nep-tre New Economics Papers
on Transport Economics
Issue of 2019‒10‒07
seven papers chosen by
Erik Teodoor Verhoef
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

  1. Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Fuel-Economy Standards By Antonio M. Bento; Mark R. Jacobsen; Christopher R. Knittel; Arthur A. van Benthem
  2. Prices, Schedules, and Passenger Welfare in Multi-Service Transportation Systems By Etienne Billette de Villemeur; Annalisa Vinella
  3. Zero emission vehicle exposure within U.S. carsharing fleets and impacts on sentiment toward electric drive vehicles By Shaheen, Susan PhD; Martin, Elliot
  4. Motivating air navigation service provider performance By Nicole Adler; Eef Delhaye; Adit Kivel; Stef Proost
  5. Action plan: Low carbon regional ports By Froese, Jens; Jahn, Malte; Wedemeier, Jan; Wuczkowski, Matthäus
  6. Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures By Yukihiko Funaki; Harold Houba; Evgenia Motchenkova
  7. Usage-Based Vehicle Insurance: Driving Style Factors of Accident Probability and Severity By Konstantin Korishchenko; Ivan Stankevich; Nikolay Pilnik; Daria Marchenko

  1. By: Antonio M. Bento; Mark R. Jacobsen; Christopher R. Knittel; Arthur A. van Benthem
    Abstract: Fuel-economy standards for new vehicles are a primary policy instrument in many countries to reduce the carbon footprint of the transportation sector. These standards have many channels of costs and benefit, impacting sales, composition, vehicle attributes, miles traveled and externalities in the new-car fleet, as well as the composition and size of the used fleet. We develop a tractable analytical framework to examine the welfare effects of fuel-economy standards, and apply it to the recent government proposal to roll back fuel-economy standards. We find that our combined, multi-market vehicle choice model implies that the proposal would increase the size of the vehicle fleet over time, and also generates smaller welfare gains than models with a less rich structure of the vehicle market, such as the one used in the analysis associated with the 2018 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) announcement. The disparities across the two models appear to result from the absence of feedback effects in the NPRM analysis. We stress the importance of instead using a multi-market vehicle choice model to provide the most accurate predictions of costs and benefits. We also derive bounds that can serve as a check on the theoretical consistency of such analyses, and that offer insights into the magnitudes of potential errors resulting from imperfect multi-market integration.
    JEL: H23 L51 Q38 Q48 Q58
    Date: 2019–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26309&r=all
  2. By: Etienne Billette de Villemeur; Annalisa Vinella
    Abstract: We consider a multi-service transportation system in which passengers are heterogeneous along two dimensions, namely ideal departure time and value of time, leading to both horizontal and vertical differentiation. We investigate the behavior of passengers, and assess how service pricing and scheduling affect their travel choices and welfare. We show that this depends, first, on whether passengers are uninformed or informed about the timetable of services, supplied at different prices, upon arrival at the station. Besides, given the information passengers hold, it also depends on their (individual-specific) value of time. The market segmentation results accordingly, and is found to be finer, in general, when passengers are informed. Our analysis offers policy-makers a scientifically founded tool to make sensible decisions, based on the exact identification of those who would gain and those who would lose from policy changes. The analysis further highlights the potential benefits of information, and points to the importance of facilitating information accessibility to passengers.
    Keywords: travel demand, service scheduling, market segmentation, targeted policy-making, impact of information
    JEL: D01 L91 L98
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7843&r=all
  3. By: Shaheen, Susan PhD; Martin, Elliot
    Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences
    Date: 2019–10–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsrrp:qt95j7g71k&r=all
  4. By: Nicole Adler; Eef Delhaye; Adit Kivel; Stef Proost
    Abstract: The ownership form of Air Navigation Service Providers varies across countries ranging from state agencies belonging to the Department of Transport, to government-owned corporations, to semi-private firms with for-profit or not-for-profit mandates. This research focusses on the link between the performance of ANSPs and their ownership form. A theoretical economic model suggests that effort to achieve cost efficiency will be higher in the case of public companies with a board of stakeholders composed of airspace users and in the case of private companies in which stakeholders are also shareholders. A stochastic frontier analysis estimation of the production and cost functions of 37 European air navigation service providers over nine years suggests that the public-private ownership form achieves statistically significantly higher cost and productive efficiency levels compared to either a government corporation or a state agency.
    Date: 2017–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:601932&r=all
  5. By: Froese, Jens; Jahn, Malte; Wedemeier, Jan; Wuczkowski, Matthäus
    Abstract: This action plan at hand will address the questions how ports can increase their efficiency, enhance their role in the industry, and become more sustainable. After presenting low carbon port activities within the DUAL ports project, the paper will derive implications for low carbon emission policies.
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hwwipp:n119&r=all
  6. By: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda University); Harold Houba (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Evgenia Motchenkova (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    Abstract: We develop a novel model of price-fee competition in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures and costly transportation. The model captures a variety of real market situations and it is the continuous quantity version of the assignment game with indivisible goods on a fixed network. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they achieve maximal bilateral joint welfare at prices equal to marginal costs. Maximal fees and the suppliers' market power are restricted by the buyers' credible threats to switch suppliers. Maximal fees also arise from a negotiation model that extends price competition to price-fee competition. Competition in both prices and fees necessarily emerges. It improves welfare compared to price competition, but buyers will not be better off. The minimal infrastructure achieving maximal aggregate welfare differs from the minimal network that protects buyers most.
    Keywords: Assignment Games, Infrastructure, Non-linear pricing, Market Power, Negotiations
    JEL: D43 C78 L1
    Date: 2019–09–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190070&r=all
  7. By: Konstantin Korishchenko; Ivan Stankevich; Nikolay Pilnik; Daria Marchenko
    Abstract: The paper introduces an approach to telematics devices data application in automotive insurance. We conduct a comparative analysis of different types of devices that collect information on vehicle utilization and driving style of its driver, describe advantages and disadvantages of these devices and indicate the most efficient from the insurer point of view. The possible formats of telematics data are described and methods of their processing to a format convenient for modelling are proposed. We also introduce an approach to classify the accidents strength. Using all the available information, we estimate accident probability models for different types of accidents and identify an optimal set of factors for each of the models. We assess the quality of resulting models using both in-sample and out-of-sample estimates.
    Date: 2019–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1910.00460&r=all

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