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on Tourism Economics |
| By: | Hasret Benar (Eastern Mediterranean University); Glenn Jenkins (Queen's University) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers alternative forms of regulation and taxation of the casino sector. The model considers the situation of a typical tourist destination country that is using casinos to attract and entertain foreign tourists. The objective is to invest in the sector efficiently while maximizing the amount of government revenue or profits accruing to the country. The regulator must determine how the price of gambling will be set, how many casinos will be allowed to enter the industry and the form and rates of taxation. Four alternative forms of regulation are considered: price regulation, state-owned monopoly, private monopoly and casino association regulation. Turnover taxes on the amount of funds gambled and also annual taxation of the fixed costs of the casinos are evaluated. Applications of the models are carried out for North Cyprus. The conclusion is that the economic efficiency costs and the revenue losses from the absence of effective regulation in these tourist destinations can be very substantial with welfare costs equal to the approximately 75 percent of the tax revenue generated by this sector. Furthermore it shows that while a tax on turnover can be efficient in the case of a competitive industry or a cartel association form of regulation, it will be distortionary if a multi-plant private monopoly is controlling the sector. In contrast a tax on fixed costs will lead to an efficient result in the case of a competitive industry, but it will lead to economic inefficiencies if the sector is regulated by a casino association that controls the number of casino entering the sector. |
| Keywords: | Casino regulation, taxation, state-monopoly, welfare cost |
| JEL: | H21 H32 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1088&r=tur |
| By: | C. Hamel; M. Herrmann; S. Lee; Keith Criddle; H. Geier |
| Abstract: | Forecasts of the regional economic impacts of changes in the demand for recreation occasioned by regulatory changes, changes in the quality of the recreation experience, or changes in average trip costs require a model that links changes in these trip attributes to individual participation decisions and population participation rates. The probability that an individual will take a particular recreational trip is described using a nonlinear random effects probit model based on variable trip attributes and individual economic and demographic characteristics. These conditional individual probabilities are transformed into predictions of changes in total recreation demand using a simulation-based sample enumeration method. The regional impacts associated with ensuing changes in primary and secondary expenditure patterns are elucidated with a stand-alone recreation-sector module linked to a regionally adjusted zip code-level input-output model. Because the participation model allows for nonconstant marginal utility, primary and secondary impacts exhibit nonlinear responses to variations in trip attributes. The modeling approach is demonstrated in an application to the saltwater sport fisheries for Pacific halibut and salmon in Lower and Central Cook Inlet, Alaska. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usu:wpaper:2001-01&r=tur |
| By: | S. Lee; M. Herrmann; K. Criddle; C. Hamel |
| Abstract: | Changes in sportfishing trip attributes such as cost, harvest regulations, environmental quality, and resource abundance, affect both the expected net benefits associated with a fishing trip and participation decisions. The ability to estimate both of these is important for various types of policy analysis. This study uses stated preference questions of anglers who sport fished in the marine waters off the Kenai Peninsula. Alaska to estimate a nonlinear random effects probit model that expresses both angler net benefits and participation rates as functions of trip attributes. The use of stated preference data along with a nonlinear utility specification allows for the simulation of a wide range of policy scenarios. The study design permits the identification of substitution and complementary effects across fishing trip attributes, as well as nonlinear marginal utility. |
| Keywords: | compensating variation, participation rate, random effects probit, sport fishery, stated preference method |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usu:wpaper:2001-03&r=tur |
| By: | Iragaël Joly (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]) |
| Abstract: | The paper is concerned with the travel activity and more specifically the urban travel time during a day. This individual mean travel time budget (TTB) has been hypothesised by Zahavi (1980) to be a constant amount of time close to 1 hour per day. This TTB seems to be stable between different cities and between different time periods. Under the TTB stability hypothesis, travel time-savings are totally reinvested in transport. This reinvestment mechanism could then explain the urban sprawl, and give to the increasing speeds all the responsibilities of the “urban transport diseases”. However, the TTB stability seems to be valid at the world aggregate level only. The paper proposes to explore finer scales of observation of the TTB: from the aggregate to the desaggregate levels of observation. First, a worldwide comparison of the mean TTB of 100 cities is produced. Second a hazard based model for the individual TTB of the French city of Lyon is constructed. Hence, two opposite urban models appear at the aggregate level: an extensive urban model of which development is based on extensive consumption of space and time resources, and an intensive urban model restricting its spatial and temporal extension. At the desaggregate level, the analysis identifies the relationships between the individual TTB and the socio-economic variables and the mobility and activities attributes. Finally, the model seems to indicate that the traditional hypothesis of the minimisation of the temporal costs of travel is unsuitable to model the behaviour of the whole urban population. |
