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on Utility Models and Prospect Theory |
| By: | Crispin Cooper; Ana Fredrich; Tommaso Reggiani; Wouter Poortinga |
| Abstract: | How should well-being be prioritised in society, and what trade-offs are people willing to make between fairness and personal well-being? We investigate these questions using a stated preference experiment with a nationally representative UK sample (n = 300), in which participants evaluated life satisfaction outcomes for both themselves and others under conditions of uncertainty. Individual-level utility functions were estimated using an Expected Utility Maximisation (EUM) framework and tested for sensitivity to the overweighting of small probabilities, as characterised by Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). A majority of participants displayed concave (risk-averse) utility curves and showed stronger aversion to inequality in societal life satisfaction outcomes than to personal risk. These preferences were unrelated to political alignment, suggesting a shared normative stance on fairness in well-being that cuts across ideological boundaries. The results challenge use of average life satisfaction as a policy metric, and support the development of nonlinear utility-based alternatives that more accurately reflect collective human values. Implications for public policy, well-being measurement, and the design of value-aligned AI systems are discussed. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.07793 |
| By: | Yutaro Akita; Kensei Nakamura |
| Abstract: | We provide a model of preferences over lotteries of acts in which a decision maker behaves as if optimally filtering her ambiguity perception. She has a set of plausible ambiguity perceptions and a cost function over them, and chooses multiple priors to maximize the minimum expected utility minus the cost. We characterize the model by axioms on attitude toward randomization and its timing, uniquely identify the filtering cost from observable data, and conduct several comparatives. Our model can explain Machina's (2009) two paradoxes, which are incompatible with many standard ambiguity models. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.05076 |
| By: | Charles F. Manski; John Mullahy |
| Abstract: | This paper considers quantile-welfare evaluation of health policy as an alternative to utilitarian evaluation. Manski (1988) originally proposed and studied maximization of quantile utility as a model of individual decision making under uncertainty, juxtaposing it with maximization of expected utility. That paper's primary motivation was to exploit the fact that maximization of quantile utility requires only an ordinal formalization of utility, not a cardinal one. This paper transfers these ideas from analysis of individual decision making to analysis of social planning. We begin by summarizing basic theoretical properties of quantile welfare in general terms rather than related specifically to health policy. We then propose a procedure to nonparametrically bound the quantile welfare of health states using data from binary-choice time-tradeoff (TTO) experiments of the type regularly performed by health economists. After this we assess related econometric considerations concerning measurement, using the EQ-5D framework to structure our discussion. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.05529 |
| By: | Emerson Melo |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the Random Utility Model (RUM) in repeated stochastic choice settings where decision-makers lack full information about payoffs. We propose a gradient-based learning algorithm that embeds RUM into an online decision-making framework. Our analysis establishes Hannan consistency for a broad class of RUMs, meaning the average regret relative to the best fixed action in hindsight vanishes over time. We also show that our algorithm is equivalent to the Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) method, offering an economically grounded approach to online optimization. Applications include modeling recency bias and characterizing coarse correlated equilibria in normal-form games |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.16030 |
| By: | Eduardo Azevedo; Ilan Wolff |
| Abstract: | The first-order approach (FOA) is the main tool for the moral hazard principal-agent problem. Although many existing results rely on the FOA, its validity has been established only under relatively restrictive assumptions. We demonstrate in examples that the FOA frequently fails when the agent's reservation utility is low (such as in principal-optimal contracts). However, the FOA broadly holds when the agent's reservation utility is at least moderately high (such as in competitive settings where agents receive high rents). Our main theorem formalizes this point. The theorem shows that the FOA is valid in a standard limited liability model when the agent's reservation utility is sufficiently high. The theorem also establishes existence and uniqueness of the optimal contract. We use the theorem to derive tractable optimal contracts across several settings. Under log utility, option contracts are optimal for numerous common output distributions (including Gaussian, exponential, binomial, Gamma, and Laplace). |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.18873 |
| By: | Toygar T. Kerman; Anastas P. Tenev; Konstantin Zabarnyi |
