|
on Transport Economics |
| By: | Randy Chugh; Maureen L. Cropper |
| Abstract: | We estimate a model of vehicle choice and miles driven to analyze the impact of fuel conservation policies in the Indian car market. Taxing diesel fuel to equalize diesel and petrol prices would reduce fuel consumption in the new car market by 7% and reduce diesel cars sales by 26%. A tax on diesel cars with the same sales impact would reduce fuel consumption by only 2%. The compensating variation per liter of fuel saved is smaller for the fuel tax than for the car tax; however, the car tax has lower deadweight loss per liter of fuel saved. Our estimates of the long-run elasticities of fuel consumption with respect to fuel prices imply that the CAFE standards contemplated by the Indian government would generate a significant rebound effect. Projected fuel savings are 20% if consumers do not adjust to the change in operating costs and less than 9% once consumers adjust. |
| JEL: | L9 Q48 R48 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20460&r=tre |
| By: | Badalyan, Gohar; Herzfeld, Thomas; Rajcaniova, Miroslava |
| Keywords: | Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, |
| Date: | 2014–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaa142:168922&r=tre |
| By: | TALARICO, Luca; SÖRENSEN, Kenneth; SPRINGAEL, Johan |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we present a variant of the vehicle routing problem (VRP) to increase security in the cash-in-transit sector. A speci?c index is used to quantify the exposure of a vehicle to the risk of being robbed along its route. In addition, the problem is subjected to a traditional capacity constraint, according to which a maximum amount of valuables can be transported inside the vehicle. Th?is constraint might be imposed, for example, by insurance companies. A bi-objective formulation, aimed at reducing both the risk and the travel cost, is proposed. Th?e objectives are con?flicting since higher risk exposures allow a reduction of the travel cost needed to visit and collect valuables from all customers. A mathematical model of the problem is proposed and solved by using a progressive multi-objective metaheuristic. Realistic instances are also generated considering the geographical coordinates of several customers (e.g., stores, banks, shopping centres) located in Belgium. Th?e proposed solution approach is tuned and tested both on these realistic instances and on standard benchmark instances for the capacitated vehicle routing problem. |
| Keywords: | Metaheuristic, Multi-objective optimization, Combinatorial optimization, Cash-in-transit, Security |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2014026&r=tre |
| By: | Gu, Yiquan; Rasch, Alexander; Wenzel, Tobias |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits the optimal entry decision in a differentiated product market where customer demand is price-sensitive and depends on a per-unit transport cost. We show that too few firms may enter for high entry cost and high transport cost compared to the socially optimal outcome. |
| Keywords: | Circular city,Horizontal product differentiation,Market entry,Price-sensitive demand |
| JEL: | L11 L13 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:165&r=tre |
| By: | Antonio Estache; Grégoire Garsous; Ronaldo Seroa da Motta |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of political (mis)alignment on public service deliverywhen mandates are shared between state and local governments. We analyze sewage treatmentpolicies in the State of São Paulo, Brazil. Based on a regression discontinuity design, we establisha causal relationship between political alignment and higher sewage treatment provision.Conceptually, we find that, with uncertain local commitment and weakly enforceable localobligations, shared mandates lead to a moral hazard issue implying service under-provision.When political alignment is an option, our results show that it attenuates such moral hazardeffects. |
| Keywords: | political alignment; infrastructure provision; moral hazard; regression discontinuity design |
| JEL: | H40 H54 H70 P48 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/177104&r=tre |
| By: | Gaudet, Gérard; Salant, Stephen (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this chapter is to provide an elementary introduction to the nonrenewable resource model with multiple demand curves. The theoretical literature following Hotelling (1931) assumed that all energy needs are satisfied by one type of resource (e.g. “oil"), extractible at different per-unit costs. This formulation implicitly assumes that all users are the same distance from each resource pool, that all users are subject to the same regulations, and that motorist users can switch as easily from liquid fossil fuels to coal as electric utilities can. These assumptions imply, as Herfindahl (1967) showed, that in competitive equilibrium all users will exhaust a lower cost resource completely before beginning to extract a higher cost resource: simultaneous extraction of different grades of oil or of oil and coal should never occur. In trying to apply the single- demand curve model during the last twenty years, several teams of authors have independently found a need to generalize it to account for users differing in their (1) location, (2) regulatory environment, or (3) resource needs. Each research team found that Herfindahl's strong, unrealistic conclusion disappears in the generalized model; in its place, a weaker Herfindahl result emerges. Since each research team focussed on a different application, however, it has not always been clear that everyone has been describing the same generalized model. Our goal is to integrate the findings of these teams and to exposit the generalized model in a form which is easily accessible. |
| Keywords: | Climate, Energy, Transportation, Waste Management |
| Date: | 2014–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-14-21&r=tre |
| By: | Frank A. Sloan; Patricia A. Robinson; Lindsey M. Eldred |
| Abstract: | This study quantifies the importance of private information, separates the extent to which the positive correlation between the accident probability and insurance coverage reflects adverse selection and moral hazard, and analyzes market segmentation on objective accident risk. We use data we collected to examine the importance of potential sources of private information in individualsʼ third- and first-party insurance choices. Individuals with higher subjective accident probabilities have less liability exposure post insurance purchase and more often experience an accident, conditional on factors insurers use for risk classification. This evidence is consistent with the positive correlation between accident occurrence and liability insurance coverage. We find that the positive correlation almost completely reflects adverse selection. In analysis of insurer sorting, we find that accident-free drivers obtain coverage from insurers with higher independent agency quality ratings. High-quality insurers eschew low-quality drivers on measured dimensions because these drivers are more likely to possess private information about their driving ability and proclivities that affect expected loss. Drivers with a higher risk on factors observable to insurers tend to have private information about their accident risk. This sorting process reflects an institutional response to asymmetric information, and assures a continuous supply of private insurance to unsafe drivers. |
| JEL: | D82 I12 R41 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20679&r=tre |