nep-tra New Economics Papers
on Transition Economics
Issue of 2026–09–21
eight papers chosen by
Maksym Obrizan, Kyiv School of Economics


  1. SEAD: Enhancing socio-ecological dialogue in the automotive industry By Tibor T Meszmann; Adam Šumichrast
  2. Investment under fire: Firm responses to war in Ukraine By Fungáčová, Zuzana; Heyert, Axelle; Weill, Laurent
  3. Risk of sanctions By Egorov, Konstantin; Korovkin, Vasily; Makarin, Alexey; Nigmatulina, Dzhamilya
  4. What Happens Without Conservation? The Prospect of Heritage Loss in Contingent Valuation By Bartosz Jusypenko
  5. Foundation models for electricity price forecasting and battery arbitrage: Can they replace market-specific forecasting models? By Arkadiusz Lipiecki; Rafa{\l} Weron
  6. Was Stalin Necessary? Counterfactual Evidence on Soviet Growth By Fern\'andez Salguero; Ricardo Alonzo
  7. Distributional and Emission Effects of Temporary Gasoline Subsidies: Evidence from Spain By Xulia González; María J. Moral
  8. Politics-driven Market Access and Its Cost: Evidence from China’s Grand Canal By Ying Bai; Xiaoyu Bian; Ruixue Jia

