| Abstract: |
Since the onset of the Civil War in 1975 Lebanon has experienced burgeoning
fiscal deficits and an unsustainable public debt overhang. Much of this arose
from the loss of revenues during the period of the Civil War 1975-90 and
attempts to maintain basic public expenditure, while from 1990-2006 it
reflected post Taif rebuilding and reconstruction of key infrastructure with
limited revenue capacity. Considerable progress from the 1990s has been
achieved in rebuilding the shattered economy from both public and private
international and domestic sources, but its legacy is a huge public debt and a
servicing requirement that currently absorbs alone almost 30 per cent of total
government revenue and is the highest in the world on a per capita basis.
While the need to reduce this debt to a sustainable level would be daunting
enough in itself, LebanonâÃÂÃÂs fiscal predicament was further
compounded by the outbreak of war with Israel during July-August 2006. The
consequence of this 34 day conflagration was the devastation of residential
property, vital infrastructure, agricultural production, industrial
production, exports, environmental damage, the collapse of tourism and a
further erosion of the influence and power of the central government.
Estimates of the direct and indirect costs for Lebanon of this relatively
brief but devastating war conservatively vary from US$10-15 billion. The
implications of such reconstruction and rebuilding costs for the budget and
public debt are potentially calamitous for Lebanon. A key question is whether
Lebanon can tackle this enormous task in insolation. This paper explores the
background to the fiscal crisis, identifies from available literature the
extent, nature and cost of the war damage, analyses the options available to
the authorities in rebuilding the economy and highlights key policy issues and
measures that will be required if a sustainable economic recovery is to be
achieved. Despite its demonstrated and remarkable resilience to past trauma
the paper concludes that the fiscal crisis makes it impossible for Lebanon to
tackle the reconstruction and rebuilding task on its own and particularly in
the wake of the events of summer 2006. The country will require substantial
and ongoing financial support from international lenders and donors. The
success of these efforts in the case of Lebanon is of particular interest as
it could well be a microcosm of possible future outcomes for the region more
generally. |