nep-upt New Economics Papers
on Utility Models and Prospect Theory
Issue of 2026–10–26
eight papers chosen by
Alexander Harin


  1. Granular Ambiguity and the Value of Resolution By Caroline Ventura
  2. How Competitive Are Competitive Payoff Vectors? Money and Commodity Bounds in Market Games By Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Trockel, Walter
  3. Globally Optimal Estimation of Nested Logit Models By Hoang Giang Pham; Tien Mai
  4. An intergenerational social welfare function that represents neutral-range utilitarianism By Bruers, Stijn
  5. Promotion Signaling and Signal Jamming: An Analysis of Job Title Inflation By Yi Chen; Michael Waldman; Zhenda Yin
  6. A dynamically consistent choice-set dependent population axiology By Bruers, Stijn
  7. Robust Rules for Voluntary Disclosure: When Commitment Matters By Sarah Auster; Helene Mass
  8. Do Groups Make Wise Decisions? By Daniel Evans; Georg Schneider

  1. By: Caroline Ventura (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Two finite sets of priors can share a convex hull while differing in resolution. Maximin expected utility treats them as equivalent. We axiomatize Variational Information-Structure (VIS) preferences over acts paired with finite prior sets, for which the convex hull is not a sufficient informational state variable. Value equals the maximin value over the convex core minus the product of the act's ambiguity exposure and a coefficient that depends on the core and on granularity, the Hausdorff distance between the prior set and its core. Under structural richness and a resolution Archimedean axiom, the coefficient vanishes as granularity approaches zero along granularities attainable at a fixed core. Differences in resolution can reverse the maximin ordering induced by core inclusion, and we characterize when the representation satisfies statewise monotonicity.Supports with the same core and the same granularity are behaviorally equivalent, which distinguishes the model from α-maximin with a structure-specific pessimism index.
    Keywords: Multiple priors, Insurance, Ellsberg paradox, Belief functions, Resolution, Granularity, Ambiguity
    Date: 2026–10–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-05795703
  2. By: Qin, Cheng-Zhong (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Trockel, Walter (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Abstract: How many commodities are required to represent a totally balanced game with transferable utility? The answer depends on whether the representing economy reproduces only coalition values or also makes the assumed utility transfers feasible. Hart’s (n − 1)-commodity bound concerns a reduced-form market representing coalition values by aggregate surplus. Its complete quasi-linear representation contains an additional transferable numéraire, which is necessary for payoff feasibility as well as competitive exchange. Counting this commodity yields a sharp worst-case bound of n, already without an equilibrium requirement. We then establish a lower bound for Walrasian representation: every concave pure-exchange representation of the n-player unanimity game that realizes even one core payoff vector at nonzero equilibrium prices requires at least n commodities. The proof expresses Hart’s commodity lower bound through the rank of net trades and combines it with individual budget balance. Building on Shapley and Shubik’s classical direct-market construction, we make explicit its budget-feasible realization of the core. A self-contained proof distinguishes trading-profit maximization with monetary settlement from utility maximization under physical-commodity budgets; the two interpretations yield the same set of payoff vectors, but need not use the same allocation. A coalition-value criterion extends the lower bound beyond unanimity and yields a quantitative welfare bound for low-dimensional representing economies. The analysis separates commodity accounting, transferable-payoff feasibility, and Walrasian implementation.
    Keywords: market games, totally balanced games, transferable utility, commodity bounds, competitive solutions, Walrasian equilibrium
    Date: 2026–10–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:770
  3. By: Hoang Giang Pham; Tien Mai
    Abstract: Nested logit is widely used in operational demand models, yet jointly estimating its utility coefficients and nest dissimilarity parameters requires nonconvex optimization. Standard estimation routines offer no certificate of global optimality, leaving a gap between globally optimizing decisions under nested-logit demand and reliably estimating that demand model. We develop, to our knowledge, the first globally convergent optimization framework with an explicit global-accuracy guarantee for joint nested-logit estimation. Our central complexity result confines all exponential dependence to the number of free nest dissimilarity parameters: computation is polynomial in the numbers of observations, alternatives, and utility coefficients. Consequently, under the stated compact-domain and relaxation-error conditions, fixing the number of nests yields an additive polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). The framework exploits an exact exponential-cone formulation for fixed dissimilarities and a spatial branch-and-bound algorithm that searches only over the free dissimilarities. Valid likelihood bounds provide an anytime certificate and finite termination at any prescribed additive average-log-likelihood tolerance. Across eight benchmark datasets and 240 estimation instances, the method certifies every reported solution and exposes inferior local estimates despite normal solver termination. These results establish a computational foundation for globally certified nested-logit estimation.
    Date: 2026–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.25038
  4. By: Bruers, Stijn
