nep-ure New Economics Papers
on Urban and Real Estate Economics
Issue of 2005‒08‒03
two papers chosen by
Steve Ross
University of Connecticut

  1. Beggar thy neighbor? the in-state vs. out-of-state impact of state R&D tax credits By Daniel J. Wilson
  2. Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants By Lars P. Feld; Christoph A. Schaltegger

  1. By: Daniel J. Wilson
    Abstract: In this paper, I exploit the cross-sectional and time-series variation in R&D tax credits, and in turn the user cost of R&D, available from U.S. states between 1981-2002 to estimate the elasticity of private R&D with respect to both the within-state (internal) user cost and the out-of-state (external) user cost. To faciliate comparisons to previous studies of the R&D cost elasticity, I first estimate an R&D cost elasticity omitting external R&D costs; the estimated elasticity is negative, above unity (in absolute value), and statistically significant—a finding quite similar to that found by previous studies based on alternative data. Unlike previous studies, however, I then add the external R&D user cost to the regressions. I find the external-cost elasticity is positive and significant, raising concerns about whether having state-level R&D tax credits on top of federal credits is socially desirable. More importantly, I find the aggregate R&D price elasticity—the difference between the internal- and external-cost elasticities—is far smaller than previously estimated. In fact, the preferred specification yields a zero aggregate elasticity, suggesting a zero-sum game among states and raising questions about the efficacy of R&D tax credits more broadly.
    Keywords: Taxation ; Research and development
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2005-08&r=ure
  2. By: Lars P. Feld; Christoph A. Schaltegger
    Abstract: Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referen-dum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of state interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.
    Keywords: Budget Referendums; Intergovernmental Grants; Interest Group Influence
    JEL: D7 D72 H77
    Date: 2005–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2005-21&r=ure

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