nep-upt New Economics Papers
on Utility Models and Prospect Theory
Issue of 2015‒11‒21
five papers chosen by
Alexander Harin
Modern University for the Humanities

  1. Some (Mis)facts about Myopic Loss Aversion By Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe Kortajarene; Giovanni Ponti; Josefa Tomás Lucas
  2. Problems of utility and prospect theories. A “certain–uncertain” inconsistency within their experimental methods By Harin, Alexander
  3. Expected Indirect Utility in an Ergodically Chaotic Overlapping Generations Model By Richard Charlton
  4. Optimal Investment with Transaction Costs under Cumulative Prospect Theory in Discrete Time By Bin Zou; Rudi Zagst
  5. Health shocks and risk aversion By Decker, Simon; Schmitz, Hendrik

  1. By: Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe Kortajarene (Universidad de Alicante); Giovanni Ponti (Universidad de Alicante); Josefa Tomás Lucas (Universidad de Alicante)
    Abstract: Gneezy and Potters (1997) run an experiment to test the empirical content of Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA). They find that the attractiveness of a risky asset depends upon the investors’ time horizon: consistently with MLA, individuals are more willing to take risks when they evaluate their investments less frequently. This paper shows that these experimental findings can be easily accommodated by the most standard version of Expected Utility Theory, namely a CRRA specification. Additionally, we use four different datasets to estimate a CRRA model and two alternative MLA versions, together with various mixture specifications of the two competing models. Our econometric exercise finds little evidence of subjects’ loss aversion, which provides empirical ground for our theoretical claim.
    Keywords: Expected Utility Theory, Myopic Loss Aversion, Evaluation Period
    JEL: C91 D81 D14
    Date: 2015–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2015-09&r=upt
  2. By: Harin, Alexander
    Abstract: In random–lottery incentive experiments, the choices of certain outcomes are stimulated by uncertain lotteries. This “certain–uncertain” inconsistency is evident, but only recently emphasized. Because of it, conclusions from a random–lottery incentive experiment that includes a certain outcome cannot be unquestionably correct. Well-known experimental results and purely mathematical theorems support this. The main result presented here is: The usual experimental systems of utility and prospect theories may need additional independent analyses in the context of the “certain–uncertain” inconsistency.
    Keywords: utility; prospect theory; experiment; incentive; random-lottery incentive system; Prelec; probability weighting function;
    JEL: C1 C9 C90 C91 C93 D8 D81
    Date: 2015–11–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:67911&r=upt
  3. By: Richard Charlton
    Abstract: The chaotic and ergodic equilibrium consumption profiles of a two period lived representative agent overlapping generations model are examined. Given a specific utility function, it is shown that for a typical equilibrium path expected indirect utility of consumption is less than the utility of expected equilibrium consumption. In turn, utility of expected consumption in equilibrium is less than utility at the steady state equilibrium. This result holds for a set of equilibrium maps of positive measure and suggests that stabilisation of the erratic system would bring about an improvement in welfare.
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:559&r=upt
  4. By: Bin Zou; Rudi Zagst
    Abstract: We study optimal investment problems with transaction costs under Kahneman and Tversky's cumulative prospective theory (CPT). A CPT investor makes investment decisions in a single-period discrete time financial market consisting of one risk-free asset and one risky asset, in which trading the risky asset incurs proportional costs. The objective is to seek the optimal investment to maximize the prospect value of the investor's final wealth. We have obtained explicit optimal investment to this problem in two examples. An economic analysis is conducted to investigate the impact of the transaction costs and risk aversion on the optimal investment.
    Date: 2015–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1511.04768&r=upt
  5. By: Decker, Simon; Schmitz, Hendrik
    Abstract: Risk preferences are typically assumed to be constant for an individual across the life cycle. In this paper we empirically assess if they are time varying. Specifically, we analyse whether health shocks influence individual risk aversion. We follow an innovative approach and use grip strength data to obtain an objective health shock indicator. In order to account for the non-random nature of our data we employ regression-adjusted matching. Health shocks are found to increase individual risk aversion. The finding is robust to a series of sensitivity analyses.
    Abstract: Risikopräferenzen werden typischerweise als konstant über den Lebenszyklus eines Individuums angenommen. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir diese Annahme empirisch. Konkret analysieren wir, ob Gesundheitsschocks den Grad individueller Risikoaversion beeinflussen. Hierbei verwenden wir die Greifkraft zur objektiven Messung von Gesundheitsschocks und regression adjusted matching. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass Gesundheitsschocks den Grad individueller Risikoaversion erhöhen. Dieser Befund ist robust über eine Vielzahl von Sensitivitätsanalysen.
    Keywords: risk preferences,health shocks,hand grip strength,regression-adjusted matching
    JEL: C81 D01 D81 I10 I12
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:581&r=upt

This nep-upt issue is ©2015 by Alexander Harin. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.