nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2013‒03‒16
three papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Do Patents Shield Disclosure or Assure Exclusivity When Transacting Technology? By Gaétan de Rassenfosse; Alfons Palangkaraya; Elizabeth Webster
  2. Patent Rights, Product Market Reforms, and Innovation By Philippe Aghion; Peter Howitt; Susanne Prantl
  3. Heterogeneity of innovative, collaborative, and productive firm-level processes. By Amoroso, S.

  1. By: Gaétan de Rassenfosse (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Alfons Palangkaraya (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Elizabeth Webster (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne)
    Abstract: Patents may assist trade in technology either by protecting buyers against the expropriation of the idea by third parties (the appropriation effect) or by enabling sellers to more frankly disclose the idea during the negotiation phase (the disclosure effect). We test for the presence of both these effects using quasi-experimental matching analysis on a novel dataset of 860 technology transaction negotiations. We identify the appropriation effect by comparing the probability of successful negotiations involving a granted patent with those involving a pending patent. Similarly, we identify the disclosure effect by comparing the probability of successful negotiations involving a pending patent with those involving no patent. We find evidence for the appropriation but not the disclosure effect: technology transaction negotiations involving a granted patent instead of a pending patent are 10 per cent more likely to be successfully completed (compared with an average completion rate of approximately 80 per cent).
    Keywords: Markets for technology, R&D, invention, patent, intellectual property, appropriability
    JEL: O31 O34
    Date: 2013–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2013n05&r=tid
  2. By: Philippe Aghion; Peter Howitt; Susanne Prantl
    Abstract: Can patent protection and product market competition complement each other in enhancing incentives to innovate? In this paper, we address this question by investigating how innovation responses to a substantial policy initiative increasing product market competition interact with the strength of patent rights. We provide empirical evidence of innovation responding positively to the product market reform in industries of countries where patent rights are strong, not where these are weak. The positive response to the reform is more pronounced in industries in which innovators rely more on patenting than in other industries, and in which the scope for deterring entry through patenting is not too large. Our empirical findings are in line with step-by-step innovation models predicting that product market competition enhances innovation and, more importantly, that patent protection can complement competition in inducing innovation.
    JEL: L1 L5 O3 O4
    Date: 2013–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18854&r=tid
  3. By: Amoroso, S. (Tilburg University)
    Abstract: This thesis addresses a set of interrelated topics that contribute to both structural and empirical fields of the economics of innovation. First, we consider the role of imperfect competition in product and labor markets in shaping the productivity of a firm. Second, we model and evaluate the expected correlations present among firms' R&D cooperative choices due to both firm- and sector-level heterogeneity. In the last study, we develop and estimate a structural dynamic monopoly model to quantify the linkages between R&D spending, cooperation, and innovation investment choices, and endogenous productivity.
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5663713&r=tid

This nep-tid issue is ©2013 by Rui Baptista. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.