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on Utility Models and Prospect Theory |
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Issue of 2022‒04‒11
eighteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Yann Bramoullé (Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France.); Christian Ghiglino (Department of Economics, Essex University, UK) |
| Abstract: | We introduce loss aversion into a model of conspicuous consumption in networks. Agents allocate their income between a standard good and a status good to maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility. Agents interact over a connected network and compare their status consumption to their neighbors' average consumption. Loss aversion has a profound impact. If loss aversion is large enough relative to income heterogeneity, a continuum of Nash equilibria appears and all agents consume the same quantity of status good. Otherwise, there is a unique Nash equilibrium and richest agents earn strict status gains while poorest agents earn strict status losses. |
| Keywords: | loss Aversion, conspicuous consumption, social networks |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2206&r= |
| By: | Matt Davison; Marcos Escobar-Anel; Yichen Zhu |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the optimal choices of financial derivatives to complete a financial market in the framework of stochastic volatility (SV) models. We introduce an efficient and accurate simulation-based method, applicable to generalized diffusion models, to approximate the optimal derivatives-based portfolio strategy. We build upon the double optimization approach (i.e. expected utility maximization and risk exposure minimization) proposed in Escobar-Anel et al. (2022); demonstrating that strangle options are the best choices for market completion within equity options. Furthermore, we explore the benefit of using volatility index derivatives and conclude that they could be more convenient substitutes when only long-term maturity equity options are available. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.08148&r= |
| By: | Antoine Bommier (Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH), ETH Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8032 Zürich, Switzerland); Adrien Fabre (Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH), ETH Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8032 Zürich, Switzerland); Arnaud Goussebaïle (Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH), ETH Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, 8032 Zürich, Switzerland); Daniel Heyen (University of Kaiserslautern and ETH Zürich) |
| Abstract: | Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of disagreement aversion to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture disagreement aversion in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts’ beliefs. |
| Keywords: | Disagreement Aversion; Ambiguity Aversion; Belief Aggregation; Decision under Uncertainty; Precautionary Principle |
| JEL: | D81 D83 D71 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:22-370&r= |
| By: | Jonathan Chapman (NYUAD); Mark Dean (Columbia University); Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University); Erik Snowberg (UBC, CESifo, NBER); Colin Camerer (Caltech) |
| Abstract: | A vast literature documents that willingness to pay (WTP) is less than willingness to accept (WTA) a monetary amount for an object, a phenomenon called the endowment effect. Using data from three incentivized studies with a total representative sample of 4,000 U.S. adults, we add one additional finding: WTA and WTP for a lottery are (essentially) uncorrelated. In contrast, independent measures of WTA (or WTP) are highly correlated, and relatively stable across time. Leading models of reference dependent preferences are compatible with a zero correlation between WTA and WTP, but only for specific parameterizations and ruling out popular special cases. These models also predict a relationship between the endowment effect and loss aversion, which we do not find. |
| Keywords: | Willingness To Pay, Willingness To Accept, Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion |
| JEL: | C90 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2021-90&r= |
| By: | Emiliano Catonini; Sergey Stepanov |
| Abstract: | When is transparency optimal in principal-agent relationships? We consider the following setting. The principal has private, payoff-relevant information about the potential of the project. She can share this information with the agent and can commit to any information structure. Positive news motivate the agent, while bad news depress effort. Under rather mild and natural restrictions on the utility functions of the parties, we obtain interpretable and easily verifiable sufficient conditions for the optimality of full disclosure. We also show that full disclosure is optimal under some modeling assumptions commonly used in applied principal-agent papers. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.07944&r= |
| By: | Lockwood, Ben (University of Warwick); Le, Minh (University of Warwick); Rockey, James (University of Birmingham) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the implications of voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall for the dynamics of electoral competition in a simple Downsian model of repeated elections. We first establish a benchmark result: when the voters’ reference point is forward-looking, there are a continuum of rational expectations equilibria (REE). When voters are backward-looking i.e. the reference point is last period’s recalled policy, interesting dynamics only emerge when voters have imperfect recall about that policy. Then, the interplay between the median voter’s reference point and political parties’ choice of platforms generates a dynamic process of polarization (or de-polarization). Under the assumption that parties are risk-neutral, platforms monotonically converge over time to a long-run equilibrium, which is always a REE. When parties are risk-averse, dynamic incentives also come into play, and generally lead to more policy moderation, resulting in equilibria that are more moderate than the most moderate REE JEL Classification: D72 ; D81 |
