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on Utility Models and Prospect Theory |
| By: | Philippe De Donder; Mathieu Lefebvre; Marie-Louise Leroux; Quitterie Roquebert |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how marginal utility varies with health status (i.e. health-state dependence) while allowing this relationship to differ across income levels. Building on the existing literature, we develop a framework that quantifies the income adjustments necessary to maintain individuals’ wellbeing when they become disabled. Using SHARE data, we empirically estimate how health affects the marginal utility of consumption across the income distribution for older adults in Europe. Our results show that health-state dependence is negative among low-income individuals, indicating that their marginal utility of consumption declines when their health worsens. In contrast, at the very top of the income distribution, health-state dependence is positive, implying that marginal utility of consumption rises as health deteriorates. |
| Keywords: | health-state dependence, marginal utility of consumption, income heterogeneity, SHARE survey |
| JEL: | D12 I1 J14 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13096 |
| By: | Ayush Gupta |
| Abstract: | This paper studies decision problems where the decision maker’s choice of action affects the probability distribution of a payoff relevant random variable. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an expected utility maximizing action in such settings. The main requirement is a mild continuity condition on the family of possible distributions. We also show that this condition is a minimal requirement. Our result does not require common assumptions such as the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) or the convexity of distribution functions condition (CDFC). It can therefore be used to prove the existence of an optimal action in many settings where existing results do not apply, including an important class of problems where the support of the random variable depends on the decision maker’s choice and the density functions are not pointwise continuous. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous uncertainty; u lity maximiza on; existence theorem |
| JEL: | D8 C6 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_789 |
| By: | Riccardo Formenti |
| Abstract: | We study the steady states of games played recurrently within large anonymous populations of players who receive partial ex-post feedback about the play of their opponents. Departing from the classical Bayesian account, players do not trust their conjectures as a correct description of the strategic environment but consider them as approximations of a reality that is only partially modeled and partially observed. We introduce games with feedback and uncertainty attitudes, in which the normal-form structure is enriched with a profile of feedback functions and, for each player, a preference functional that encodes aversion to misspecification and to ambiguity. The induced misspecification sensitive criterion contains the variational, maxmin, and smooth-ambiguity evaluations as special cases and collapses to expected utility when beliefs are unambiguous and the player is neutral to misspecification. The appropriate steady-state notion for such games is the Self-Confirming Equilibrium under Model Misspecification (SCEM), which requires each player to best respond to a set of structured conjectures that the feedback generated by equilibrium play cannot falsify. In contrast with the classical theory and with its ambiguity-averse extensions, mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria need not be self-confirming. We therefore develop a companion notion of Robust Nash Equilibrium (R-NE), in which every supported action remains optimal under a variational evaluation. Robust Nash equilibria refine SCEM, exist whenever the statistical distances are continuous, thereby delivering existence of SCEM, and coincide with the latter under fully informative feedback. Under observationally consistent divergences and observable payoffs, R-NE and SCEM reduce, respectively, to Nash equilibrium and Self-Confirming Equilibrium under Ambiguity (SCEA), which generalizes smooth self-confirming equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.35692 |
| By: | Moira Gidseg (College of the Holy Cross) |
| Abstract: | In this study, I investigate whether the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of existing distributional preference models can be improved by appending a "discretion" term which captures the intrinsic value of choosing for others (i.e., valuing control over others as distinct from caring about their outcomes). I propose a specific functional form for the discretion term that distinguishes between positive discretion (options to increase another’s payoff) and negative discretion (options to decrease it), with diminishing marginal utility. I append this term to four distributional preference models: inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), quasi-maximin (Charness & Rabin, 2002), constant elasticity of substitution (Andreoni & Miller, 2002), and bliss point (Gidseg, 2026). I estimate individual-level parameters using an incentivized experiment with 105 subjects playing a Power Game, in which subjects spend their own earnings to gain control over a partner’s payoff. I then assess predictive accuracy on non-estimation data using the root mean squared error. I find that the discretion term improves spending prediction accuracy for approximately 18–23% of subjects across all four distribution models. Importantly, the discretion term rarely worsens prediction (1–4% of subjects). The estimated discretion parameters show significant heterogeneity across individuals but are not significantly correlated with measured personal characteristics. These findings suggest that incorporating the intrinsic value of decision rights over others into utility models can meaningfully improve 'economists' ability to predict behavior in social contexts. |
