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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Yanfei Li (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)); Jia Zhao (Hunan University of Technology and Business); Jianjun Yan (Hunan University of Technology and Business) |
| Abstract: | Currently, major economies are competing on the technological and industrial development of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). This paper discusses the relationship between the patent value of FCEVs and the commercialisation of this technology. First, the patent data of FCEVs are analysed, focusing on data of China, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. Then, the paper constructs the FCEV patent value index framework based on the technological value and economic value of patents. Finally, this paper conducts an empirical study to analyse the influence of patent value on the development of the FCEV industry. It is found that, under the current situation, individual patent value can significantly promote the development of the FCEV industry, whilst the gross patent value of a certain country even has a negative impact. In addition, the increase of hydrogen infrastructure, research and development expenditure, and market demand will significantly promote the development of the FCEV industry. The development level of related industries such as the battery electric vehicle industry and the reduction of environmental pollution are also significant drivers of the development of FCEVs |
| Keywords: | FCEV, patent value, industry development |
| Date: | 2023–06–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:era:wpaper:dp-2023-05&r=tre |
| By: | Enzmann, Johannes; Ringel, Marc |
| Abstract: | The European Union aims at net-zero emissions by 2050. A key sector to achieve this goal is road transport, where emissions show no signs of reducing but continue to grow. A review of policies undertaken by EU member states and the G20 to reduce transport emissions reveals that both present and planned policies focus on binding supply-side measures, but offer only weak demand-side incentives. To address this imbalance, we developed a downstream, demand-side policy prototype through an expert interview design process. We call the prototype “cap-and-surrender” because it caps road emissions, and then allocates tradable emission allowances to individual vehicles that drivers surrender at each fill-up. Allowance pricing, both by the state and in the secondary market, is designed to incentivize decarbonization of the sector. Though the system would require significant investment, its revenue potential to the state should exceed this investment by several multiples. We discuss the potential economic, environmental and social impacts of the policy, as assessed by European transport experts. We find that the approach can deliver significant transport emission reductions in an effective and economically efficient manner. Through the appropriate design of national allocation rules and a gradual phasing in of cap and surrender, potential negative social consequences can be mitigated, and public acceptance of the policy promoted. |
| Date: | 2023–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:141745&r=tre |
| By: | Adrián, Nerja |
| Abstract: | Parallel airline alliances have negative effects on consumers a priori; however, they can be counteracted if airports may modify the behavior of airlines. In particular, vertical airport–airline agreements allow the airport to influence the competition downstream market, changing the effects of parallel alliances. In this paper, we analyze the effects of parallel alliances in the context of competition between vertical airport–airline pairs competition. We show that under the influence of airports, parallel alliances are welfare improving, and the number of passengers increases, against former studies. These results offer a new brand of analyses to be considered by authorities that evaluate parallel alliances. |
| Keywords: | Airlines parallel alliances; Concession revenue sharing; Vertical agreements; Airports competition |
| JEL: | D43 D47 L13 L93 R49 |
| Date: | 2022–11–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119174&r=tre |
| By: | Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo; Vidal-Puga, Juan |
| Abstract: | We propose a new freight transportation problem to distribute the benefit of ore transportation throughout a linear route to compensate the communities located on it. Such distribution aims to avoid conflicts generated by the transportation that causes external costs such as air, water, and land pollution to communities that can block the route, forcing more expensive alternatives. We propose a solution based on stability and fairness principles. In particular, we present some reasonable properties to characterize a family of assignment rules for determining compensation to local communities. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative game theory; core; mining; freight transportation |
| JEL: | C71 D74 |
| Date: | 2023–11–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119301&r=tre |
| By: | Seebacher, Moritz |
| JEL: | O18 I21 I28 H42 J16 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277569&r=tre |