nep-tre New Economics Papers
on Transport Economics
Issue of 2013‒09‒13
five papers chosen by
Erik Teodoor Verhoef
VU University Amsterdam

  1. Optimal Environmental Policy with Network Effects: Is Lock-in in Dirty Technologies Possible? By Mads, Greaker; Kristoffer, Midttømme
  2. Impactos econômicos da recente política de revisão tarifária do setor ferroviário de carga no Brasil (2013-2025) By Admir Betarelli Jr; Edson Domingues
  3. Cost Sharing in Chains and Other Fixed Trees By Hougaard, Jens Leth; Tvede, Mich; Østerdal, Lars Peter
  4. Accounting for uncertainty in willingness to pay for environmental benefits By Daziano, Ricardo A.; Achtnicht, Martin
  5. Formation of supply chain collaboration and firm performance in the Thai automotive and electronics industries By Ueki, Yasushi

  1. By: Mads, Greaker (Statistics Norway); Kristoffer, Midttømme (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)
    Abstract: Network externalities could be present for many low or zero emission technologies. One obvious example is alternative fuel cars, whose use value depends on the network of service stations. The literature has only briefy looked at environmentally benefcial technologies. Yet, the general literature on network effects is mixed on whether governments need to intervene in order to correct for network externalities. In this paper we study implications of network effects on environmental policy in a discrete time dynamic game. Firms sell a durable good. One type of durable is causing pollution when being used, while the other type is "clean". Consumers' utility increase in the number of other users of the same type of durable, which gives rise to the network effect. We find that the optimal tax depends on the size of the clean network. If starting from a situation in which the dirty network dominates, the optimal tax may exceed the marginal environmental damage, thereby charging consumers for more than just their own emissions. Applying a Pigovian tax may, on the contrary, fail to introduce a socially beneficial clean network.
    Keywords: Network eects; lock-in; enviromnetal taxes
    JEL: H23 Q55 Q58
    Date: 2013–06–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2013_015&r=tre
  2. By: Admir Betarelli Jr (PhD, Cedeplar-UFMG); Edson Domingues (Cedeplar-UFMG)
    Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the long turn economic impacts of tariff review policy of the Brazilian rail freight sector, as well as explore some analytic potential of the dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model which captures some forms of market imperfections (such as increasing returns to scale, imperfect markets). The main findings of this application indicated that tariff policies promote positive long turn effects on GDP growth, exports, and investments. In addition, the sectorial projections of such policies suggest a negative effect on the rail sector and positive effects on sectors’ production, which are most dependent on rail modal.
    Keywords: rail modal; general equilibrium; market imperfections.
    JEL: C68 D4 R40
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdp:texdis:td496&r=tre
  3. By: Hougaard, Jens Leth (Department of Food and Resource Economics); Tvede, Mich (Newcastle University); Østerdal, Lars Peter (Department of Business and Economics)
    Abstract: We consider a cost sharing problem among agents on a line. The problem is closely related to the classic airport game, but in our model agents are characterized by their location, rather than their needed runway length. We characterize a family of cost allocation rules in which agents pay a share of the incremental costs as well as any debt from upstream agents, with the Bird rule (where agents pay their full incremental cost) and the ‘free rider’ rule (where the terminal agent pays everything) as the two extreme cases. We also extend the analysis to cost sharing among agents located on a fixed tree structure.
    Keywords: Airport game; cost allocation; axiomatic characterization; Bird Rule; Incremental cost sharing
    JEL: C71 D63
    Date: 2013–09–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2013_012&r=tre
  4. By: Daziano, Ricardo A.; Achtnicht, Martin
    Abstract: Previous literature on the distribution of willingness to pay has focused on its heterogeneity distribution without addressing exact interval estimation. In this paper we derive and analyze Bayesian confidence sets for quantifying uncertainty in the determination of willingness to pay for carbon dioxide abatement. We use two empirical case studies: household decisions of energy-efficient heating versus insulation, and purchase decisions of ultralow-emission vehicles. We first show that deriving credible sets using the posterior distribution of the willingness to pay is straightforward in the case of deterministic consumer heterogeneity. However, when using individual estimates, which is the case for the random parameters of the mixed logit model, it is complex to define the distribution of interest for the interval estimation problem. This latter problem is actually more involved than determining the moments of the heterogeneity distribution of the willingness to pay using frequentist econometrics. A solution that we propose is to derive and then summarize the distribution of point estimates of the individual willingness to pay under different loss functions. --
    Keywords: Discrete Choice Models,Willingness to Pay,Credible Sets
    JEL: C25 D12 Q51
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13059&r=tre
  5. By: Ueki, Yasushi
    Abstract: This paper examines factors that encourage firms to go into supply chain collaborations (SCC) and relationships between SCC and supply chain performances (SCP), using a questionnaire survey on Thai automotive and electronics industries in 2012. OLS regression results show firms established supplier evaluation and audit system, system of rewards for high-performance supplier and long-term transactions with their supply chain partners under a competitive pressure are more closely cooperate with these partners on information sharing and decision synchronization. Instrumental variables regression indicates SCC arisen from competitive pressure, supplier evaluation and audit, a system of rewards for high-performance supplier and long-term relationship causally influence SCP such as on-time delivery, responsiveness to fast procurement, flexibility to customer need, and profit.
    Keywords: Thailand, Distribution, Industrial management, Automobile industry, Electronic industries, Supply chain collaboration, Supply chain performance, Automotive, Electronics, Supply chain
    JEL: L23 L62 L63 O31 O53 D22
    Date: 2013–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper415&r=tre

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