddy Koesrindartoto; Peter Allen; Phil Blythe; Sergio Grosso
    Abstract: To control and price negative externalities in passenger road transport, we develop an innovative and integrated computational agent based economics (ACE) model to simulate a market oriented "cap" and trade system. (i) First, there is a computational assessment of a digitized road network model of the real world congestion hot spot to determine the "cap" of the system in terms of vehicle volumes at which traffic efficiency deteriorates and the environmental externalities take off exponentially. (ii) Road users submit bids with the market clearing price at the fixed "cap" supply of travel slots in a given time slice (peak hour) being determined by an electronic sealed bid uniform price Dutch auction. (iii) Cross-sectional demand data on car users who traverse the cordon area is used to model and calibrate the heterogeneous bid submission behaviour in order to construct the inverse demand function and demand elasticities. (iv) The willingness to pay approach with heterogeneous value of time is contrasted with the generalized cost approach to pricing congestion with homogeneous value of travel time.
    Date: 2007–04–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:630&r=ure
  4. By: Robert Baade (Department of Economics and Business, Lake Forest College); Victor Matheson (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)
    Abstract: Prior to 2005, New Orleans had struggled to retain its NFL franchise. The Saints remained in the city, despite an outdated stadium and small media market, only through generous direct public subsidies to the team. Paradoxically, the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in September 2005 actually improved the short-term viability of the franchise by spurring an outpouring of local support for the team and by making relocation of the Saints politically untenable for the league. The long-term outlook for the team, however, appears grim. Already a small market, New Orleans’ population and business community has declined considerably due to Katrina. The NFL’s G-3 loan program for stadium construction is tapped out. Finally, the financial success of other NFL franchises has both raised the cost of fielding a competitive team and increased the value of the Saints as a target of relocation.
    Keywords: sports, NFL Governance, New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina, football
    JEL: L83
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spe:wpaper:0709&r=ure
  5. By: Alan Kirman; Sheri Markose; Simone Giasante; Paolo Pin
    Abstract: We study the formation of social networks that are based on local interaction and simple rule following. Agents evaluate the profitability of link formation on the basis of the Myerson-Shapley principle that payoffs come from the marginal contribution they make to coalitions. The NP-hard problem associated with the Myerson-Shapley value is replaced by a boundedly rational 'spatially' myopic process. Agents consider payoffs from direct links with their neighbours (level 1) which can include indirect payoffs from neighbours' neighbours (level 2) and up to M-levels that are far from global. Agents dynamically break away from the neighbour to whom they make the least marginal contribution. Computational experiments show that when this self-interested process of link formation operates at level 2 neighbourhoods, agents self-organize into stable and efficient network structures that manifest reciprocity, equity and segregation reminiscent of hunter gather groups. A large literature alleges that this is incompatible with self-interested behaviour and market oriented marginality principle in the allocation of value. We conclude that it is not this valuation principle that needs to be altered to obtain segregated social networks as opposed to global components, but whether it operates at level 1 or level 2 of social neighbourhoods. Remarkably, all M>2 neighbourhood calculations for payoffs leave the efficient network structures identical to the case when M=2.
    Date: 2007–04–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:629&r=ure

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