  1. By: Tibor T Meszmann; Adam Šumichrast
    Abstract: The report is prepared within the SEAD project. The report aims to help relevant employer organisations and trade unions in the Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia develop practical strategies to strengthen social dialogue and influence policies for the future of work, emerging from ongoing socio-ecological and digital transformations in the automotive industry. The report is structured around the analytical and conceptual framework of the project and the research conducted within it between October 2025 and February 2026. In addition to desk research, which mostly involved monitoring and summarising relevant studies and articles, we developed and launched two online surveys, and conducted interviews with stakeholders and experts in the three countries, as well as at EU level.
    Date: 2026–09–15
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cel:report:73
  2. By: Fungáčová, Zuzana; Heyert, Axelle; Weill, Laurent
    Abstract: How do firms adapt their decision-making about strategic investments during a war? We examine this question in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, combining data on almost 500, 000 Ukrainian firms from 2017 to 2023 with detailed conflict data. We argue that war reshapes firm investment through three related mechanisms: exposure to violence, changes in the strategic value of firm resources, and sectoral alignment with wartime demand. Our results show that firms exposed to war strongly reduce their investment, and that this negative investment response is amplified by conflict intensity. Moreover, war reconfigures the strategic value of firm resources: financial resilience preserves firm investments, whereas the investment advantages associated with firm size and leverage weaken as larger firms have more resources at risk and debt creates financial rigidity. Firms in war-related industries increase investment during war, indicating that productive capabilities aligned with wartime demand may create strategic opportunities even under extreme uncertainty. These findings contribute to research on violent conflict and firm strategy by showing that war is not simply a uniform negative shock, but also creates a strategic context in which firms adapt depending on how risks, resources, and opportunities are reconfigured.
    Keywords: Firm investment, War, Ukraine
    JEL: D22 D25 D91 F51
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:343534
  3. By: Egorov, Konstantin; Korovkin, Vasily; Makarin, Alexey; Nigmatulina, Dzhamilya
    Abstract: Does uncertainty created by the risk of sanctions affect trade above and beyond the sanctions actually imposed? While most restrictions on Russian imports were introduced immediately after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the sanctioning countries simultaneously pledged further escalation unless the conflict ended. In line with this threat, we estimate that the subsequent escalations were largely anticipated in advance, with trade flows declining many months before they actually became subject to sanctions. Crucially, this effect was not limited just to sanctioned trade flows: we also estimate a decline for a wide range of never-sanctioned trade flows that nonetheless could have been perceived as being at risk of future sanctions. Overall, our results imply that Russia lost the equivalent of about a month and a half of imports over 2022-23 due to the escalation of sanctions after April 2022, with two-thirds of this loss driven by reductions in never-sanctioned trade flows that were only at risk of sanctions.
    Keywords: sanctions, international trade, Russia-Ukraine war, geoeconomics, uncertainty
    JEL: D22 D74 F14 F51 H56
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:343078
  4. By: Bartosz Jusypenko (University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences)
    Abstract: Economic valuation of heritage conservation depends on what respondents expect to happen without the implementation of a proposed intervention, yet this no-program counterfactual is often left implicit. We examine whether explicitly directing respondents to consider potential heritage loss affects stated willingness to pay (WTP) for renovation of a building and whether the contribution of information about adaptive reuse depends on whether such loss enters the valuation decision. A contingent valuation survey of 452 adult residents living near Pückler Palace, a deteriorating historic building in Poland, used a 2 × 2 randomized design combining a loss-consideration prompt with information about a genuine proposal to adapt the renovated palace as the new premises of the Museum of Ceramics. WTP was elicited as the maximum mandatory one-off levy respondents would support within an advisory-referendum framework. Among respondents not assigned to the loss-prompt treatment, a post-valuation question identified spontaneous consideration of heritage loss. Two-part models separated the probability of positive WTP from the amount stated among positive responses. Respondents assigned to the loss-prompt treatment had approximately twice the odds of reporting positive WTP and stated 61% higher amounts among positive responses. Among unprompted respondents, spontaneous loss consideration—reported by 54%—was associated with 92% higher positive WTP. Reuse information appeared to contribute more when heritage loss was not otherwise considered. The findings show that common information about an asset’s current condition need not produce a common understanding of its expected future without the proposed intervention. Stated preference surveys should therefore specify this trajectory with sufficient clarity and credibility that respondents are evaluating a common underlying policy change.
    Keywords: cultural heritage, historic preservation, adaptive reuse, contingent valuation, stated preferences, prospect of loss
    JEL: C51 H43 Z18 Q51
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2026-27
  5. By: Arkadiusz Lipiecki; Rafa{\l} Weron
    Abstract: Foundation models promise accurate forecasts with little or no task-specific training, but whether they can replace models designed specifically for electricity price forecasting remains unclear. We compare nine variants from five foundation model families, evaluated in zero-shot mode, with two state-of-the-art electricity price forecasting benchmarks in Germany, Poland, and Spain over 2021-2025. Their performance is assessed in terms of point and probabilistic forecasting accuracy, as well as economic value in battery energy storage arbitrage. Only the TabPFN models consistently and significantly outperform the benchmarks across all three markets and all statistical measures. However, this statistical dominance does not translate directly into economic dominance: TabPFN performs best under unlimited bids and riskier quantile-based strategies, whereas the Distributional Deep Neural Network benchmark is more profitable when risk tolerance is lower. Thus, foundation models cannot universally replace market-specific models, and their value depends on both model architecture and the decision problem.
    Date: 2026–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.00089
  6. By: Fern\'andez Salguero; Ricardo Alonzo
    Abstract: This article evaluates whether the exceptionally rapid growth of the Russian and Soviet economy after 1928 requires a specifically Stalinist explanation. The analysis treats this historical question as a sequence of increasingly demanding counterfactual comparisons rather than a binary comparison between observed growth and a single alternative. Long run output series from the Global Macro Database and the Maddison Project are combined with synthetic control, augmented synthetic control, synthetic difference in differences, interactive factor models, matrix completion, prediction benchmarks, historical analogues, spatial and temporal placebos, donor pool perturbations, endpoint sensitivity, and independent Soviet national account reconstructions. A key methodological contribution is a revised New Economic Policy counterfactual. Instead of extrapolating the rapid recovery observed from 1922 to 1928, the analysis models the recovery gap as a bootstrap process anchored to the pre 1914 trend and calibrated using the observed postwar closure of the Russian output gap. The Russian core estimates exceed the median admissible frontier at every endpoint and surpass the main 90th percentile frontier from the mid 1930s onward, whereas the broader Soviet territorial aggregate remains more conservative. Donor perturbations preserve a positive Russian core premium, but the limited placebo sample, imperfect pretreatment fit, recovery related false positives, source dependence, and hostile upper bounds prevent strong claims of historical necessity. The evidence supports a conditional growth premium but does not identify Stalin as the only institutionally feasible path.
    Date: 2026–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.00418
  7. By: Xulia González; María J. Moral
    Abstract: In response to the sharp rise in fuel prices following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many governments introduced temporary fuel subsidies to shield households from higher energy costs. This paper evaluates the distributional and environmental effects of Spain’s fuel subsidy policy. We combine household-level estimates of gasoline price elasticities from the Household Budget Survey with weekly retail fuel price data to estimate the pass-through of the subsidy to consumers. We find an average short-run gasoline price elasticity of 0.55 and incomplete pass-through, with only 89% of the subsidy reflected in retail prices. As a result, part of the fiscal transfer was captured by fuel retailers, while the benefits accrued disproportionately to higher-income households: the lowest income quartile received 12.4% of total benefits compared with 28.4% for the highest quartile. We also identify substantial regional heterogeneity in this distribution. The subsidy also increased fuel consumption and carbon emissions. Overall, the findings suggest that uniform fuel subsidies are poorly targeted and can conflict with both equity and environmental policy objectives.
    Keywords: Fuel subsidy, price elasticity, gasoline prices, distributional equity, emissions
    JEL: H22 H23 L11 Q41
    Date: 2026–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vig:wpaper:2603
  8. By: Ying Bai; Xiaoyu Bian; Ruixue Jia
    Abstract: Transportation networks often radiate from national capitals, reflecting political priorities as much as economic logic. How costly is infrastructure built for politics rather than markets? We study China’s Grand Canal: when the Mongols moved the capital from the central plain to Beijing, the canal followed, bypassing the economic core it once served. Using a grid-year panel spanning five dynasties (8th–19th centuries), we show the route best suited to reach the capital predicts the canal’s actual path. This redesign reshaped market access and, through it, population. Counterfactual analysis shows the canal raised population by 2.5–6.1%, but its politically motivated redesign cost 1.1–2.2%.
    JEL: N45 N75 O18 R12
    Date: 2026–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35721

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