nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2012‒03‒14
five papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Asymmetric R&D alliances and coopetitive games By Carfì, David; Bagileri, Daniela; Dagnino, Gianbattista
  2. Innovationstätigkeit im Mittelstand: Messung und Bewertung By Maaß, Frank; Führmann, Bettina
  3. Smithian Growth Through Creative Organization By Legros, Patrick; Newman, Andrew F; Proto, Eugenio
  4. Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition By L. Lambertini; A. Tampieri
  5. Innovation in EU merger control: walking the talk By Reinhilde Veugelers

  1. By: Carfì, David; Bagileri, Daniela; Dagnino, Gianbattista
    Abstract: In this paper we show how the study of asymmetric R\&D alliances, that are those between young and small firms and large and MNEs firms for knowledge exploration and/or exploitation, requires the adoption of a coopetitive framework which consider both collaboration and competition. We draw upon the literature on asymmetric R&D collaboration and coopetition to propose a mathematical model for the coopetitive games which is particularly suitable for exploring asymmetric R&D alliances.
    Keywords: R&D alliances; coopetitive games
    JEL: D7 M1 D74 C7 O32 M54 O3 J5
    Date: 2012
  2. By: Maaß, Frank; Führmann, Bettina
    Abstract: Gegenstand der vorliegenden Studie ist eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme der Innovationstätigkeit kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen (KMU) im Vergleich zu Großunternehmen in Deutschland. Hierzu wird die vorhandene Literatur ausgewertet und die existierenden Daten-sammlungen in ihrer Erfassungssystematik analysiert. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Großunternehmen häufiger als KMU innovativ sind. Dies ist insbesondere hinsichtlich der technologischen Innovationen zu beobachten. Neueste Berichtssysteme basierend auf der erweiterten OECD-Begriffsdefinition berücksichtigen auch nicht-technologische Innovationen. Hier zeigt sich eine besondere Stärke der KMU. In der Gesamtbetrachtung sind die KMU deutlich häufiger innovativ als bislang angenommen. 78 % der Unternehmen mit 10 bis 49 und 84 % der Unternehmen mit 50 bis 249 Beschäftigten beteiligen sich am Innovationsprozess. Der Anteilswert für die Großunternehmen liegt bei 95 %. -- The objective of this study is to assess the contribution of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to innovation in Germany. The paper reviews the empirical literature on SMEs' innovation activities and conceptualises indicators to identify the key dimensions of innovation processes and outputs. The analysis of statistical data and surveys from various sources shows that large enterprises on the whole are more often innovative than SMEs. This is particularly the case for technological innovations. As new data based on the OECD wider concept of innovation reveal, the strength of SMEs lies in their non-technological innovation capacity. Covering both types of innovation activities SMEs turn out to be innovative more often than presumed. Indeed, 78 % of all small enterprises with 10 to 49 employees engage in innovation activities. The share of innovators is even higher among the enterprises with 50 to 249 employees (84 %) and the large enterprises with more than 250 employees (95 %).
    Keywords: Innovationsindikatoren,Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE),Patentanmeldungen,technologische Innovationen,nicht-technologische Innovationen,KMU,Deutschland,innovation indicators,R&D measurement,patent data,technological innovation,non-technological innovation,SME,Germany
    JEL: C80 D01 O12 O30
    Date: 2012
  3. By: Legros, Patrick (ECARES and CEPR); Newman, Andrew F (Boston University and CEPR); Proto, Eugenio (University of warwick)
    Abstract: We consider a model in which appropriate organization fosters innovation, but because of contractibility problems, this benefit cannot be internalized. The organizational design element we focus on is the division of labor, which as Adam Smith argued, facilitates invention by observers of the production process. However, entrepreneurs choose its level only to facilitate monitoring their workers. Whether there is innovation depends on the interaction of the markets for labor and for inventions. A high level of specialization is chosen when the wage share is low. But low wage shares arise only when there are few entrepreneurs, which limits the market for innovations therefore and discourages inventive activity. When there are many entrepreneurs, the innovation market is large, but the rate of invention is low because there is little specialization. Rapid technological progress therefore requires a balance between these opposing e ects, which occurs with a moderate relative scarcity of entrepreneurs and workers. In a dynamic version of the model in which a credit constraint limits entry into entrepreneurship, this relative scarcity depends on the wealth distribution, which evolves endogenously. There is an inverted-U relation between growth rates driven by innovation and the level of inequality. Institutional improvements have ambiguous effects on growth. In light of the model, we offer a reassessment of the mechanism by which organizational innovations such as the factory may have spawned the industrial revolution. Key words: factory system ; industrial revolution ; technological change ; contracts
    Date: 2012
  4. By: L. Lambertini; A. Tampieri
    Abstract: We modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, in which firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed-strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than its complement to one. In the alternative of full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide.
    JEL: C73 L13
    Date: 2012–03
  5. By: Reinhilde Veugelers
    Abstract: European Union policymakers have in principle put innovation at the heart of competitiveness, in particular in the Europe 2020 strategy. But in merger control, assessments of the innovation effects of mergers are inadequate, even though mergers and acquisitions can have a significant impact on the development of the structure of an industry, and on its capability to innovate. EU merger control rules include scope for assessing the innovation effects of mergers, but in practice, the European Commission's directorate-general for competition (DG COMP) is not â??walking the talkâ??. Innovation effects are only assessed when claimed by parties to a merger, and this happens rarely. Where innovation effects have been claimed, they have not been decisive in any case, meaning DG COMP has not considered them important enough to influence its decision. A framework should be put in place that makes the reporting of efficiency-related information by the merging parties mandatory, so that innovation effects can be properly assessed for all mergers. In addition, models can be used to make an assessment of the longer-term innovation effects of a merger, and to help inform decision-making. The author acknowledges the excellent research assistance of Joan de Solà-Morales and Hendrik Meder, and would like to thank Lars-Hendrik Röller for discussing and commenting on earlier versions of the paper.
    Date: 2012–02

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