|
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
|
Issue of 2014‒06‒22
eight papers chosen by Fulvio Castellacci Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) |
| By: | Haus, Axel (Dept. of Management and Microeconomics, Goethe University Frankfurt); Juranek, Steffen (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We examine the role of non-practicing entities (NPEs), often called patent trolls, in patent litigation. We present a theoretical model that predicts that cases with NPE patentees resolve faster. We test this prediction using a hand-collected data set of US patent litigation cases. We find that NPEs challenge larger and more technology intensive firms, and use more valuable patents from technology areas that have a less fragmented ownership base compared to the control group. Controlling for these factors, we find that NPE cases are indeed resolved faster. NPEs help to increase the speed of diffusion of technology into the economy; therefore, increasing the effectiveness of the market for innovation. |
| Keywords: | Litigation; patents; patent trolls; technology diffusion |
| JEL: | K00 K41 O34 |
| Date: | 2014–06–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2014_024&r=tid |
| By: | MORIKAWA Masayuki |
| Abstract: | This paper, using Japanese firm-level data, presents findings about innovative activities in the service sector and the role of patents and trade secrets on innovation. According to the analysis, first, service firms have fewer product innovations than do manufacturing firms, but the productivity of innovative service firms is very high. Second, service firms have a low propensity for holding patents, but their holding of trade secrets is comparable to that of the manufacturing firms. Third, patents and trade secrets have positive relationships with product innovations, and the effects are quantitatively similar in magnitude in both the manufacturing and the service sectors. On the other hand, a positive relationship between trade secrets and process innovations is found only in the manufacturing sector. These results suggest a pivotal role of the law protecting trade secrets on innovation and productivity growth in the service sector. |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:14030&r=tid |
| By: | Marc Baudry; Adrien Hervouet |
| Abstract: | This article deals with the impact of legislation in the seed sector on incentives for variety creation. Two categories of rules interact. The first category consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D investments by the private sector. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection on the seed market. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs. We simultaneously examine two kinds of commercial legislation: compulsory registration in a catalogue and minimum standards for commercialisation. Analytical results are completed by numerical simulations. The main result is that the combination between minimum standards and PBRs provides higher incentives for sequential innovation and may be preferred by a public regulator to maximise the expected and discounted total surplus when sunk investment costs are low or when they are medium and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high. This solution differs from the combination of IPRs and commercialisation rules used in both the US and Europe. Otherwise, PBRs have to be replaced by patents, which yields a configuration close to that observed in the US. The catalogue commercialisation rule is seldom preferred to minimum standards, so that the combination of IPRs and commercialisation rules that prevails in Europe is not supported by our model. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights, Plant Breeders’ Rights, Catalogue, Product differentiation, Asymmetric information, Biodiversity. |
| JEL: | D43 D82 K11 L13 Q12 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-32&r=tid |
| By: | Spielman, David J.; Ma, Xingliang |
| Abstract: | The role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has been extensively debated in the literature on technology transfers and agricultural production in developing countries. However, few studies offer cross-country evidence on how IPRs affect yield growth, for example, by incentivizing private-sector investment in cultivar improvement. We address this knowledge gap by testing technology diffusion patterns for six major crops using a unique dataset for the period 1961–2010 and an Arellano–Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation approach. Findings indicate that both biological and legal forms of IPRs tend to promote yield gap convergence between developed and developing countries, although effects vary between crops. |
| Keywords: | Technology transfer, Agricultural development, productivity, Developing countries, Intellectual property rights, Diffusion of information, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1345&r=tid |
| By: | Bottomley, Sean |
| Abstract: | There are two competing accounts for explaining Britain's technological transformation during the Industrial Revolution. One sees it as the inevitable outcome of a largely exogenous increase in the supply of new ideas and ways of thinking. The other sees it as a demand side response to economic incentives – that in Britain, it paid to invent the technology of the Industrial Revolution. However, this second interpretation relies on the assumption that inventors were sufficiently responsive to new commercial opportunities. This paper tests this assumption, using a new dataset of Scottish and Irish patents. It finds that the propensity of inventors to extend patent protection into Scotland and/or Ireland was indeed closely correlated with the relative market opportunity of the patented invention. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:28168&r=tid |
| By: | Ruge-Leiva, Diego-Ivan |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether returns to domestic R&D and international R&D spillovers should be estimated without considering the heterogeneous impact of unobserved common shocks, as has been done by the literature in this area. Using a panel of 50 economies from 1970-2011, I find that when unobserved common shocks are disregarded, estimates of domestic R&D and foreign R&D weighted by bilateral imports might be biased and inconsistent. Once unobserved common factors are accounted for, by allowing for heterogeneous technology coefficients, significant estimates become more sizable, consistent and not seriously biased in most cases. However, these estimates might be capturing not only returns to domestic R&D and trade-related knowledge spillovers, but also unobserved common spillovers and other effects. This indicates that knowledge spillovers and effects of unknown form cannot be easily separated. Therefore, unobserved common shocks should not be ignored when estimating returns to domestic R&D and international R&D spillovers. |
| Keywords: | Productivity, Spillovers, Cross-Section Dependence, Unobserved Common Shocks. |
| JEL: | C23 O11 O30 O40 |
| Date: | 2014–06–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56718&r=tid |
| By: | Marco Marinucci (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides theoretical background to the increasing R&D cooperation among firms and public research institutions. We find that R&D spillovers may impede cooperation among firms or research institutions even when the cost of forming a link is negligible. Further, the presence of heterogeneous players results in different concepts of network regularity but also increases the number of possible pairwise stable networks. Consequently, stronger concepts of stability are needed to study networks in which players are not homogeneous. |
| Keywords: | networks, innovation, R&D cooperation, spillovers |
| JEL: | C70 L14 O30 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_962_14&r=tid |
| By: | Abeer El-Sayed (Department of Economic Analysis and ERICES, University of Valencia, Spain); Santiago J. Rubio (Department of Economic Analysis and ERICES, University of Valencia, Spain) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions and that they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as the coalition information exchange decreases until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached. We also find that the grand coalition is stable if the countries sign an international research joint venture but in this case the effectiveness of the agreement is very low. |
| Keywords: | International Environmental Agreements, R&D Investment, Technology Spillovers, Coalition Information Exchange, Research Joint Ventures |
| JEL: | D74 F53 H41 Q54 Q55 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2014.41&r=tid |