nep-tre New Economics Papers
on Transport Economics
Issue of 2018‒09‒03
nine papers chosen by
Erik Teodoor Verhoef
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

  1. Finland needs new ways of financing transport infrastructure By Hyytinen, Ari; Määttänen, Niku; Vihriälä, Vesa
  2. Restructuring the Chinese Freight Railway: Two Scenarios By Cui, Shana; Pittman, Russell; Zhao, Jian
  3. Financing Sustainability and Resiliency of Transportation Infrastructure in an Era of Fiscal Constraint By Rouhani, M. Rouhani
  4. Hidden Baggage : Behavioral Responses to Changes in Airline Ticket Tax Disclosure By Sebastien Bradley; Naomi E. Feldman
  5. What Goes Around Comes Around: Export-Enhancing Effects of Import- Tariff Reductions By Kazunobu HAYAKAWA; Jota ISHIKAWA; Nori TARUI
  6. Modern Tram and Public Transport Integration in Chinese Cities: A case study of Suzhou By Chia-Lin Chen
  7. Political Distortions and Infrastructure Networks in China: A Quantitative Spatial Equilibrium Analysis By Simon Alder; Illenin Kondo
  8. Welfare Effects of Open-Access Competition on Railway Markets By Broman, Emanuel; Eliasson, Jonas
  9. Impact of partial product outsourcing, transportation mode selection, and single-assignment requirements on the design of a multi-stage supply chain network By Cortinhal, M. J.; Lopes, M. J.; Melo, M. T.

