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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Alessandro Avenali (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Tiziana D'Alfonso (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Claudio Leporelli (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Giorgio Matteucci (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Alberto Nastasi (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Pierfrancesco Reverberi (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza") |
| Abstract: | We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that generates an efficient slot allocation, where prices are built on a measure of the best use of each slot in serving end users. Incentive prices are set by considering the structure of the air transport network (and thus interdependencies among slots at different airports) in a given region, and the effect on both quantity and quality of passenger air transport in the region. Therefore, incentive prices should better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with pure market mechanisms (auctions and trading). |
| Keywords: | Airport slot allocation; Congestion; Administered incentive pricing; Market mechanisms |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aeg:report:2014-03&r=tre |
| By: | Beria, Paolo; Grimaldi, Raffaele; Debernardi, Andrea; Ferrara, Emanuele; Laurino, Antonio |
| Abstract: | In Italy long distance coach services have long played a significant role in connecting the most dispersed part of the country to major destinations, giving an important contribution to social and geographical inclusion, but remaining limited in absolute numbers and receiving marginal attention by the general public and even policy makers. After years of stability, the industry is going to face radical changes in the next years since its liberalisation process, gradually started in 2007, was completed at the end of 2013, changing from exclusive concessions to non-exclusive authorisations. In this paper we perform some spatial and scenario analyses, with particular reference to competing transport modes and new potential markets. The industry supplied more than 88 million bus-km in 2012, serving about 2.6 billion passenger-km. The existing network, providing a particularly extensive service in the South and in the Centre of the country, directly serves 2/3 of Italian population. New opportunities are arising as a consequence of liberalisation, changes in competing modes (in particular long distance railway services) and changes in characteristics of part of the country also as a consequence of more recent internal migration phenomena. Coach services in 2013 are serving only 27,000 origin-destination, including indirect connection, out of about 115,000 formally allowed. Many relations, including some very important in terms of total mobility, are still unexplored and left to competing transport modes (rail and air). Our analyses suggest that the most promising relations for possible new services appear to be those among the Centre and the North-East of the country, with a polarisation on urban areas having limited rail services. |
| Keywords: | coach, bus, intercity, long distance, express, highway, public transport, transport planning, Italy |
| JEL: | R4 R40 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54739&r=tre |
| By: | Grimm, Michael (University of Passau); Treibich, Carole (Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We focus on helmet use behavior among motorbike users in Delhi. We use a detailed data set collected for the purpose of the study. To guide our empirical analysis, we rely on a simple model in which drivers decide on self-protection and self-insurance. The empirical findings suggest that risk averse drivers are more likely to wear a helmet, there is no systematic effect on speed. Helmet use also increases with education. Drivers who show a higher awareness of road risks are both more likely to wear a helmet and to speed less. Controlling for risk awareness, we observe that drivers tend to compensate between speed and helmet use. The results can provide a basis for awareness-raising policies. Improvements to the road infrastructure bear the risk of leading to risk-compensating behavior. |
| Keywords: | road safety, helmet use, risky health behavior, self-protection, self-insurance, India, risk-taking behavior |
| JEL: | D10 I10 I15 K42 R41 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8042&r=tre |
| By: | Valentina Bracaglia (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Tiziana D'Alfonso (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Alberto Nastasi (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza") |
| Abstract: | We study airport competition when vertically differentiated products may be strategically offered at the time of ticket purchase through the Internet: a base product Ð the flight Ð and a composite one Ð the flight plus some premium commercials (PCs), as car parking, car rental or hotel reservation. We model a two stages game: first airports decide whether to offer PCs online, thus making the purchasing decisions interact through observability of aviation and commercial prices. Then, they engage in Bertrand competition deciding on both prices. We find that airports set lower aviation charge than they would have levied absent concessions, when they are both competing on online offers. Nevertheless, when only one airport pursues the online offer, that facility sets a higher aviation charge than it would have levied absent concessions, as long as profits from retail earned at the facility on the travel day are not high enough. This suggests that the combined effect between airports competition on side business and demand complementarity does moderate airports market power in the core business. The Nash equilibrium of the game is such that both airports offer PCs on line, making travelers account for the surplus they would gain from both the sides of the business when they buy air tickets. This is welfare enhancing. Nevertheless, when profits from retail earned at the airports on the travel day are sufficiently high, the facilities are caught in a PrisonerÕs Dilemma. |