| Abstract: | We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which a sender wants to persuade a critical mass of receivers by revealing partial information about the state to them. The homogeneous binary-action receivers are located on a communication network, and each observes the private messages sent to them and their immediate neighbors. We examine how the sender's expected utility varies with increased communication among receivers. We show that for general families of networks, extending the network can strictly benefit the sender. Thus, the sender's gain from persuasion is not monotonic in network density. Moreover, many network extensions can achieve the upper bound on the sender's expected utility among all networks, which corresponds to the payoff in an empty network. This is the case in networks reflecting a clear informational hierarchy (e.g., in global corporations), as well as in decentralized networks in which information originates from multiple sources (e.g., influencers in social media). Finally, we show that a slight modification to the structure of some of these networks precludes the possibility of such beneficial extensions. Overall, our results caution against presuming that more communication necessarily leads to better collective outcomes. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.09099 |
| By: | Dylan Laplace Mermoud |
| Abstract: | We adopt a continuous-time dynamical system approach to study the evolution of the state of a game driven by the willingness to reduce the total dissatisfaction of the coalitions about their payment. Inspired by the work of Grabisch and Sudh\"olter about core stability, we define a vector field on the set of preimputations from which is defined, for any preimputation, a cohesion curve describing the evolution of the state. We prove that for each preimputation, there exists a unique cohesion curve. Subsequently, we show that, for the cohesion flow of a balanced game, the core is the unique minimal attractor of the flow, the realm of which is the whole preimputation set. These results improve our understanding of the ubiquity of the core in the study of cooperative games with transferable utility. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.02918 |
| By: | Florian Lengyel |
| Abstract: | We study a noncooperative $n$-player game of slack allocation in which each player $j$ has entitlement $L_j>0$ and chooses a claim $C_j\ge0$. Let $v_j=(C_j-L_j)_+$ (overage) and $s_j=(L_j-C_j)_+$ (slack); set $X=\sum_j v_j$ and $I=\sum_j s_j$. At the end of the period an overage-proportional clearing rule allocates cooperative surplus $I$ to defectors in proportion to $v_j$; cooperators receive $C_j$. We show: (i) the selfish outcome reproduces the cooperative payoff vector $(L_1, \dots, L_n)$; (ii) with bounded actions, defection is a weakly dominant strategy; (iii) within the $\alpha$-power family, the linear rule ($\alpha=1$) is the unique boundary-continuous member; and (iv) the dominant-strategy outcome is Strong Nash under transferable utility and hence coalition-proof (Bernheim et al., 1987). We give a policy interpretation for carbon rationing with a penalty collar. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.07145 |
| By: | Florian Gutekunst; Martin Herdegen; David Hobson |
| Abstract: | In this article, we study optimal investment and consumption in an incomplete stochastic factor model for a power utility investor on the infinite horizon. When the state space of the stochastic factor is finite, we give a complete characterisation of the well-posedness of the problem, and provide an efficient numerical algorithm for computing the value function. When the state space is a (possibly infinite) open interval and the stochastic factor is represented by an It\^o diffusion, we develop a general theory of sub- and supersolutions for second-order ordinary differential equations on open domains without boundary values to prove existence of the solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation along with explicit bounds for the solution. By characterising the asymptotic behaviour of the solution, we are also able to provide rigorous verification arguments for various models, including -- for the first time -- the Heston model. Finally, we link the discrete and continuous setting and show that that the value function in the diffusion setting can be approximated very efficiently through a fast discretisation scheme. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.09452 |
| By: | Bonneton, Nicolas; Sandmann, Christopher |
| Abstract: | This paper studies assortative matching in a non‐stationary search‐and‐matching model with non‐transferable payoffs. Non‐stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of agents searching evolve endogenously over time. Assortative matching can fail in non‐stationary environments under conditions for which Morgan (1995) and Smith (2006) show that it occurs in the steady state. This is due to the risk of worsening match prospects inherent to non‐stationary environments. The main contribution of this paper is to derive the weakest sufficient conditions on payoffs for which matching is assortative. In addition to known steady state conditions, more desirable individuals must be less risk‐averse in the sense of Arrow–Pratt. |
| Keywords: | non-stationary random search; assortiative matching; risk preferences; NTU |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2025–09–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:128639 |