| Keywords: | electoral competition ; repeated elections ; loss-aversion ; imperfect recall ; advantage |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1399&r= |
| By: | Teresa Backhaus; Yves Breitmoser |
| Abstract: | Reanalyzing 12 experiments on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD), we identify three distinct subject types: defectors, cautious cooperators and strong cooperators. The defectors defect with a high probability in every round. Both cooperating types play semigrim behavior strategies. This simple three-type mixture fits significantly better than any model consisting of combinations of (generalized) pure strategies from the literature, which we fitted at the treatment level (considering 1051 pure-strategy mixtures), even when we use constant specifications of the three types across all experiments. The three best fitting strategies vary slightly across experiments, however. Structurally analyzing these strategies, we find that subjects have limited foresight and subjectively assign utility values to the four states (cc,cd,dc,dd) of the supergame, which relate to the original stage-game payoffs in a manner compatible with inequity aversion. This subjectively transforms the prisoners dilemma game into a coordination game and can reliably explain the strategies used across all 12 experiments and 32 treatments. |
| Keywords: | Repeated game, Behavior, Tit-for-tat, Mixed strategy, Memory, Belief-free equilibrium, Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D12 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_341&r= |
| By: | Anna Bogomolnaia; Herve Moulin |
| Abstract: | We must divide a finite number of indivisible goods and cash transfers between agents with quasi-linear but otherwise arbitrary utilities over the subsets of goods. We compare two division rules with cognitively feasible and privacy preserving individual messages. In Sell&Buy agents bid for the role of Seller or Buyer: with two agents the smallest bid defines the Seller who then charges any a price constrained only by her winning bid. In Divide&Choose agents bid for the role of Divider, then everyone bids on the shares of the Divider's partition. S&B dominates D&C on two counts: its guaranteed utility in the worst case rewards (resp. penalises) more subadditive (resp. superadditive) utilities; playing safe is never ambiguous and is also better placed to collect a larger share of the efficient surplus. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.08117&r= |
| By: | Deole, Sumit S.; Rieger, Marc Oliver |
| Abstract: | We present new descriptive evidence on the immigrant-native gap in risk and time preferences in Germany, one of the most preferred host countries for immigration. Using the recent waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) dataset, we find that the immigrant-native gap in risk preferences has widened for recent immigration cohorts, especially around the 2015 European Refugee Crisis. We attribute the recent widening to decreased assimilation rates of new immigrants caused by a reduced integration due to sudden increases in immigrants flows from culturally diverse parts of the world, particularly around the year 2015. We also find that the immigrant-native gap varies across different migrant groups: "Opportunity seekers", which we define as economic immigrants who intend to stay in Germany only temporarily, are very similar in their risk preferences to natives. Other immigrants, however, are substantially more risk-averse than natives. A smaller gap in risk preferences is also found among migrants who are female, highly educated, proficient in the host language, self-employed and working in predominantly high-skilled jobs. Concerning time preferences, although a noticeably large immigrant-native gap is evident, the gap is not found to vary across most individual-level socio-economic variables. |
| Keywords: | Risk aversion,time discounting,immigration,assimilation |
| JEL: | J61 D91 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1055&r= |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Yang Cai (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Grigoris Velegkas (Yale University); Mingfei Zhao (Google Research) |
| Abstract: | We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by Blackwell [Bla51, Bla53]. Initially, he data buyer has only partial information about the payoff-relevant state of the world. A data seller offers additional information about the state of the world. The information is revealed through signaling schemes, also referred to as experiments. In the single-agent setting, any mechanism can be represented as a menu of experiments. A recent paper by Bergemann et al.