nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2012‒12‒10
two papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Innovation, Exports and Productivity: Learning and Self selection in Chile By Claudio Bravo-Ortega; Jose Miguel Benavente; Álvaro González
  2. Strategic Timing in R&D Agreements By Marco Marini; Maria Luisa Petit; Roberta Sestini

  1. By: Claudio Bravo-Ortega; Jose Miguel Benavente; Álvaro González
    Abstract: Since long ago economists have shown that research and development (R&D) and business innovation are key factors for the growth of firms and the development of the economies. There is also some consensus that greater degrees of trade openness are beneficial for the long-term growth of countries. Nonetheless, there is still no evidence on the combined impact of both factors even though the link between them seem of particular relevance, especially for developing countries. This article examines the relationship between productivity, expenditure in R&D and exports at a plant level for the case of Chile. The main results show that firms that actually spend on R&D are considerably more likely to export but the reverse is not true. Moreover, we observe that both R&D and exports have a joint effect on the improvement in productivity in the Chilean plants. These results allow us to recover the private return to R&D and to learning by exporting across different sectors.
    Date: 2012–12
  2. By: Marco Marini (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Maria Luisa Petit (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Roberta Sestini (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")
    Abstract: We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among firms in which also the timing of R&D investments is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the endogenous formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. This allows to consider the formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, the stability of an R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When instead spillovers are sufficiently high, cooperation in R&D constitutes a profitable option, although firms also possess an incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely profitable, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.
    Keywords: R&D Investment; Spillovers; Endogenous Timing; R&D Alliances; Endogenous Research Cartels
    Date: 2012–07

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