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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Jingquan, Li; Chan, Ching-Yao; Zhou, Kun; Zhang, Wei-Bin |
| Abstract: | This report documents a research effort to understand the current practice and issues associated with Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) planning and deployment. It reviewed the design options incorporated into existing BRT deployments across California and the nation. The project team interviewed practitioners of California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) Districts and transit agencies to understand the BRT project approval decision-making process, the impacts of BRT implementation and the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for transit and non-transit system performance. The studies revealed that though Caltrans and transit agencies do use a similar set of MOEs for the evaluation of BRT projects, the emphasis and parametric assumptions for the MOEs may be different and can influence the results of the evaluation. Other evaluation criteria and factors must be considered. This study concluded that a systematic approach needs to be developed and taken in the BRT planning process. |
| Keywords: | Engineering, Bus rapid transit, measures of effectiveness, evaluation, traffic congestion, California Department of Transportation |
| Date: | 2015–03–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsrrp:qt90z0n86b&r=tre |
| By: | Cheung, Jimmy; Kragt, Marit; Burton, Michael |
| Abstract: | Several airlines in Australia have initiated voluntary carbon offset (VCO) programs, called 'Fly Carbon Neutral', to encourage their customers to offset the carbon emissions of their flight. A VCO scheme aims to 'neutralise' emissions from a particular activity, by compensating with carbon reduction projects in another sector. As well as carbon sequestration, these activities often bring secondary benefits such as wildlife protection. There are currently few studies about the awareness and willingness to pay to offset carbon emission from flying. This paper conducted a choice experiment study to address this knowledge gap, by estimating Australian air travellers' willingness to pay for different attributes of carbon offset projects. Analyses reveal that values for carbon offset projects depend on respondent's perceptions of the importance of the aviation industry's contribution to the global carbon emissions, membership of environmental organisation, education level, income and their age. Results show that the majority of respondents preferred to not buy an offset. Of those respondents willing to buy an offset, most preferred renewable energy projects located in their own state over reforestation or forest protection projects in other states or overseas. The results will provide a better understanding of air travellers' preference, thus to improve future carbon offset policies making. |
| Keywords: | Carbon offsets, Aviation industry, Willingness to pay, Choice experiments, Choice modelling, Australia, Environmental Economics and Policy, Q51, Q57, |
| Date: | 2015–03–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:uwauwp:199231&r=tre |
| By: | Jakob Landwehr (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | The question how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first the Designer defends network connectivity by forming costly links and additionally protecting nodes. Then, the Adversary attacks a fixed number of nodes, aiming to disconnect the network. In contrast to the existing literature, defense is imperfect in the sense that defended nodes can still be destroyed with some fixed probability. We completely characterize the solution of the game for attack budgets of one and two nodes, while for larger budget we present a partial characterization of the solution. To do so, we determine the minimum number of links necessary to construct a network with any degree of connectivity and any given number of essential nodes. |
| Keywords: | Network Design, Network Defense, Designer-Adversary Games, Node Destruction |
| JEL: | C69 C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:537&r=tre |
| By: | An, Yonghong; Tang, Xun |
| Abstract: | We introduce a structural model of procurement auctions with incomplete contracts, where a procurer chooses an initial project specification endogenously. The contract between the procurer and the winner of the auction is incomplete in that the two parties may agree to adopt a new feasible specification later, and negotiate an additional transfer via Nash Bargaining where both parties’ disagreement values depend on the auction price. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, contractors competing in the auction take account of such incompleteness while quoting prices. We show that the model primitives are non-parametrically identified and propose a feasible estimation procedure. Using data from highway procurement auctions in California, we estimate the structural elements that determine the hold-up due to incompleteness, and infer how a contractor’s bargaining power and the mark-up in the price quoted vary with its characteristics and the features of the construction project. We also find that ignoring the existence of contract incompleteness in the structural analysis of the bidding data leads to substantial over-estimation of the mark-ups in the prices. |
| Keywords: | Identification, estimation, incomplete contracts, procurement auctions |
| JEL: | C14 D44 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:62602&r=tre |