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on Transition Economics |
| By: | Ruben Enikolopov (Harvard University); Maria Petrova (Harvard University); Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (New Economic School (NES), Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)) |
| Abstract: | Governments control media in much of the developing world. Does this have an effect on political choices of voters? We address this question using exogenous variation in the availability of the signal of the only independent from the government national TV channel in Russia during the 1999 parliamentary elections. We find that the presence of an independent source of political news on TV significantly decreased the vote in favor of the government party and increased the vote in favor of the opposition parties. We find that the difference in TV coverage significantly changed voting behavior even controlling for voters’ inclinations just one month prior to the elections. The effects we find are larger than those found in established democracies. |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0112&r=tra |
| By: | Ville Kaitila; Kari E. O. Alho; Nuutti Nikula |
| Abstract: | ABSTRACT : Using a neo-classical growth model, we analyse the real and nominal GDP per capita convergence of 21 emerging market economies (EMEs) of Central and Eastern Europe towards the EU15 average by 2050. We estimate the countries’ initial capital stocks and project future investment as a function of the GDP per capita gap, among other things, in order to have converging physical capital intensities in the long run. Due to standard-convergence in the model, catching up will continue at a decelerating speed. Also nominal convergence in prices that will lead to a real appreciation of the EME currencies with respect to the euro is projected as a function of the GDP-per-capita gap vis-à-vis the EU15. We also discuss whether the level of human capital in the EMEs is likely to allow for full catching up. We argue that the EU membership of most of the EMEs is likely to improve their economic, investment and business environments and lead to economic and other policies that support long-term convergence. According to the results, the EMEs will not quite catch up with the EU15 by 2050. However, our analysis of the uncertainty related to the growth rates and calculations of a confidence band for the results, as well as a qualitative assessment of other factors (politics, institutions, human capital) that have not been taken into account in the model explicitly lead us to conclude that some of the EMEs are likely to catch up with the EU15 average during the course of the next couple of decades. |
| Keywords: | productivity, growth, convergence, emerging markets, EU |
| JEL: | O47 |
| Date: | 2007–12–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:dpaper:1115&r=tra |
| By: | Jacob A. Bikker; Laura Spierdijk; Paul Finnie |
| Abstract: | Using a measure of competition based on the Panzar-Rosse model, this paper explains bank competition across 76 countries on the basis of various determinants. Studies explaining banking competition are rare and typically insuffciently robust as they are based on a limited number of countries only. Traditionally, market structure indicators, such as the number of banks and banking concentration, have been considered the major determinants of competition in the banking sector. However, we find that these variables have no significant impact on market power. Instead, we show that a country's institutional framework is a key factor in explaining banking competition. Extensive regulation, particularly antitrust policies, improves the competitive environment. The foreign investment climate, a proxy of contestability, also plays an important role. The fewer restrictions on foreign investments exist, the more competitive the banking sector becomes. In addition, activity restrictions make large banks less competitive and collusion markups are procyclical. Finally, competition is substantially weaker in countries with a socialist past, such as Central- and Eastern Europe. |
| Keywords: | banking competition, market structure, concentration, contestability, interindustry competition |
| JEL: | D4 G21 L11 L13 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0729&r=tra |
| By: | Katleen Van den Broeck (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Carol Newman (Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin); Finn Tarp (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | In most of the empirical literature on land titling, the household is regarded as unitary, and land rights are found to have ambiguous effects on land allocation, investment and productivity. Using data from 12 provinces in Vietnam, we diversify land titles, and show in a household fixed effects analysis of plot level rice yields that land titles are indeed important. Only exclusively held titles have the expected positive effects, and the positive effect on yields is found in male headed households. Furthermore, a household level rice yield function reveals that exclusive user rights are inefficiency decreasing, while jointly held user rights have no efficiency effects. Finally, once the gender of the head of household is controlled for, exclusively held female titles have a greater positive effect on the efficiency of the household than that of male held titles. |
| JEL: | D13 O12 Q12 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep1207&r=tra |