| Keywords: | Airports competition; e-commerce; concessions; vertical differentiation |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aeg:report:2014-04&r=tre |
| By: | Hermeling, Claudia; Klement, Jan Henrik; Koesler, Simon; Köhler, Jonathan; Klement, Dorothee |
| Abstract: | On the basis of a joint economic and legal analysis, we evaluate the effects of a 'regional' (European) emission trading scheme aiming at reducing emissions of international shipping. The focus lies on the question which share of emissions from maritime transport activities to and from the EU can and should be included in such a system. Our findings suggest that the attempt to implement an EU maritime ETS runs into a dilemma. It is not possible to design a system that achieves emission reductions in a cost efficient manner and is compatible with international law. -- |
| Keywords: | emission trading,international shipping,maritime emissions,regional emission trading,international jurisdiction for emission trading schemes |
| JEL: | L91 Q58 R48 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14021&r=tre |
| By: | Zhang, Zheng; Fujii, Hidemichi; Managi, Shunsuke |
| Abstract: | This study examines the impact of incentives on commuters’ travel behavior based upon a questionnaire survey conducted on the Beijing Subway System. Overall, we find that giving incentives to commuters, especially fast food restaurant-related services and reduced ticket fares, has a positive influence on morning rush-hour avoidance. Furthermore, using interaction analysis, we discover that the flexible work time schedule has an impact on commuters’ behavior and the efficiency of the subway system. Finally, we recommend two possible policies to maximize the utility of the subway system and to reduce congestion at the peak of morning service: 1) a set of incentives including free wireless internet connection service with a coupon for breakfast and a discount on ticket fares before the morning peak, and 2) the introduction of a flexible work time schedule. |
| Keywords: | Behavior, Incentives, Morning Peak, Commute, Beijing Subway System, Flexibility |
| JEL: | O18 R40 R48 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54691&r=tre |
| By: | Miquel-Àngel Garcia-López (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona & IEB); Albert Solé-Ollé (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB) |
| Abstract: | We study whether local land use policies are modified in response to enhanced demand for building generated by a new highway. We also examine the extent to which this effect affects building activity. We focus on the case of Spain during the last housing boom (1995-2007). We assembled a new database with information about new highway segments and the modification of the land zoning status in nearby municipalities. The empirical strategy compares the variation in the amount of developable land before-after the construction of the highway in treated municipalities and in control municipalities with similar pre-treatment traits. Our results show that, following the construction of a highway, municipalities converted a huge amount of land from rural to urban uses. We also show that new highways have an impact on building activity. |
| Keywords: | Land use regulation, Highways |
| JEL: | R4 R52 O2 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2014-2&r=tre |
| By: | Brunes, Fredrik (Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of Technology); Lind, Hans (Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | The first part of the article presents a new framework for analyzing cost overruns. It has a descriptive part in two dimensions: when during the process that the cost overrun arose and what part of the cost function was responsible (change in the product, change in quantities of the inputs and change in price of inputs. The explanatory part is a development of Flyvbjerg´s theories and identifies four possible explanations: political/strategic aspects, psychological aspects, competence related and bad luck. It is argued that Flyvbjerg´s technological explanation belongs to the descriptive part. The empirical part of the paper uses this framework to analyze cost overruns in infrastructure projects in Sweden, primarily based on a questionnaire to experienced project managers. The results is that most of the cost overruns occur in the planning stages up to the final design and are related to design changes and to increases in the amount of inputs needed because of technical and administrative problems. Of the explanatory factors there is most support for lack of competence and optimism bias. |
| Keywords: | cost overrun; theoretical framework; infrastructure; Sweden |
| JEL: | L21 L24 L32 |
| Date: | 2014–03–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2014_001&r=tre |