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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Jérôme Danguy (Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, iCite and ECARES, Université libre de Bruxelles); Gaétan de Rassenfosse (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, iCite and ECARES, Université libre de Bruxelles) |
| Abstract: | This paper decomposes the R&D-patent relationship at the industry level to shed light on the sources of the worldwide surge in patent applications. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that includes 5 patent indicators computed for 18 industries in 19 countries covering the period from 1987 to 2005. The analysis shows that variations in patent applications reflect not only variations in research productivity but also variations in the appropriability and filing strategies adopted by firms. The results also suggest that the patent explosion observed in several patent offices can be attributed to the greater globalization of intellectual property rights rather than to a surge in research productivity. |
| Keywords: | Appropriability, complexity, patent explosion, propensity to patent, research productivity, strategic patenting |
| JEL: | O30 O34 O38 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2013n15&r=tid |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Ufuk Akcigit; Nicholas Bloom; William Kerr |
| Abstract: | We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A key feature is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using detailed US Census micro data on firm-level output, R&D and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output and R&D, and its implied elasticities are in the ballpark of a range of micro estimates. We find industrial policy subsidizing either the R&D or the continued operation of incumbents reduces growth and welfare. For example, a subsidy to incumbent R&D equivalent to 53 of GDP reduces welfare by about 1.53 because it deters entry of new high-type firms. On the contrary, substantial improvements (of the order of 53 improvement in welfare) are possible if the continued operation of incumbents is taxed while at the same time R&D by incumbents and new entrants is subsidized. This is because of a strong selection effect: R&D resources (skilled labor) are inefficiently used by low-type incumbent firms. Subsidies to incumbents encourage the survival and expansion of these firms at the expense of potential high-type entrants. We show that optimal policy encourages the exit of low-type firms and supports R&D by high-type incumbents and entry. |
| Keywords: | entry, growth, industrial policy, innovation, R&D, reallocation, selection. |
| JEL: | E2 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:13-23&r=tid |
| By: | Maria Alipranti (University of Crete); Emmanuel Petrakis (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece) |
| Abstract: | The present paper examines the firms' incentives to adopt a new cost reducing technology in vertically related markets, as well as, the effects of the vertical relations on the firms' timing of adoption. It demonstrates that in vertically related industries, independently of the upstream market structure (either upstream separate firms or upstream monopoly), downstream firms always have strong incentives to adopt the new technology, while in equilibrium there is technology diffusion. Further, comparing the speed of the firms' technology adoption in one-tier and two-tier industries, we show that, independently of the upstream market structure, technology adoption may occurs earlier in two-tier than in one-tier industries depending on the intensity of the final market competition, the drasticity of the new technology and the bargaining power distribution in the market. |
| Keywords: | Technology adoption, Vertical relations, Two-part tariffs, Product Differentiation |
| JEL: | L13 O31 L22 L41 |
| Date: | 2012–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crt:wpaper:1307&r=tid |
| By: | S. Bakhtiari; A. Minniti; A. Naghavi |
| Abstract: | This research sheds light on the role of product scope on the innovation activity of multinational multi-product firms. We use patent citation data to break down innovation into two types by measuring the degree to which innovation performed by firms is fundamental and the extent to which the output of the R&D can be spread across different product lines. We focus on two features in multinational production: (i) fundamental innovation is geographically more difficult to transfer abroad to foreign production sites, (ii) learning spillovers can occur from international operations. The results reveal that the second effect is more likely to dominate when a firm is active in more product lines. We argue that a more diversified portfolio of products increases a firm’s scope of learning from international operations, thereby enhancing its ability to engage in more fundamental research. In contrast, firms with less product lines that geographically separate production from innovation shift the innovation activities towards more specialized types of innovation. |
| JEL: | F12 F23 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp879&r=tid |
| By: | MUKUNOKI Hiroshi |
| Abstract: | This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market increases the speed with which a foreign firm adopts new technology. In our model, foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) in serving the domestic market. In the absence of other foreign firms, a reduction in the fixed cost of FDI promotes and accelerates technology adoption by the foreign firm, while tariff-free access to the domestic market induces the most rapid timing of technology adoption. If there is another foreign firm that has already adopted the advanced technology and both firms compete in the domestic market, a reduction in the fixed cost of FDI or the elimination of the tariff may either deter or delay the timing of technology adoption. The quickest timing of technology adoption may be attained when the fixed cost of FDI and the tariff are neither very high nor very low. These results suggest that improved access to the domestic market does not necessarily contribute to the technological upgrading of foreign firms. |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:13040&r=tid |