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on Transport Economics |
| By: | Wolański, Michał |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to present the different approaches to demonopolisation used in Polish and European urban public transport, compare the efficiency of these models which have proven popular in Poland as well as to estimate the total losses incurred due to the high monopolisation of Polish public transport. The methodology of the research is based on econometric modelling (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and on a survey conducted by the author among Public Transport Authorities. The author proves that the modern London model (competition for the market) is more efficient in Polish conditions than the classic German one (communal monopoly). The very popular in Poland combination of the two above formulas – the co-existence of a Public Transport Authority with a monopolistic publicly owned operator – is surprisingly the least efficient. Total losses due to the existence of monopolies in Polish urban bus transport are estimated for the year 2007 at the level of 10-14% of its total budget (ca. 117-149 m EURO/year). In some cities, the losses can be as high as 20-25% of the total remuneration to the public bus operator. In others, public monopolists can be as efficient as private operators in the competitive model. |
| Keywords: | public transport; demonopolisation; Stochastic Frontier Analysis |
| JEL: | K21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38525&r=tre |
| By: | Daniel L. Bond; Daniel Platz; Magnus Magnusson |
| Abstract: | In most developing countries a shortage of long-term, local-currency financing for small-scale infrastructure projects impedes local economic development. Inadequate fiscal transfers, little own source revenue and low creditworthiness make it difficult for local governments to fully fund projects on their own. This paper proposes the use of project finance as a means to attract financing from domestic banks and institutional investors. Donors can play a catalytic role by providing technical assistance to develop projects and credit enhancement to attract commercial financing. |
| Keywords: | infrastructure finance, issuers, investors, financial sector, structured finance |
| JEL: | H54 H41 H81 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:une:wpaper:114&r=tre |
| By: | Judit M rkus (Corvinus University of Budapest); Anna Radv nyi (Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest); Mikl¢s Pint‚r (Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest) |
| Abstract: | In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems on a rooted tree, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, we call these games irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The well-known class of airport games (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977) is a subclass of irrigation games. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is probably the most popular solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) show respectively, that Shapley's (Shapley, 1953) and Young (1985)'s axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of airport games. In this paper we extend Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results to the class of irrigation games, that is, we provide two characterizations of the Shapley value for cost sharing problems given on a rooted tree. In our characterization results we relate the TU games terminologies to the cost sharing terminologies, so we bridge between the two fields. |
| Keywords: | Cost sharing; Shapley value; Rooted tree; Axiomatization of the Shapley value |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1207&r=tre |