nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2013‒09‒13
six papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Sources of spillovers for imitation and innovation By Cappelli, Riccardo; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius
  2. Evolution of Standards and Innovation By AOKI Reiko; ARAI Yasuhiro
  3. Innovation in a generalized timing game By Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew
  4. R&D, IP, and firm profits in the automotive supplier industry By Stefan Lutz
  5. Do trademarks diminish the substitutability of products in innovative knowledge-intensive services? By Crass, Dirk; Schwiebacher, Franz
  6. The Determinants of R&D Investment: An Empirical Survey By Bettina Becker

  1. By: Cappelli, Riccardo; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius
    Abstract: We estimate the effect of R&D spillovers on sales realized by products new to the firm (imitation) and new to the market (innovation). It turns out that spillovers from rivals lead to more imitation, while inputs from customers and research institutions enhance original innovation. --
    Keywords: innovation,imitation,spillovers
    JEL: L12 O31 O32
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13064&r=tid
  2. By: AOKI Reiko; ARAI Yasuhiro
    Abstract: We present a framework to examine how a standard evolves when a standard consortium or firm (incumbent) innovates either to improve the standard or to strengthen the installed base which increases switching cost. By investing also in technology improvement, both investments make it more difficult for another firm (entrant) to introduce a standard. Our analysis shows that that the incumbent's strategy will differ according to whether the technology is in its infancy or if it has matured, but the existing standard will never be replaced by the entrant. Stability of a standard consortium standard has dynamic benefits in that it prevents replacement by an entrant. The incumbent deters entry when the technology is in its infancy but allows entry and co-existence of two standards when the technology is mature. This implies that dominance of a single standard even for well-established technologies suggests some market power by the incumbent. Our results also indicate that superior technology will never be sufficient to overtake an existing standard.
    Date: 2013–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:13075&r=tid
  3. By: Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew
    Abstract: We examine innovation as a timing game with complete information and observable actions in which firms decide when to enter a market. We characterize all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric game. In particular, we describe all subgame perfect equilibria when both the leader's and the followers' payoff functions are multi-peaked, non-monotonic and discontinuous. We find that there are potentially multiple equilibria, which could involve: joint adoption by both firms, with and without rent equalization; and, alternatively, single-firm adoption with a second-mover advantage. Economic applications are discussed including process and product innovation and the timing of the sale of an asset.
    Keywords: product innovation; process innovation; follower; leader; entry; timing games
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9340&r=tid
  4. By: Stefan Lutz
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:sespap:1313&r=tid
  5. By: Crass, Dirk; Schwiebacher, Franz
    Abstract: Trademarks are often supposed to reduce substitutability and imitability of product innovations. Using German CIS data for 2010, we provide empirical evidence that trademarking firms assess easy product substitutability as less characteristic for their competitive environment. This is particularly the case for knowledge-intensive service providers, product innovators and firms which consider trademarks as important intellectual property rights. This suggests that trademarks are an important supplementary mechanism to protect innovations in knowledgeintensive services. --
    Keywords: Trademarks,product differentiation,innovation,services
    JEL: O32 O34
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13061&r=tid
  6. By: Bettina Becker (School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, UK)
    Abstract: This paper offers an extensive survey and a critical discussion of the empirical literature on the driving factors of R&D. These factors are subsumed under five broad types. The paper first summarises the key predictions from theory regarding each type's R&D effect. It then examines for which factors differences in the theoretical predictions can also be found in empirical studies, and for which factors the empirical evidence is more unanimous. As the focus is on the empirical literature, methodological issues are also highlighted. The major factor types identified in the literature are, individual firm or industry characteristics, particularly internal finance and sales; competition in product markets; R&D tax credits and subsidies; location and resource related factors, such as spillovers from university research within close geographic proximity, membership of a research joint venture and cooperation with research centres, and the human capital embodied in knowledge workers; and spillovers from foreign R&D. Although on balance there is a consensus regarding the R&D effects of most factors, there is also variation in results. Recent work suggests that accounting for nonlinearities is one area of research that may explain and encompass contradictory findings.
    Keywords: R&D; R&D policy; innovation policy; financial constraints; competition; public funding; knowledge spillovers.
    JEL: G20 G28 M15
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2013_09&r=tid

This nep-tid issue is ©2013 by Rui Baptista. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.