nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2014‒04‒05
four papers chosen by
Fulvio Castellacci
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

  1. Regulation, Innovation and Technology Diffusion: Evidence from Building Energy Efficiency Standards in Germany By Makram El-Shagi; Claus Michelsen; Sebastian Rosenschon
  2. Intellectual Property Rights, the Pool of Knowledge, and Innovation By Joseph E. Stiglitz
  3. Innovation in State-owned Enterprises: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom By Belloc, Filippo
  4. Dynamic capabilities for service innovation: conceptualization and measurement By Matthijs Janssen; Carolina Castaldi; Alexander Alexiev

  1. By: Makram El-Shagi; Claus Michelsen; Sebastian Rosenschon
    Abstract: The impact of environmental regulation on technology diffusion and innovations is studied using a unique data set of German residential buildings. We analyze how energy efficiency regulations, in terms of minimum standards, affects energy-use in newly constructed buildings and how it induces innovation in the residential-building industry. The data used consists of a large sample of German apartment houses built between 1950 and 2005. Based on this information, we determine their real energy requirements from energy performance certificates and energy billing information. We develop a new measure for regulation intensity and apply a panel-error-correction regression model to energy requirements of low and high quality housing. Our findings suggest that regulation significantly impacts technology adoption in low quality housing. This, in turn, induces improvements in the high quality segment where innovators respond to market signals.
    Keywords: Environmental regulation, innovation, technology diffusion, residential real estate, energy efficiency
    JEL: D2 Q4 R5
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1371&r=tid
  2. By: Joseph E. Stiglitz
    Abstract: The pace of innovation is related both to the level of investment in innovation and the pool of knowledge from which innovators can draw. Both of these are endogenous: Investments in innovations are affected by the pool of knowledge and the ability of firms to appropriate the returns to their innovative activity, itself affected by the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime. But as each firm engages in research, it both contributes to the pool, and takes out from it. The strength and design of IPR affects the extent to which any innovation adds to or subtracts from the pool of ideas that are available to be commercially exploited, i.e. to the technological opportunities. We construct the simplest possible general model to explore the resulting dynamics, showing that, under plausible conditions, stronger intellectual property rights may lead to a lower pace of innovation, and more generally, that long run effects may be the opposite of the short run effects.
    JEL: E61 H41 O3 O31 O32 O33 O34 O38
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20014&r=tid
  3. By: Belloc, Filippo
    Abstract: A very well established economic literature maintains that State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient comparatively to privately-owned ones (POEs). In this paper we argue that SOEs' inefficiency is not due to the State ownership per se, rather it is caused by some conditions other than ownership which SOEs often, but not necessarily, relate to. In particular, we focus on dynamic efficiency - specifically, the production of technological innovation - of SOEs in manufacturing industries, where SOEs should contend with POEs in a competitive environment. We suggest that targeted measures aimed at increasing managers' commitment to long-term investment strategies and at reducing corruption and political interference, though being complex and difficult to implement, can be much more (positively) incisive on long-run technical progress than the simple privatization of companies. This leaves room for exploration and implementation of policies that might reconcile State ownership and market competition in industrial sectors.
    Keywords: State-owned enterprises; innovation; privatization.
    JEL: H11 L33 O31 P12
    Date: 2013–11–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54748&r=tid
  4. By: Matthijs Janssen; Carolina Castaldi; Alexander Alexiev
    Abstract: For both managers and policy makers involved in innovation, capability failures regarding development of new services are a major concern. Efforts to strengthen those capabilities, and evaluation thereof, demand more comprehensive insight in firms’ actual abilities to source ideas and convert them into marketable service propositions. This paper aims to provide clarity by operationalizing a set of dynamic service innovation capabilities (DSICs). We first review how existing conceptualizations adopt recent insights from the dynamic capability view, which emphasizes the need to identify microfoundations corresponding to a limited set of common constructs. One of the encountered conceptualizations, consolidating earlier works in specific service sectors, was found appropriate for gauging DSICs across a wide range of industries. It exemplifies how DSICs can be conceptualized according to the so-called synthesis approach to service innovation by capturing insights on the evolutionary properties of the creation of novel solutions. Secondly, we operationalize a refined version of such DSICs and develop a measurement scale, using two subsamples from a dataset of 391 Dutch firms. The measured capabilities are found to correlate to different extents with performance measures. Our main contribution, a validated scale for five complementary DSICs, opens the way to comparative analyses which are of relevance for further research, management and policy development.
    Keywords: Dynamic capabilities, service innovation, measurement scale
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ein:tuecis:1407&r=tid

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