[BBS18] present a complete characterization of the revenue-optimal mechanism in a binary state and binary action environment. By contrast, no characterization is known for the case with more actions. In this paper, we consider more general environments and study arguably the simplest mechanism, which only sells the fully informative experiment. In the environment with binary state and m = 3 actions, we provide an O(m)-approximation to the optimal revenue by selling only the fully informative experiment and show that the approximation ratio is tight up to an absolute constant factor. An important corollary of our lower bound is that the size of the optimal menu must grow at least linearly in the number of available actions, so no universal upper bound exists for the size of the optimal menu in the general single-dimensional setting. We also provide a sufficient condition under which selling only the fully informative experiment achieves the optimal revenue. For multi-dimensional environments, we prove that even in arguably the simplest matching utility environment with 3 states and 3 actions, the ratio between the optimal revenue and the revenue by selling only the fully informative experiment can grow immediately to a polynomial of the number of agent types. Nonetheless, if the distribution is uniform, we show that selling only the fully informative experiment is indeed the optimal mechanism. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2324&r= |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Sapienza Università di Roma, Dipartimento di Economia e Diritto, Via del Castro Laurenziano, 9 00161 Roma); Claire Rimbaud (University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance, Universitätsstrasse 15/4, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France. IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether a player’s guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players’ vulnerability or whether it is only activated by the willingness to avoid disappointing them. We also explore whether the nature of vulnerability (ex-post vs. ex-ante) matters. Ex-post vulnerability arises when a player’s material payoff depends on another player’s action (e.g., recipients in a dictator games). Ex-ante vulnerability arises when her initial endowment can be entrusted to another player (e.g., trustors in trust games). Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of another player who is ex-post and/or ex-ante vulnerable. We find that trustees’ guilt aversion is insensitive to the nature of the co-player’s vulnerability and to the role of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent vulnerability of co-players. It is mainly triggered by the willingness to respond to others’ expectations, regardless of their responsibility or the kindness of their intentions. |
| Keywords: | Guilt Aversion, Vulnerability, Psychological Game Theory, Dictator Game, Trust Game, Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2203&r= |
| By: | Barry Eichengreen; Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj |
| Abstract: | Stablecoins and central bank digital currencies are on the horizon in Asia, and in some cases have already arrived. This paper provides new analysis and a critique of the use case for both forms of digital currency. It provides time-varying estimates of devaluation risk for the leading stablecoin, Tether, using data from the futures market. It describes the formidable obstacles to widespread use of central bank digital currencies in cross-border transactions, the context in which their utility is arguably greatest. The bottom line is that significant uncertainties continue to dog the region's digital currency initiatives. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.07564&r= |
| By: | Özgür, Arslan-Ayaydin; Thewissen, James (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/LFIN, Belgium); Torsin, Wouter |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether CEO risk aversion – proxied by their political affiliation – explains the method used to manage earnings. We argue that, even though real earnings management can have severe long-term consequences for firm performance, Republican managers are likely to prefer real over accruals-based earnings management because the former incurs significantly lower litigation risk costs than the latter and is relatively more difficult to detect. Based on a sample of more than 20,000 firm-year observations, we find that firms led by Republican (i.e. more risk averse) CEOs tend to manage their earnings through real activities manipulation, while those led by Democratic (i.e. more risk taking) CEOs tend to favor accruals-based earnings management. We also show that the positive (negative) relation between Republican-leaning managers and real (accruals-based) is more positive (less negative) for CEOs whose compensation is more oriented towards risk-taking. |
| Keywords: | Accruals earnings management ; CEO Risk Aversion ; Political affiliation ; Political donations ; Real activities manipulation |
| JEL: | M41 |
| Date: | 2021–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajf:louvlf:2021017&r= |
| By: | Jonathan Chapman (NYUAD); Mark Dean (Columbia University); Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University); Erik Snowberg (Caltech); Colin Camerer (Caltech) |
| Abstract: | We study the pattern of correlations across a large number of behavioral regularities, with the goal of creating an empirical basis for more comprehensive theories of decision- making. We elicit 21 behaviors using an incentivized survey on a representative sample (n = 1,000) of the U.S. population. Our data show a clear and relatively simple structure underlying the correlations between these measures. Using principal components analysis, we reduce the 21 variables to six components corresponding to clear clusters of high correlations. We examine the relationship between these components, cognitive ability, and demographics. Common extant theories explain some of the patterns in our data, but each theory we examine is also inconsistent with some patterns. |
