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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Andersson , Henrik (Toulouse School of Economics); Hultkrantz , Lars (Örebro University); Lindberg , Gunnar (The Institute of Transport Economics, Norway); Nilsson , Jan-Eric (VTI) |
| Abstract: | Beginning as a planning tool within the national road administration in the early 1970s, benefit-cost analysis (BCA) became a pillar of national transport policy because of strategic choices made by the national parliament. The Transport Policy Act of 1979 established marginal instead of average cost as the overarching principle for pricing of transport. The subsequent 1988 Act separated rail infrastructure from train-service provision. Both policy updates made it necessary to widen the analysis of costs to include also externalities and a foregone conclusion was that efficient investment priorities should be made based on BCA. But no one asked whether the political decision makers or the BCA models were apt to that task. This paper reviews the current state of BCA for transport infrastructure investment and considers design issues that have been and still are debated, also providing a benchmark description of how these issues have been addressed elsewhere. Moreover, the role of BCA as a platform for prioritization of investment project is reviewed. |
| Keywords: | Benefit-cost analysis; Rail; Road; Sweden; Transport |
| JEL: | H43 H54 R42 |
| Date: | 2017–10–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2017_012&r=tre |
| By: | Bergantino, Angela Stefania; Capozza, Claudia; Capurso, Mauro |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we aim at empirically uncovering the existence of price leadership in the passenger transport market, whose oligopolistic structure facilitates the strategic interaction among companies, with price being one of the principal elements of competition. The strategic interaction is particularly favoured by the fact that prices are easily observable online by all competitors. The analysis focuses on selected Italian city-pair markets that differ from one another with respect to the degree of inter and intra-modal competition and to the characteristics of the transport services provided. We exploit this heterogeneity to study transport operators’ strategic interactions in different competitive environments. We find evidence of the existence of price leadership, even though results differ across city-pair markets. In particular, it emerges that the incumbent operator, in either the air or the rail sector, always holds the role of leader. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sit:wpaper:17_3&r=tre |
| By: | Muthers, Johannes; Hunold, Matthias |
| Abstract: | We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria in case of capacity constrained price competition, transportation costs and customer-specific pricing. Equilibrium prices weakly increase in the distance between supplier and customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, the firms exclusively their serve home markets. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of more distant customers to suppliers. Even ex-post subcontracts may restore efficiency only partly. |
| JEL: | L11 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168248&r=tre |
| By: | James B. Bushnell; Jonathan E. Hughes; Aaron Smith |
| Abstract: | Grain shippers and political figures in North Dakota and nearby states have voiced concern that the dramatic increases in shipments of crude oil by rail have caused service delays and higher costs. We investigate the potential impact of crude shipments on grain markets accounting for harvest effects and other potential sources of rail congestion. Increased crude oil shipments are associated with substantially larger spreads between wheat prices at regional elevators and in Minneapolis, the market hub. The effect on corn and soybean spreads are an order of magnitude smaller. Increased oil traffic is associated with small increases in rail rates but large increases in rail car auction prices. We document increases in wheat carry (storage) costs and decreases in shipment quantities. Surprisingly, little of the spread increase is due to lower prices paid to farmers, suggesting consumers rather than producers paid the cost of increased rail congestion. |
| JEL: | H22 Q02 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23924&r=tre |
| By: | Haucap, Justus; Heimeshoff, Ulrich; Siekmann, Manuel |
| Abstract: | We use a novel data set with exact price quotes from virtually all German gasoline stations to empirically investigate how a temporary variance in local market structure induced by restricted opening hours of specific players affects price competition. We find that, during their hours of opening, they have a significant negative price effect on nearby competitors. |
| JEL: | L71 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168198&r=tre |
| By: | Annette Ficker; Frits Spieksma; Gerhard Woeginger |
| Abstract: | The transportation problem is a fundamental problem in Operations Research, where items need to be transported from supply nodes (each with a given supply) to demand nodes (each with a given demand) in the cheapest possible way. Here, we are interested in a generalization of the transportation problem where, each supply node has a (possibly empty) set of conflicting pairs of demand nodes, and each demand node a (possibly empty) set of conflicting pairs of supply nodes. Each supply node may only receive supply from at most one demand node of each conflicting pair. Likewise, each demand node may only send supply to at most one supply node of each conflicting pair. We call the resulting problem the transportation problem with conflicts (TPC). We show that the complexity of TPC depends upon the structure of the so-called conflict graph that follows from the conflicting pairs. More concrete, we show that for many graph-classes the corresponding TPC remains NP-hard, and for some special cases we derive constant factor approximation algorithms. |
| Keywords: | Transportation problem, Conflict graph, Computational complexity, Approximation |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:kbiper:594801&r=tre |
| By: | Matsuyama, Kiminori |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a theoretical framework, which allows us to study the effects of geographical factors on the distribution of industries across many regions. The geographical feature of each region is summarized by a proximity matrix, whose elements measure the closeness between every pair of regions and depend on the parameters representing the transport and other costs of using a variety of trade routes. A change in these costs of trade affects the distribution of industries by amplifying the geographical advantages and disadvantages of regions. Through a series of examples, we demonstrate how this framework can be used not only to examine the effects of an improvement in transport infrastructure, but also to address some problems from economic history, regional economic integration, and the north-south division, and discuss some geopolitical issues. |
| Keywords: | A Multi-region Model of Costly Trade in Differentiated Goods; Convergence versus Divergence; Geographical Advantages and Disadvantages; Home Market Effect; monopolistic competition; Proximity Matrix; Regional Economic Integration; Trade Routes; Uneven Development |
| JEL: | F12 F15 O11 R12 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12352&r=tre |
| By: | Beattie, Graham; Durante, Ruben; Knight, Brian; Sen, Ananya |
| Abstract: | Do news media bias content in favor of advertisers? We examine the relationship between advertising by auto manufacturers in U.S. newspapers and news coverage of car safety recalls. This context allows us to separate the influence of advertisers, who prefer less coverage, from that of readers, who demand more. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that newspapers provide less coverage of recalls by their advertisers, especially the more severe ones. Competition for readers from other newspapers mitigates bias, while competition for advertising by online platforms exacerbates it. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that lower coverage increases auto fatalities. |
| Keywords: | advertising; car manufacturers; media bias; newspapers; safety recalls |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12366&r=tre |
| By: | Joshua D. Angrist; Sydnee Caldwell; Jonathan V. Hall |
| Abstract: | Ride-hailing drivers pay a proportion of their fares to the ride-hailing platform operator, a commission-based compensation model used by many internet-mediated service providers. To Uber drivers, this commission is known as the Uber fee. By contrast, traditional taxi drivers in most US cities make a fixed payment independent of their earnings, usually a weekly or daily medallion lease, but keep every fare dollar net of expenses. We assess these compensation models from a driver’s point of view using an experiment that offered random samples of Boston Uber drivers opportunities to lease a virtual taxi medallion that eliminates the Uber fee. Some drivers were offered a negative fee. Drivers’ labor supply response to our offers reveals a large intertemporal substitution elasticity, on the order of 1.2. At the same time, our virtual lease program was under-subscribed: many drivers who would have benefitted from buying an inexpensive lease chose to opt out. We use these results to compute the average compensation required to make drivers indifferent between ride-hailing and a traditional taxi compensation contract. The results suggest that ride-hailing drivers gain considerably from the opportunity to drive without leasing. |
| JEL: | J18 J22 J41 J58 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23891&r=tre |