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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Shladover, Steven E; Nowakowski, Christopher; Lu, Xiao-Yun; Hoogendoorn, Raymond |
| Abstract: | This research identifies the operational concepts for managing cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) vehicle maneuvering and traffic flows. This includes approaches for grouping the CACC vehicles, ranging from ad-hoc to centrally coordinated strategies, and the incentives that could be used to facilitate the vehicle clustering, both operational and financial. These are particularly important at low market penetrations, when the CACC vehicles are likely to be widely separated. The dissolution of CACC strings is also discussed, since this needs to be done carefully to avoid adverse traffic impacts. While the main focus is on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) CACC for use on limited access highways, strategies for infrastructure to vehicle (I2V) CACC and for both V2V and I2V CACC on signalized arterials are also considered. Connected Cruise Control (CCC), which has been developed as a driver-advisory transitional strategy to lead toward CACC in the Netherlands, is also discussed. |
| Keywords: | Engineering, Cooperative adaptive cruise control, vehicle to vehicle communication, infrastructure to vehicle communication |
| Date: | 2014–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsrrp:qt3m89p611&r=tre |
| By: | C.-Philipp Heller (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin); Johannes Johnen (European School of Management and Technology); Sebastian Schmitz (Freie Universitae Berlin) |
| Abstract: | We study road congestion as a mechanism design problem. In our basic model we analyze the allocation of a set of drivers among two roads, one of which may be congested. An additional driver on the congestible road imposes an externality on the other drivers by increasing their travel time. Each driver is privately informed about her value of time and asked to report that value to the mechanism designer, who assigns drivers to roads. With a nite number of drivers, there is aggregate uncertainty and the efficient allocation is ex ante unknown. Setting a single Pigouvian price is then not optimal. However, the efficient allocation is implementable by a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price schedule that lets each driver pay the externality she imposes on other drivers. This allows drivers to pay to have other drivers use the slow road instead of the congestible road. As the number of drivers becomes large, there is a single optimal Pigouvian price that leads to an efficient allocation. However, finding this price requires the mechanism designer to either know the precise distribution of the value of time or the use of our mechanism. We analyze some extensions and apply our model to various congestion problems arising in other contexts. Creation Date: 2015-06-26 |
| Keywords: | Mechanism Design, Congestion Pricing, VCG Mechanism, Externalities, Value of Time |
| JEL: | D82 D62 R48 R41 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2015008&r=tre |
| By: | Mathias Beiglb\"ock; Marcel Nutz; Nizar Touzi |
| Abstract: | We study the optimal transport between two probability measures on the real line, where the transport plans are laws of one-step martingales. A quasi-sure formulation of the dual problem is introduced and shown to yield a complete duality theory for general marginals and measurable reward (cost) functions: absence of a duality gap and existence of dual optimizers. Both properties are shown to fail in the classical formulation. As a consequence of the duality result, we obtain a general principle of cyclical monotonicity describing the geometry of optimal transports. |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1507.00671&r=tre |
| By: | Stefanie Peer (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria); Jasper Knockaert (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Erik Verhoef (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | We study the trip scheduling preferences of train commuters in a real-life setting. The underlying data have been collected during large-scale peak avoidance experiment conducted in the Netherlands, in which participants could earn monetary rewards for traveling outside peak hours. The experiment included ca. 1000 participants and lasted for about 6 months. Holders of an annual train pass were invited to join the experiment, and a customized smartphone app was used to measure the travel behavior of the participants. We find that compared to the pre-measurement, the relative share of peak trips decreased by 22% during the reward period, and by 10% during the post-measurement. By combining multiple complementary data sources, we are able to specify and estimate (MNL and panel latent class) departure time choice models. These yield plausible estimates for the monetary values that participants attach to reducing travel time, schedule delays, the number of transfers, crowdedness, and unreliability. |
| Keywords: | C25; C90; D01; D80; R41 |
| Date: | 2015–07–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150078&r=tre |
| By: | Sudhölter, Peter (Department of Business and Economics); Zarzuelo, José M. (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | A highway problem is a cost sharing problem that arises if the common resource is an ordered set of sections with fixed costs such that each agent demands consecutive sections. We show that the core, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value on the class of TU games associated with highway problems possess characterizations related to traditional axiomatizations of the solutions on certain classes of games. However, in the formulation of the employed simple and intuitive properties the associated games do not occur. The main axioms for the core and the nucleolus are consistency properties based on the reduced highway problem that arises from the original highway problem by eliminating any agent of a specific type and using her charge to maintain a certain part of her sections. The Shapley value is characterized with the help of individual independence of outside changes, a property that requires the fee of an agent only depending on the highway problem when truncated to the sections she demands. An alternative characterization is based on the new contraction property. Finally it is shown that the games that are associated with generalized highway problems in which agents may demand non-connected parts are the positive cost games, i.e., nonnegative linear combinations of dual unanimity games. |
| Keywords: | TU game; airport problem; highway problem; core; nucleolus; Shapley value |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2015–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2015_013&r=tre |