| Keywords: | Econographics, Reciprocity, Altruism, Trust, Costly Third-Party Punishment, Inequality Aversion, Risk Aversion, Common-Ratio Effect, Endowment Effect, WTA, WTP, Ambiguity Aversion |
| JEL: | C90 D64 D81 D90 D91 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-75&r= |
| By: | Röthke, Konstantin |
| Abstract: | Information systems (IS) research that examines individual user-system interaction naturally relies on human cognition, judgment, and decision-making. Accordingly, this branch of IS research has employed psychological theories since its inception. However, only in recent years have IS researchers started to investigate how insights from cognitive psychology, social psychology, and behavioral economics can be leveraged within IS design. Especially the utilization of cognitive biases in combination with gamification currently attracts a lot of research attention. Both concepts aim at designing IS in a way that motivates users towards a target behavior. Despite calls for IS research on gamification to leverage insights from behavioral economics and social psychology in the context of gam(bl)ified IS (i.e., IS that use game/gambling design elements for non-entertainment purposes), there is only sparse research investigating how information cues can address cognitive biases to affect outcomes within gam(bl)ified IS. To advance the emergent research in these connected fields, this thesis investigates how information cues embedded in user-interface design elements can account for two important categories of cognitive biases regarding their influence on user behavior. More specifically, this thesis examines how information cues that address social influence biases and risk assessment biases impact user conversion (i.e., the process of turning visitors into active and/or paying users) within gam(bl)ified IS. Against this backdrop, five studies were conducted and published across four articles. The first study lays the foundation for the research context and setting. More specifically, a taxonomy of gamification elements is developed and extended to account for the novel gamification-related concept of gamblification. While gamification is often defined as the use of game design elements in a non-gaming context, gamblification can be viewed as the use of gambling design elements in non-gambling contexts. Gamblification is a unique concept that can be distinguished from gamification because it additionally relies on chance-based uncertainty and user-system resource transfer. Both gamification and gamblification provide a suitable setting for examining how cognitive biases can be accounted for in regard of their impact on user behavior. This is because gamification is often concerned with social interactions (e.g., competition or cooperation) and therefore frequently relies on social psychology as a theoretical foundation. Gamification is thus predestined to investigate the role of social influence biases (i.e., cognitive biases based on social influence theory) in motivating users towards a target behavior. Likewise, the emergent gamblification research setting is intriguing for investigating cognitive biases. Due to the inherent characteristics of gamblification (i.e., chance-based uncertainty and resource transfer) particularly risk assessment biases (i.e., cognitive biases that are induced by biased risk assessment) are highly relevant in this environment. The second article is situated in a gamified IS environment and investigates the role of social influence biases in fostering user conversion behavior (i.e., user registration) on an e-commerce platform. Drawing on social influence theory, two social influence cues (i.e., information cues that account for social influence biases), namely reciprocity cues and social proof cues, are embedded in the gamification design element ‘user onboarding’ and investigated in an e-commerce setting. The article’s findings indicate that both, reciprocity and social proof, have positive direct effects on user registration. However, depending on how reciprocity is implemented, the interactive effect of reciprocity and social proof attenuates or amplifies the positive direct effect. The third article examines risk assessment cues (i.e., information cues that aim to account for risk assessment biases) positioned within the gamblification element of a ‘loot box menu’. By illuminating how these risk assessment cues can address a group of risk assessment biases, namely probability evaluation biases (i.e., cognitive biases that result from a skewed evaluation of probabilities during risk assessment) their role in affecting product selection in a digital gaming context is investigated. More specifically, drawing on prospect theory, information cues are designed to account for two different probability evaluation biases, the certainty effect and the availability bias. The study’s results demonstrate that offering users loot box menus with two different probabilities of winning a reward (i.e., the choice between two different uncertain rewards vs. the choice between a certain and an uncertain reward) may trigger the certainty effect which influences user conversion behavior (i.e., product selection). Moreover, combining these different loot box menu designs with a previous loss experience causes users to be subject to the availability bias and amplifies the certainty effect. In contrast, when users are subject to the optimism bias, the certainty effect is attenuated. The fourth and last article investigates how risk assessment cues embedded in differently designed product offerings (i.e., gamblified vs. transaction-based) in the context of a digital gaming service can