| By: |
Leonardo Becchetti (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata");
Giacomo Degli Antoni (University of Milano - Bicocca);
Stefania Ottone (University of Milano - Bicocca);
Nazaria Solferino (University of Calabria-Unical) |
| Abstract: |
We device a randomized experiment with task performance in which players
directly decide allocation criteria (with/without) veil of ignorance on payoff
distribution under different criteria in a stakeholder/spectator position. Our
main result is a strong and significant gender effect: women choose
significantly more protection (that is, they choose criteria in which a part
or all the total sum of money that must be allocated among participants is
equally distributed) before (but not after) the removal of the veil of
ignorance. They also reveal less overconfidence and significantly higher
civicness and inequality aversion in ex post questionnaire responses, even
though such differences are not enough to fully capture our main result. The
puzzle when interpreting it is that the gendered preference for protection
exists not only for stakeholders but also for spectators while it disappears
for both once we remove the veil of ignorance. This makes it impossible to
explain it exclusively with risk or competition aversion. |
| Keywords: |
Distributive Justice; Gender Effects; Risk Aversion; Competition Aversion; Veil of Ignorance. |
| JEL: |
C91 D63 J16 |
| Date: |
2011–10–24 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:214&r=tur |