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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Alfredo Marvão Pereira (Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg VA 23187); Rui Marvão Pereira (Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg VA 23187); João Pereira dos Santos (Nova School of Business and Economics, Faculdade de Economia – Universidade Nova de Lisboa) |
| Abstract: | We present a difference-in-differences analysis of the road safety effects of introducing tolls on SCUT highways in Portugal, a policy motivated purely by financial considerations, as congestion was never an issue. Using negative binomial count models and a comprehensive dataset on all mainland municipalities covering 2008 to 2014, we find that introducing tolls led to an increase in the total numbers of accidents and of road injuries in municipalities where SCUT highways are located. Additionally, we register a change in the composition thereof, with fewer occurrences on highways (including on SCUT highways) and an increase on national and other roads. Finally, we find that most effects pertain to light injuries. No statistically significant effects were identified for fatal or serious injuries. Furthermore, as a result of introducing tolls on SCUT highways, we estimate that around 20% of the toll revenue collected is lost on the costs linked to road accidents. This questions the rationale of introducing such tolls, even on a revenue-raising standpoint. |
| Keywords: | Road safety, Accident, Injury, Toll, Difference-in-differences, SCUT, Portugal |
| JEL: | R10 R41 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mde:wpaper:0074&r=tre |
| By: | Adrian Nerja (Universidad de Valencia. ERI-CES) |
| Abstract: | In the last decades the number of airports has grown substantially leading to situations where two or more airports share the same catchment area. On the other hand, the airlines market has been partially deregulated which has intensifi ed competition. All of these have motivated the formation of controversial vertical agreements as they raise possible anticompetitive issues. This paper considers a type of vertical agreement, concession revenue sharing contract, to analyze how airport-airline vertical structures compete for passengers when they share a catchment area. The analysis distinguishes the e ect of ownership structure of airports. Parallel alliances in the airlines market are also considered. Our results point out that airports have incentives to share the whole concession revenues, and that parallel alliances may improve Social Welfare. These results have policy implications because this kind of contract encourages Social Welfare, so they should to be leniently looked, just as the formation of alliances. |
| Keywords: | Concession revenues; Revenue shraing; Airport competition; Airport-airline vertical cooperation; Parallel alliances. |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0317&r=tre |
| By: | Jan J. Rouwendal (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands); Or Levkovich (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Ismir Mulalic (DTU, KRAKS) |
| Abstract: | An emerging quantitative spatial economics literature models commuting interactions by a gravity equation that is mathematically equivalent to a multinomial logit model. This model is widely viewed as restrictive because of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property that links substitution behavior in response to changes in the attractiveness of choice alternatives to choice probabilities in a mechanistic way. This is relevant for counterfactual analysis. In this paper we examine the appropriateness of the commuting model from a theoretical as well as an empirical point of view. We show that conventional specification tests of the multinomial logit model are of limited use when alternative specific constants are used, as is common in the recent literature, and offer no information with respect to the validity of IIA. In particular, we show that maximum likelihood estimation of relevant nested logit model is impossible because the crucial parameters are not identified. We discuss cross-nested and mixed logit as alternatives. We argue that a comparison between predicted and actual changes in commuting flows in response to a change in the attractiveness of choice alternatives provides a more informative test for the validity of the multinomial logit model for commuting interaction and report the results of such a test – as well as others – for data referring to Copenhagen. |
| Keywords: | quantitative spatial economics; multinomial logit; mixed logit; independence of irrelevant alternatives |
| JEL: | R1 R2 R4 |
| Date: | 2017–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170067&r=tre |
| By: | Esteves, Rui; Geisler Mesevage, Gabriel |
| Abstract: | In the 1840s, speculation in railway shares in the UK prompted the creation of hundreds of new railway companies. Each company needed to petition Parliament for the approval of new railway routes. In this paper, we investigate whether parliamentary regulation of the new railway network was distorted by politicians' vested interests. Drawing on methods from peer-effects analysis, we identify situations where MPs could have traded votes with specific colleagues in order to get their preferred projects approved (logrolling). We confirm that logrolling was both prevalent and significant. Our estimates suggest that at least a quarter of approved lines received their bills because of logrolling. Companies approved through logrolling also underperformed in the stock market during the railway bubble and after its final crash in 1847. |
| Keywords: | networks; railways; rent-seeking; voting |
| JEL: | D72 N44 N73 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12182&r=tre |
| By: | Samuel de Haas (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen); Jan Thomas Schaefer (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen) |
| Abstract: | We study effects on prices and quantities of a takeover in the rather concentrated German interurban bus industry. We empirically asses the effect of the takeover of Postbus by Flixbus on industry key features, using a route-level price data set containing prices for more than 6,000 routes in Germany for a period between September and December 2016. We find that average prices significantly increase and quantities decrease in the post-takeover phase. However, these results are mainly driven by the fact that Postbus was a low-cost supplier. The remaining providers do not seem to have increased their prices significantly in the post-takeover phase. This absence of a price increase despite the removal of a close competitor could be an indication of a strong impact of intermodal competition. This suggestion is confirmed by our empirical findings. |
| Keywords: | Competition, Takeover, Interurban Bus Services, Germany |
| JEL: | L11 L41 L92 K21 K23 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201731&r=tre |