nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2013‒04‒20
four papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. “What Drives the Choice of Partners in R&D Cooperation? Heterogeneity across Sectors” By Erika Badillo; Rosina Moreno
  2. “Do intra- and inter-industry spillovers matter? CDM model estimates for Spain” By Esther Goya; Esther Vayá; Jordi Suriñach
  3. Old Technology Upgrades, Innovation, and Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets By Marc Bourreau; Paolo Lupi; Fabio Manenti
  4. Standards and Innovation: Technology vs. Installed Base By Aoki, Reiko; Arai, Yasuhiro

  1. By: Erika Badillo (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona); Rosina Moreno (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona)
    Abstract: In this paper we analyse the heterogeneity in firms’ decisions to engage in R&D cooperation, taking into account the type of partner (other companies from the same group, suppliers or customers, competitors, and research institutions) and the sector to which the firm belongs (industrial or services). We use information from the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for the years 2006-2008 and estimate multivariate probit models corrected for endogeneity. We find that the determinants of R&D cooperation differ between sectors. In the industrial sector, the perception of risk as an obstacle to innovation reduces the likelihood of cooperating with companies in the same group and competitors, while in the service sector it reduces cooperation with suppliers or customers. For its part, the possibility of accessing additional human resources has a significantly positive effect on cooperation with all types of partner in the service sector, but not for manufactures..
    Keywords: R&D cooperation; Choice of partners; Industrial sector; Service sector; Innovative Spanish firms. JEL classification: O30; O32; L24; L60; L80.
    Date: 2012–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aqr:wpaper:201206&r=tid
  2. By: Esther Goya (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona); Esther Vayá (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona); Jordi Suriñach (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona)
    Abstract: This paper uses a structural model to analyse the impact of innovation activities, including intra- and inter-industry externalities, on the productivity of Spanish firms. To the best of our knowledge, no previous paper has examined spillover effects by adopting such an approach. Here, therefore, we seek to determine the extent to which the innovations carried out by others affect a firm’s productivity. Additionally, firm’s technology level is taken into account in order to ascertain whether there are any differences in this regard between high-tech and low-tech firms both in industrial and service sectors. The database used is the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) which includes 8,611 firms for the year 2009. We find that low-tech firms make the most of a range of factors, including funding and belonging to a group, to increase their investment in R&D. As expected, R&D intensity has a positive impact on the probability of achieving both product and, more especially, process innovations. Finally, innovation output has a positive impact on firm’s productivity, being greater in more advanced firms in the case of process innovations. Both intra- and inter-industry spillovers have a positive impact on firm’s productivity, but this varies with the firm’s level of technology. Thus, innovations made by firms from the same sector are more important for low-tech firms than they are for their high-tech counterparts, while innovations made by the rest of the sectors have a greater impact on high-tech firms.
    Keywords: Productivity, innovation, industry spillovers. JEL classification: D24, O33.
    Date: 2012–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aqr:wpaper:201207&r=tid
  3. By: Marc Bourreau (Telecom Paris); Paolo Lupi (AGCOM); Fabio Manenti (University of Padova)
    Abstract: We study how the migration from an old to a new technology is affected by the access price to the old technology. We show that both the incumbent and the regulator are willing to set a very high access price to accelerate consumers' migration to the new technology. When the quality of the old technology is exogenous and the entrant dominates investment in the new technology, the old technology is completely switched off in equilibrium, whereas the old technology persists when the incumbent dominates investment. When the incumbent can decide on an endogenous upgrade of the old technology, the migration to the new technology is slowed down, and the entrant might be foreclosed.
    Keywords: Access, Investment, Vertical differentiation, Multi-product firms. JEL Codes: L1, L51, L96.
    Date: 2013–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0158&r=tid
  4. By: Aoki, Reiko; Arai, Yasuhiro
    Abstract: We present a framework to examine how a standard evolves when a standard consortium or a firm (incumbent) innovates either to improve the standard or to strengthen installed base which increases switching cost. Both investments make it more difficult for another firm (entrant) to introduce a standard, also by investing in technology improvement. We show that incumbent's strategy will differ according to if the technology is in infancy or it has matured. The incumbent will deter entry when the technology is in infancy and return from investment is high. In this case ability to raise switching cost is important since entrant also has low cost. If the technology is mature and return to investment is low, then incumbent will choose to allow entry and there is co-existence of two standards. Replacement of standard by the entrant never occurs in equilibrium.
    Keywords: standards, innovation, installed base
    Date: 2013–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:cisdps:601&r=tid

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