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on Transport Economics |
By: | Stephen Gibbons; Teemu Lyytikäinen; Henry Overman; Rosa Sanchis-Guarner |
Abstract: | This paper estimates the impact of road improvements on firm employment and productivity using plant level longitudinal data for Britain. Exposure to transport improvements is measured by changes in employment accessibility along the road network. These changes are constructed using data on employment for small geographical units, details of the main road network and of road construction schemes carried out between 1998 and 2007. We deal with the central problem of endogenous scheme placement by using changes due to new road links and exploiting the spatial detail in our data to focus on accessibility changes close to new schemes. We find substantial effects on employment and numbers of plants for small-scale geographical areas (electoral wards), but no employment response at plant level. This suggests that road construction affects firm entry and exit, but not the employment of existing firms. We also find effects on labour productivity and wages at the firm level, although these results are less robust. |
Keywords: | Productivity, employment, accessibility, transport |
JEL: | D24 O18 R12 |
Date: | 2012–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:sercdp:0117&r=tre |
By: | Jo Reynaerts |
Abstract: | We consistently estimate the parameters of 600 and 1200 ft lock congestion func- tions by exploiting the geographical variation in demand patterns for individual locks along the Upper Mississippi River system of locks and dams. In addition to avoiding endogeneity bias, we control for lock-specific heterogeneity in estimating a fixed- effects regression model that relates lock congestion to lock usage and lock charac- teristics. Using a panel data set spanning the years 1993–2010, we find significant empirical evidence of the existence of a quadratic lock congestion function for 600 ft technology in the sense of BPR (1964). While 1200 ft technology on the other hand seemly operates under free-flow conditions, the presence of an auxiliary chamber significantly mitigates congestion, with the effect being more pronounced for higher levels of traffic. Unscheduled lock outages and non-commercial traffic attenuate lock congestion. |
Date: | 2012 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:vivwps:34&r=tre |
By: | Vincent A.C. van den Berg (VU University Amsterdam) |
Abstract: | This paper investigates regulation by auctions of private supply of congestible infrastructures in two networks settings: 1) two serial facilities, where the consumer has to use both in order to consume; and 2) two parallel facilities that are imperfect substitutes. There are four market structures: a monopoly and 3 duopolies that differ in how firms interact. The effects of an auction depend on what the bidders compete. With a bid auction, the bidders compete on how much money they transfer to the government. This auction leads to the same outcome as the unregulated game (for a given market structure), since this gives the maximum profit to transfer. An auction on the capacity of a facility leads to an even lower welfare than no regulation, because firms set very high capacities and usage fees. Conversely, an auction on generalised price or number of users leads to the first-best outcome. Moreover, these two auctions are robust: they attain the first-best regardless of whether the facilities are auctioned off to a single firm or to two firms, and for all market and network structures. On the contrary, the performances (relative to the first-best) of the bid and capacity auctions strongly depend on these considerations. |
Keywords: | private supply; congestible facilities; auctions; serial facilities; parallel facilities; imperfect substitutes |
JEL: | D43 L13 L51 R41 R42 |
Date: | 2012–08–31 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120087&r=tre |
By: | Dan Bogart (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine) |
Abstract: | The infrastructure sector has the potential to generate wide differences in profits and economic outcomes. This paper examines financial returns and investment strategies for Britain’s turnpike roads in the early nineteenth century. There are three main findings. First, rates of return on capital invested and returns to bondholders were similar to competitive sectors. Second, there was significant variation in returns across trusts. Third, there is evidence that turnpike investors were driven by financial motives, although economic motives appear to be important in some cases. The findings have implications regarding the connection between infrastructure and Britain’s industrialization. |
Keywords: | Monopoly; Regulation; Turnpike roads; Infrastructure; Britain; Industrial Revolution |
JEL: | K23 N43 N73 |
Date: | 2012–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irv:wpaper:121304&r=tre |
By: | Taryn Dinkelman; Sam Schulhofer-Wohl |
Abstract: | Evaluations of new infrastructure in developing countries typically focus on direct effects, such as the impact of an electrification program on household energy use. But if new infrastructure induces people to move into an area, other local publicly provided goods may become congested, offsetting the benefit of the infrastructure. We use a simple model to show how to measure the net benefit of a place-based program without data on land prices—an indicator that is commonly used to measure congestion in developed countries but that often cannot be used in poor countries because land markets are missing or land prices are badly measured. Our model shows that congestion externalities are especially large when land markets are missing. To illustrate, we estimate the welfare impact of a recent household electrification program in South Africa. Congestion externalities from migration reduced local welfare gains by half. |
Keywords: | South Africa |
Date: | 2012 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedmwp:700&r=tre |