| Keywords: | Duration model ; Travel Time Budget ; Zahavi's hypothesis ; Worldwide comparison |
| Date: | 2006–07–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00087433_v1&r=tur |
| By: | Catarina Aroso Monteiro (INESC-Porto, Universidade do Porto); Aurora A.C. Teixeira (CEMPRE, Faculdade de Economia do Porto, Universidade do Porto) |
| Abstract: | Urban mobility has become an international problem and several countries have joined together in different consortia, signing international agreements and developing projects with a view to establishing new standards for current mobility levels and the development of the transport systems of the future. Although such worldwide increasing effort regarding sustainable mobility issue, namely by the most proactive European cities, it is not yet clear why measures towards sustainable mobility are not implemented by the generality of local authorities. The main goal of this paper is to identify the different sustainable mobility strategies and the corresponding perceptions by local public authorities. Such local governance aspects have yet to be dealt with appropriately and in a credible way. This shortcoming is particularly acute in Portugal where sustainable urban mobility management is still highly underdeveloped and very few studies have been dedicated to the matter. We provide new evidence on the perceptions and strategies of the Portuguese local public authorities regarding sustainable urban mobility management. Through a survey to all Portuguese municipalities we provide brand new evidence on their perceptions and strategies regarding sustainable urban mobility management. Estimates based on econometric regressions indicate that the most mobility-conscious municipalities are, on average, those that are richer, more cultural and educated, possess alternative transport parks and routes, have larger and more human capital intensive mobility departments. Results show that more than simply participating in urban regeneration programs it is necessary a more committed attitude, namely that municipalities’ urban plans explicitly mention mobility issues and indicators. All the models estimated clearly evidence a higher awareness of North municipalities towards sustainable mobility issues. |
| Keywords: | Zona Euro; Sustainability; mobility management; regions; human capital |
| JEL: | Q01 Q56 R11 J24 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:225&r=tur |
| By: | Yue, Chengyan; Marette, Stéphan; Beghin, John C. |
| Abstract: | In the context of the wine industry, we investigate producers’ choice between geographical indications and brand advertising to convey information to consumers. Producers also decide whether or not to select an effort level for improving the quality of their products. We show that if this effort level is selected, a producer will prefer to rely on brand advertising for promoting its products and setting up its own reputation. Despite allowing the cost of promotion to be shared, a geographical indication does not sufficiently reward the effort to improve quality. Finally, the selection of both instruments by producers is examined. |
| Keywords: | brand advertising, effort, geographical indication, GI, quality, wine. |
| Date: | 2006–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12651&r=tur |
| By: | M. Herrmann; S. Lee; C. Hamel; K. Criddle; H. Geier; J. Greenberg; C. Lewis |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usu:wpaper:2000-14&r=tur |
| By: | K. Lyon; D. Lee |
| Abstract: | In this paper we have examined optimal tariffs for non-renewable natural resources in the setting of imperfect competition. We do this because Larry Karp (1984, p. 74) states that, “If the buyer attempts to exert market power, he is constrained by the dynamic optimization behavior of the seller and does not face a standard control problem.” We show that when extraction costs are a function of the remaining stock of the resource, the costate variable can be separated into a scarcity effect and a cost effect. Karp concludes that the cost effect must be left with the producer; thereby, restricting the actions of the buyer. We, however, prove that it is not necessary to pay this cost effect to the producer; hence, we conclude that the monopsonist can extract all of the rent from the seller. The optimal tariff is neither dynamically time inconsistent, nor is it “Karp’s consistent tariff.” |
| Keywords: | Optimal control problem, optimal non-renewable resource tariff, dynamic inconsistency, imperfect competition, scarcity and cost effect |
| JEL: | H21 L20 Q30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usu:wpaper:2000-27&r=tur |