| JEL: | C72 D64 C91 H41 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hcx:wpaper:2602 |
| By: | Karl-Friedrich Israel (EGEI - Éthique et Gouvernance de l’Entreprise et des Institutions - UCO - Université Catholique de l'Ouest, COGI - Comportements, Organisations et Gouvernance des Institutions - UCO - Université Catholique de l'Ouest) |
| Abstract: | Austrian price theory is riddled with inconsistencies surrounding the neoclassical income eFect and GiFen behavior. It has sometimes been argued that neither the income eFect nor GiFen behavior exist. This paper first argues that GiFen behavior is possible and can perfectly well be explained within the framework of Austrian price theory in the tradition of Mses. Moreover, it shows that income eFects are real. They are merely an outgrowth of the law of diminishing marginal utility applied to money. The paper also outlines the expenditure approach to income and substitution eFects as an alternative conceptualization that does not require any reference to quantifiable and measurable notions of utility, or an unambiguous and objective notion of real income. |
| Keywords: | Price theory, Giffen behavior, Income effect, Substitution effect |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04905506 |
| By: | Hannah H. Chen (Department of Finance, National Central University); Cary Deck (Department of Economics, University of Alabama & Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Rachel J. Huang (Department of Finance, National Central University); Larry Y. Tzeng (Department of Finance, National Taiwan University); Lin Zhao (School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics) |
| Abstract: | Economic decisions often involve uncertainty in both wealth and time. We introduce an axiom requiring the trade-of between wealth and time to remain invariant across both domains. Together with standard axioms, it characterizes Expected Additive Time-Wealth Utility (EATWU). We provide an alternative characterization based on consistency in higher-order risk preferences and extend risk apportionment to decisions involving wealth, time, and both. Our model predicts consistent risk allocations across these domains within each order. A laboratory experiment examining second-, third-, and fourth-order risk preferences fnds systematic relationships across domains that are broadly consistent with the model’s predictions. |
| Keywords: | Time and Wealth, Cross-Domain Stationarity, Higher-Order Risk Preferences, Risk Apportionment, Experimental Economics |
| JEL: | C9 D8 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:26-13 |
| By: | Wienand, Tim (Erasmus University); Magdalou, Brice (University of Montpellier); Nock, Richard (Google Research); Hufe, Paul (University of Bristol) |
| Abstract: | We develop a framework to evaluate income distributions from the perspective of an opportunity-egalitarian social planner. Through an original axiomatic route that bridges normative economics and decision theory under ambiguity, we characterize a class of social welfare functions governed by a single parameter capturing the planner's aversion to inequality of opportunity. We obtain a 'mean-divergence' representation that separates economic efficiency from a penalty for inequality of opportunity, as well as a stochastic dominance criterion for robust welfare comparisons. We apply these theoretical results to analyze opportunity-sensitive social welfare in the United States across birth cohorts and regions. Mapping standard estimates of intergenerational mobility into our framework, we show that welfare rankings vary substantially with the assumed degree of inequality-of-opportunity aversion. We transparently gauge the extent of this normative ambiguity by providing bounds on the ranking of birth cohorts and regions, respectively. |
| Keywords: | inequality of opportunity, intergenerational mobility, welfarism, utilitarianism, social welfare measurement |
| JEL: | D31 D63 I31 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18986 |
| By: | Kevin Dano; Bryan S. Graham; Yassine Sbai Sassi |
| Abstract: | In social and economic networks linked agents often share connections in common. There are two competing explanations for this phenomenon. First, agents may have a structural taste for transitive links – the returns to linking may be higher if two agents share a common connection. Second, agents may assortatively match on unobserved attributes, a process called homophily. We study parameter identifiability in a simple model of dynamic network formation with both effects. Agents form, maintain, and dissolve links over time to maximize utility. The return to linking may be higher if agents share connections in common. A pair-specific utility component allows for arbitrary homophily on time-invariant agent attributes. We derive conditions under which it is possible to detect the presence of a taste for transitivity in the presence of assortative matching on unobservables. We leave the joint distribution of the initial network and the pair-specific utility component, both high dimensional nuisance parameters, unrestricted. Our identification result is constructive, suggesting an analog estimator, whose finite and (single) large network properties we characterize. We show, via examples, the delicacy of information accumulation in the single (large) network setting. |
| Date: | 2026–10–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:azt:cemmap:18/26 |
| By: | Moira Gidseg (College of the Holy Cross) |