address a different group of risk assessment biases (i.e., stability biases) and thereby influence user conversion behavior (i.e., user purchase behavior). More specifically, drawing on literature on decision-making under risk, information cues are designed to address two stability biases, namely the risk avoidance effect and the endowment effect. Moreover, the effect of a general personal trait that is relevant for risk assessment (i.e., risk aversion) is examined. The results reveal that a gamblified product offering (i.e., a loot box with an uncertain reward) vs. a transaction-based product offering (i.e., a loot box with a certain reward) triggers the risk avoidance effect that influences user conversion. This effect is amplified when users are either subject to the endowment effect (i.e., when they experience a previous endowment with a loot box) or when they are risk-averse. Taken together, this thesis highlights the importance of considering the role of social influence and risk assessment biases and how information cues can be designed within gam(bl)ified IS to address these cognitive biases to motivate users towards a target behavior. Moreover, the results contribute to IS research by exploring the impact of manifold information cues that account for social influence and risk assessment biases as well as context-dependent interacting variables in various gam(bl)ified IS environments. Alongside these contributions to research, this thesis provides several interesting and actionable recommendations on how to implement information cues that take cognitive biases into account. This is primarily aimed at practitioners tasked with designing gam(bl)ified IS with the goal of optimizing user conversion behavior. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:131551&r= |
| By: | Keser, Claudia; Rau, Holger A. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the results of a survey exploring the determinants of vacinees' confidence in COVID-19 vaccines and their motivations to become vaccinated. At the threatening rise of the highly infectious Omicron variant, in December 2021, we interviewed people in waiting lines of vaccination centers. Our results identify risk-averse and social-distancing-compliant people as showing high confidence in the vaccine, which motivates them to receive it for reasons of protecting themselves and others. By contrast, policy incentives, such as "3G/2G" restrictions, motivate risktolerant people who opted for vaccination to get access to public areas. Trusting people who regularly vote are little afraid of vaccines' side effects. Our findings offer insights for policymakers in societies and firms that help to tailor policies promoting vaccination based on people's economic preferences |
| Keywords: | Behavioral Economics,COVID-19,Policy Incentives,Vaccination Motives |
| JEL: | C91 D81 H12 I12 I18 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:434&r= |
| By: | Zachariah Sinkala; Vajira Manathunga; Bichaka Fayissa |
| Abstract: | In this research, we develop a framework to analyze the interaction between the economy and the Covid-19 pandemic using an extension of SIR epidemic model. At the outset, we assume there are two health related investments including general medical expenditures and the other for a direct investment for controlling the pandemic. We incorporate the learning dynamics associated with the management of the virus into our model. Given that the labor force in a society depends on the state of the epidemic, we allow birth, death, and vaccination to occur in our model and assume labor force consists of the susceptible, vaccinated, and recovered individuals. We also assume parameters in our epidemic compartmental model depend on investment amount for directly controlling the epidemic, the health stock of individual representative agents in the society, and the knowledge or learning about the epidemic in the community. By controlling consumption, the general medical expenditure, and the direct investment of funds for controlling the epidemic, we optimize the utility realized by the representative individuals because of consumption. This problem is nontrivial since the disease dynamics results in a non-convex optimization problem. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.05374&r= |
| By: | Oihane Gallo; Bettina Klaus |
| Abstract: | We consider a set of agents, e.g., a group of researchers, who have claims on an endowment, e.g., a research budget from a national science foundation. The research budget is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions and coalitional funding is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members, except for singleton coalitions which receive no funding. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL).For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) pairwise coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable pairwise partition. While for CEL the resulting stable pairwise partition is assortative and sequentially matches up lowest-claims pairs, for CEA the resulting stable pairwise partition is obtained sequentially by matching up in each step either a highest-claims pair or a highest-lowest-claims pair.More generally, we also assume that the minimal coalition size to have a positive endowment is larger or equal to two. We then show how all results described above are extended to this general case. |
| Keywords: | Winner-take-all market, Market entry game, Excess entry, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Probability weighting, Experiment |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D63 D71 D74 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:22.03&r= |