    Abstract: An intergenerational social welfare function is presented for a population ethical theory that generalizes critical-level utilitarianism and necessitarianism. Utilities of future people are discounted when these utilities lie within a neutral range. This neutral-range utilitarianism mitigates the repugnant and sadistic conclusions in population ethics, but entails a time inconsistency: the ranking of options available to the social planner can change depending on when decisions are made. A modified social welfare function is proven to be top choice dynamically consistent. As applications, specific distributions of utilities of future people are used to derive closed form expressions of the Ramsey rule for the social discount rate and the maximum bandwidth of the neutral range.
    Keywords: social welfare function, utilitarianism, time discounting, time inconsistency, population ethics, repugnant conclusion
    JEL: D60 I30
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:344076
  5. By: Yi Chen; Michael Waldman; Zhenda Yin
    Abstract: Starting with Waldman (1984), it has become widely understood that an important role of promotions in labor markets is that promotions serve as signals of high worker ability. In this paper we explore the common and growing practice called job title inflation which serves a signal jamming role that reduces the signaling value of promotions. We first explore a two-period model and show how job title inflation can arise in equilibrium and increase social welfare both because workers directly value impressive sounding job titles and because the practice reduces job assignment inefficiencies due to signaling. We then introduce into the model an investment choice for young workers concerning human capital accumulation and show that job title inflation can decrease rather than increase welfare in that case. That is, when promotions and the associated wage increases serve as an important incentive for investing in human capital, the use of job title inflation can persist even though the practice lowers both overall efficiency and expected worker utility. We then consider three extensions: (i) a setting characterized by worker turnover; (ii) a setting characterized by a wage transparency law; and (iii) a setting characterized by heterogeneous worker visibility. Also, in addition to showing how job title inflation can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon that can either raise or lower welfare, we discuss the extent to which our theoretical analysis matches evidence concerning the use of job title inflation in real-world labor markets.
    Date: 2026–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.26494
  6. By: Bruers, Stijn
    Abstract: Dynamic neutral-range utilitarianism is a choice-set dependent population axiology, which means that the social welfare ordering depends on the set of eligible options that are available to the decision maker. This choice-set dependency allows to avoid many impossibility theorems in population ethics, and in particular allows to avoid repugnant and sadistic conclusions. To make the theory dynamically consistent, the social welfare function contains a correction term that measures dynamic inconsistency. The theory is complete, continuous, transitive, separable, Pareto efficient and inequality averse, but violates the dominance addition condition and entails a weak non-identity problem.
    Keywords: population ethics, repugnant conclusion, person-affecting view, critical-level utilitarianism, procreation asymmetry, dynamic inconsistency
    JEL: D60
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:344077
  7. By: Sarah Auster (University of Bonn, Department of Economics & CEPR); Helene Mass (Department of Economics & University of Vienna)
    Abstract: We study the value of commitment in verifiable disclosure games when the receiver faces non-quantifiable uncertainty about the evidence environment. The sender has stochastic access to hard evidence and may disclose or suppress it; the receiver chooses a decision rule to maximize her payoff guarantee. When ambiguity concerns the payoff state, the receiver has strict incentives to soften her standards ex post after non-disclosure, making commitment strictly valuable. When ambiguity concerns the sender’s expertise, incentives reverse: the receiver prefers a stricter reaction than is ex-ante optimal, so prespecified, hard-wired rules for non-disclosure improve payoffs for both sides.
    Keywords: Ambiguity, Commitment
    JEL: D81 D82 D86
    Date: 2026–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:435
  8. By: Daniel Evans (University of Bonn); Georg Schneider (University of Bonn)
    Abstract: Many important decisions are made jointly by groups. While groups can draw on and discuss diverse perspectives, they may also suffer from counterproductive dynamics, such as herding and gridlock. To investigate this tension, we study three features that distinguish joint from individual decision-making: composition, communication, and collaborative aggregation. Simple comparisons between joint and individual decisions cannot distinguish their effects. To separate them, we design an experiment in which subjects construct portfolios to maximize returns and minimize volatility, first individually and then in one of three decision modes; each mode differs from adjacent modes by a single feature. We find that composition drives the benefits of joint decision-making: simply pooling two individuals' independent submissions together reduces portfolio concentration and volatility. Communication attenuates these gains by inducing partners to converge on similar portfolios and to prioritize maximizing returns over managing risk. Collaborative aggregation has little effect on average, but is beneficial when partners hold differing beliefs. Disentangling these features reveals an offsetting cost of communication that limits the ability of groups to make full use of members' inputs.
    Keywords: Group decision-making, Wisdom of crowds, Communication, Portfolio choice
    JEL: C92 D70 D91 G41 M54
    Date: 2026–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:436

This nep-upt issue is ©2026 by Alexander Harin. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the Griffith Business School of Griffith University in Australia.