  1. By: Hyytinen, Ari; Määttänen, Niku; Vihriälä, Vesa
    Abstract: Motor fuel tax revenue is likely to decrease in the coming years because of the shift to electric cars. At the same time, self-driving cars and so-called smart mobility -services require new type of investments into road infrastructure. The concentration of population in urban centres also adds to the investment needs. In other words, investment needs for transport infrastructure are increasing while the tax revenue generated by road traffic is decreasing. To tackle this challenge, Finland should start preparing a road fee system based on a modern positioning technology. A well-designed road fee system would allow for congestion charges thereby also helping urban planning. We should also increase property taxes to tax a higher share of land and house value increases due to transport infrastructure investments. Public-private-partnerships may also be useful in transport infrastructure investments. The fact that the government can usually borrow at a lower rate than private businesses does not imply that private financing is more expensive. This is because in a public-private-partnership, the private sector is expected to bear some of the risks.
    Keywords: Transport, infrastructure, user charges, property tax, ppp
    JEL: R41 R42 R53
    Date: 2018–08–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:briefs:70&r=tre
  2. By: Cui, Shana; Pittman, Russell; Zhao, Jian
    Abstract: Twenty years of debate regarding the restructuring of the Chinese freight railway have failed to yield a consensus. Early policy statements favoring the creation of above-the-rail competition over a monopoly infrastructure – the “European” model of rail restructuring – have broadened into a lively policy and scholarly debate that includes as an alternative the division of the system into competing vertically integrated railways – the “Americas” model of restructuring. To date, however, there have been no tangible reform steps beyond organizational restructuring, the construction of new coal railroads, some with private-sector participation, and the introduction of scheduled service, especially for containers, between China and Europe. In this paper we argue in favor of the Americas model as a basis for restructuring and offer two alternative scenarios for the creation of multiple vertically integrated freight railways. Both plans enable competition between independent firms and routes for import/export traffic, one a southern, One Belt/One Road path, the other a northern path via the Trans-Siberian Railway.
    Keywords: Freight railway, restructuring, competition, vertical separation, horizontal separation, China
    JEL: L14 L33 L43 L92 O18 R42
    Date: 2018–06–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:88407&r=tre
  3. By: Rouhani, M. Rouhani
    Abstract: In this short paper, I review several solutions in order to provide technical assistance to U.S. State officials in implementing new financing approaches for surface transportation projects. The general idea is to educate transportation officials on project funding and finance options, project planning and delivery, and life-cycle asset management. I examine a strategic plan and attempt to identify specific goals of such technical assistance.
    Keywords: Transportation system, Investment gaps, Education
    JEL: H1 R40 R48
    Date: 2018–08–17
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:88504&r=tre
  4. By: Sebastien Bradley; Naomi E. Feldman
    Abstract: We examine the impact on air travelers of an enforcement action issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation in January 2012 that required U.S. air carriers and online travel agents to incorporate all mandatory taxes and fees into their advertised fares. Exploiting cross-itinerary ticket tax variation within international city market pairs, we provide evidence that the more prominent display of tax-inclusive prices is associated with a significant reduction in tax incidence on consumers and a decline in passenger volume along more heavily-taxed itineraries. Ticket revenues are commensurately reduced. These results suggest a pronounced degree of inattention to ticket taxes prior to the introduction of full-fare advertising and reinforces the theoretical predictions and experimental findings of the literature on tax salience in a quasi-experimental context where taxes average more than $100 per ticket and where firms may engage in price-setting behavior.
    Keywords: Tax salience ; Airlines ; Ticket taxes ; Tax incidence
    JEL: H22 H31 D90 D18 L5
    Date: 2018–08–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2018-57&r=tre
  5. By: Kazunobu HAYAKAWA (Institute of Developing Economies); Jota ISHIKAWA (Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University and the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry); Nori TARUI (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa and the University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization)
    Abstract: In international trade, transportation requires a round trip for which a transport firm has to commit to the shipping capacity to meet the maximum shipping volume. This may cause the “backhaul problem.†Trade theory suggests that facing the problem, transport firms with market power adjust their freight rates strategically when import tariffs change. As a consequence, a country reducing its import tariffs may experience an increase in exports as well as imports. Using worldwide data during 2000-2007, we find evidence that supports these predictions. These findings indicate a new mechanism through which import-tariff reductions lead to export expansions.
    Keywords: Transport firm, freight rates, tariffs, backhaul problem
    JEL: F12 F13 R40
    Date: 2018–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201808&r=tre
  6. By: Chia-Lin Chen
    Abstract: This paper explores the role of modern trams in Chinese cities and identifies issues and challenges of integrating modern trams with other public transport modes. The Suzhou National High-tech District (SND) Tram is chosen as a representative case for study. The findings show that, due to the strict national policy and approval procedures, trams are often planned and constructed as a good alternative to metro systems. Instead of practically addressing transport congestion, with a “development-driven” and “control and management” ideology, the current approach emphasises new development and avoids potential confrontation and social unrest in dense urban areas. As a result, despite massive investment in tram and other public transport modes, public transport mobility is not competititve against car mobility. Lessons learnt from the Suzhou tram case include prioritising public transport, well articulating public transport systems at multiple levels, combining strategic planning and supportive policies, enabling open competition for tram operation, and exercising leadership for collective goverance.
    Date: 2017–07–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:itfaab:2017/21-en&r=tre
  7. By: Simon Alder (University of North Carolina at Chapel H); Illenin Kondo (Notre Dame)
    Abstract: Using the timing of China's highway network construction and political leadership cycles, we document systematic political distortions in the road infrastructure network: the birthplaces of the top officials who were in power during the network's design and implementation are more likely to be closer to the actual network compared to the optimal network arising from a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model. We then use the model to quantify the aggregate effects of distortions in the highway network. Altogether, aggregate income is 0.75 percent higher with the optimal highway network compared to the actual highway network. Counterfactual networks with political distortions simply modeled using standard iceberg transportation costs are shown to account for a portion of these welfare losses. Finally, we use light data regressions to show that political distortions to the optimal network are also associated with slower growth.
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed018:1269&r=tre
  8. By: Broman, Emanuel (CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI)); Eliasson, Jonas (City of Stockholm Traffic Department)
    Abstract: In recent years, several countries have deregulated passenger railway markets to allow open access. The aim is for competition to lower fares and increase quality of service, thereby increasing demand, economic efficiency and overall social welfare. In this paper, we use a stylised simulation model to study how open access competition affects fares, demand, supply, consumer surplus and operator profits compared to a profit-maximising monopoly and to a welfare-maximising benchmark situation. We conclude that aggregate social welfare increases substantially when going from profit-maximising monopoly to duopoly competition, as consumers make large gains while operators’ profits fall. According to simulations, there generally exists a stable competitive Nash equilibrium with two or more profitable operators. Although operators are identical in the model setup, the Nash equilibrium outcome is asymmetric: one operator has more departures and higher average fares than the other. If operators are allowed to collude, however, for example by trading or selling departure slots, the equilibrium situation tends to revert to monopoly: it will be profitable for one operator to buy the other’s departure slots to gain monopoly power. The regulatory framework must therefore prevent collusion and facilitate market entry. Even the potential for competitive entry tends to increase social welfare, as the monopolist has incentives to increase supply as an entry deterrence strategy.
    Keywords: open access; rail reform; capacity allocation; passenger
    JEL: D43 R41 R48
    Date: 2018–08–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2018_012&r=tre
  9. By: Cortinhal, M. J.; Lopes, M. J.; Melo, M. T.
    Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel mixed-integer linear programming model for a comprehensive multi-stage supply chain network design problem. Our model integrates location and capacity choices for plants and warehouses with supplier and transportation mode selection, and distribution of multiple products through the network. The aim is to identify the network configuration with least total cost subject to side constraints related to resource availability, technological conditions, and required customer service level. In addition to in-house production, end products may also be purchased from external sources and consolidated in warehouses. Therefore, our model identifies the best mix between in-house production and product outsourcing. To measure the impact of this strategy, we further present two additional formulations for alternative network design approaches that do not include partial product outsourcing. Several classes of valid inequalities tailored to the problems at hand are also proposed. We test our models on randomly generated instances and analyze the trade-offs achieved by integrating partial outsourcing into the design of a supply chain network against a pure in-house manufacturing strategy, and the extent to which it may not be economically attractive to provide full demand coverage.
    Keywords: supply chain network design,facility location,supplier selection,in-house production,product outsourcing,transportation mode selection,single-assignment,mixed-integer linear programming
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:htwlog:15&r=tre

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