| Abstract: | In this study, I propose a new model of distributional preferences, the “Bliss Point†model. According to this model, each person has a preferred payoff for others which is a linear function of his own payoff, and he suffers a utility penalty proportional to the distance between this bliss point for his co-players and the actual payoffs. To evaluate the empirical relevance of this model, I create an experiment in which subjects play several games which affect both their own payoff and that of an anonymous partner. I used their behavior to estimate individual-level parameters of my model as well as three others: inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), quasi-maximin (Charness & Rabin, 2002), and constant elasticity of substitution (Andreoni & Miller, 2002). I then compare the models’ ability to predict behavior out-ofsample. I find that the Bliss Point model generally predicts about as well as the other models. Further, it is a better predictor than the other models for up to 7% of subjects, depending on the task. This suggests that the Bliss Point model is a useful alternative to existing models. |
| JEL: | C72 D64 C91 H41 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hcx:wpaper:2601 |
| By: | Adi Tarabeih |
| Abstract: | Prospect theory splits risky choice into three parts: loss aversion, measured by the relative weight of losses to gains, $\lambda$ (e.g., $\lambda = 2$ implies that losses weigh twice as much as gains), diminishing sensitivity to the size of outcomes (i.e., the curvature and linearity of the value function), and the nonlinear weighting of probabilities. I examined whether Large Language Models (LLMs) display the same properties as people by meta-analyzing 102 fitted estimates from 11 studies covering 32 language models. The three components emerge differently. Loss aversion is modest: the pooled $\lambda$ is 1.26 (95% CI 1.06 to 1.46), far below the strongest human meta-analytic estimate ($\lambda = 1.96$) and compatible with more conservative ones (1.07 and 1.31). Matched by design, LLMs are compatible with people when gains and losses are symmetric ($\lambda = 1.15$ against 1.07), but well below them when losses are smaller than gains (1.46 against 2.3), where human loss aversion is strongest. Value functions are close to linear rather than concave under the Tversky-Kahneman method (1.01, against a human value of 0.67), but more concave than in people under the Tanaka method (0.52, against 0.67), so diminishing sensitivity depends on how it is measured. Probability weighting shows a human-like inverse S shape ($\gamma = 0.81$ under Tversky-Kahneman and 0.84 under the Tanaka method), though on few studies. In sum, LLMs show little loss aversion and little diminishing sensitivity, but retain human-like probability distortion, yet these generalizations shift when looking at specific model families and fitting methods. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.33103 |
| By: | Matías Vernengo (Bucknell University) |
| Abstract: | This paper critically analyzes Geoffrey Hodgson’s definition of heterodox economics as the refutation of the orthodox view that emphasizes utility maximization as its main theoretical core, and his view that it is the fragmentation of heterodox economics that explains its subsidiary role within the profession. Hodgson’s views led to a series of responses, that criticize his definition, but also present significant problems of their own. The limitations of Hodgson and his critics’ views are contrasted with an alternative definition that emphasizes the importance of conflictive distribution and the principle of effective demand in the long run. The idea of a broad tent, from a sociological point of view, does not preclude the need for a clear analytical definition of heterodoxy. The broad tent should be seen as part of a strategy of survival. |
| Keywords: | Economic Methodology; Heterodox Economics |
| JEL: | B4 B5 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:sraffa:023857 |
| By: | John K. -H. Quah; Rui Tang |
| Abstract: | Convexity of preferences is a pervasive assumption in economic analysis, so it is important to understand how this property is revealed in data. In this paper, we develop a method to test for convexity given partial preference information in the form of weak and strict incomplete orders. We characterize the pairs that can be extended to convex preferences and provide an efficient algorithm to verify this property. Requiring the convex preference to align with an order that satisfies independence, such as the Euclidean order or stochastic dominance, does not complicate the test. We apply our results to consumer demand, choice under risk and uncertainty, and preferences over information, and establish conditions under which upper semicontinuity or continuity can also be obtained. We identify environments in which convexity imposes no additional restrictions beyond rationality, extending Afriat-type results to infinite data and co-convex budgets and establishing a convex version of exact rationalization. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.34771 |
| By: | Mickael Beaud (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Yujiang Sun (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Marc Willinger (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | While various models of inequality aversion predict different effects of background risk on giving, empirical evidence remains mixed. This study presents a laboratory experiment using a modified dictator game to examine whether exposure to an additive, zero-mean background risk affecting endowments influences giving behavior. Our results show that such exposure does not significantly affect average donation amounts, the likelihood of giving nothing, or the tendency to split resources equally. These findings are consistent with ex ante inequality concerns under risk neutrality; however, overall, our experimental data do not support the behavioral predictions implied by purely ex post inequality aversion. |
| Keywords: | Inequality aversion, Background risk, Dictator game |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05777756 |