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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Diego Aboal; Paula Garda; Bibiana Lanzilotta; Marcelo Perera |
| Abstract: | The employment impact of innovation in the heterogeneous universe of services was studied using data from the 2004-2009 Uruguayan service innovation surveys. The empirical evidence shows that the impact of product innovation on employment is positive, while process innovation appears to have no effect. The effect varies according to the skill level of the labor force, across sectors, and the type of innovation strategy pursued by firms. Process innovation activities tend to substitute low-skilled jobs with higher-skilled jobs, while product innovation allows for more gains in efficiency in the production of new products with unskilled labor and no gains with the skilled labor force. Producing technology in-house has in most cases no impact on employment, while the combined strategy of acquiring technology outside the firm and producing it in-house has strong positive effects. The results found for knowledge-intensive business services and small firms, with some exceptions, are similar to the ones found for whole sample. |
| Keywords: | Science & Technology :: Research & Development, Science & Technology :: New Technologies, Labor :: Workforce & Employment, Economics :: Economic Development & Growth, service sector, innovation, innovation strategies, firm size, knowledge intensity, employment quantity and quality, innovation surveys, Uruguay |
| JEL: | D2 J23 L8 O31 O33 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:60318&r=tid |
| By: | laino, antonella |
| Abstract: | When it speaks of Schumpeterian hypothesis we refer to the close relationship that exists between the degree of innovation and market structure. The entrepreneur represented by Schumpeter's is strongly creative and innovative to condition to be able to get e/o to maintain a market power, and thus make a extra profit |
| Keywords: | Innovation; monopoly; Schumpeter; Market structure |
| JEL: | D42 L12 A11 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35321&r=tid |
| By: | Masatoshi Kato (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University); Hiroyuki Okamuro (Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University); Yuji Honjo (Faculty of Commerce, Chuo University) |
| Abstract: | Using a sample from an original questionnaire survey in Japan, this paper explores whether and how founders’ human capital affects innovation outcomes by start-ups. The results provide evidence that founders with greater human capital are more likely to yield innovation outcome. However, because certain types of founders’ human capital may boost R&D investment, which possibly results in innovation outcomes, we estimate the determinants of innovation outcomes by an instrumental variable probit model taking into account the endogeneity of R&D investment. Our findings suggest that specific human capital for innovation, such as founders’ prior innovation experience, is directly associated with innovation outcomes after start-up, while generic human capital, such as founders’ educational background, indirectly affects innovation outcomes through R&D investment. |
| Keywords: | Founder, Human capital, Innovations, R&D investment |
| JEL: | L24 M13 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kgu:wpaper:78&r=tid |
| By: | Evangelos Mitrokostas (University of Portsmouth); Emmanuel Petrakis (University of Crete; Economics, Universitat Jaume I (Castellón, Spain)) |
| Abstract: | We endogenize firms’ organizational structures in a homogenous goods duopoly where firms invest in cost reducing R&D and compete in quantities, and examine their impact on R&D efforts, market performance and social welfare. Each firm’s owner can either delegate to a manager both market competition and R&D investment decisions (Full Delegation strategy) or delegate the market competition decision alone (Partial Delegation strategy). We show that when the initial marginal cost is relatively high, Universal Full Delegation emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, an asymmetric equilibrium with one owner choosing a Full Delegation strategy and the other a Partial Delegation strategy arises. Welfare is always higher in the asymmetric equilibrium configuration, thus, market and societal incentives are not always aligned. Finally, Universal Partial Delegation can arise in equilibrium only if goods are poor substitutes or if competition is in prices. |
| Keywords: | Organizational Structure, Strategic Delegation, Innovation, Oligopolistic Industries |
| JEL: | L1 L22 O33 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2011/9&r=tid |
| By: | Daniele Sabbatini (Banca d'Italia) |
| Abstract: | The Italian and European regulatory framework for patents would benefit from further improvements in order to foster dynamic competition between Italian firms. At the national level the exclusive allocation of the right to patent inventions to universities, rather than to researchers, would promote better commercial exploitation. At the European level a more integrated system of protection (provision of a single patent that is valid in all Member States, the abolition of translation requirements, a unitary system of fees, and the integration of the litigation system) is essential to lower costs and expand the geographic scope of the protection, thus fostering dynamic competition. Further improvements in the language requirements are needed. The objective of reducing the cost of patenting inventions without raising costs for competitors would be better achieved were English the sole official language of the system (instead of the present choice between English, French and German), to make it easier for competitors to know which is the valid version of the patent. |
| Keywords: | patents, industrial inventions, judicial trial, European patent |
| JEL: | K11 K41 L51 O31 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_109_11&r=tid |
| By: | Peter Klimek; Ricardo Hausmann; Stefan Thurner |
| Abstract: | We show that world trade network datasets contain empirical evidence that the dynamics of innovation in the world economy follows indeed the concept of creative destruction, as proposed by J.A. Schumpeter more than half a century ago. National economies can be viewed as complex, evolving systems, driven by a stream of appearance and disappearance of goods and services. Products appear in bursts of creative cascades. We find that products systematically tend to co-appear, and that product appearances lead to massive disappearance events of existing products in the following years. The opposite - disappearances followed by periods of appearances - is not observed. This is an empirical validation of the dominance of cascading competitive replacement events on the scale of national economies, i.e. creative destruction. We find a tendency that more complex products drive out less complex ones, i.e. progress has a direction. Finally we show that the growth trajectory of a country's product output diversity can be understood by a recently proposed evolutionary model of Schumpeterian economic dynamics. |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1112.2984&r=tid |
| By: | Christin, Clémence |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we highlight new conditions under which R&D agreements may have anti-competitive effects. We focus on cases where two firms compete with each other and with a competitive fringe. R&D activities need a specific input available to all firms on a common market, the price of which increases with demand for the input. In such a context, if a firm increases its R&D expenses, it increases the cost of R&D for its rivals. This induces exit from the fringe and may increase the final price. Therefore, by contrast to the case where the cost of R&D for one firm is independent of its rivals' R&D decisions, cooperation between strategic firms on the upstream market may induce more R&D by strategic firms, in order to exclude firms from the fringe and increase the final price. -- |
| Keywords: | Competition policy,Research and Development Agreements,Collusion,Entry deterrence |
| JEL: | L13 L24 L41 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:38&r=tid |
| By: | Ben Youssef, Slim; Breton, Michèle; Zaccour, Georges |
| Abstract: | We consider a duopoly competing in quantity, where firms can invest in both innovative and absorptive R&D to reduce their unit production cost, and where they benefit from free R&D spillovers between them. We analyze the case where firms act non cooperatively and the case where they cooperate by forming a research joint venture. We show that, in both modes of play, there exists a unique symmetric solution. We find that the investment in innovative R&D is always higher than in absorptive R&D. We also find that the value of the learning parameter has almost no impact on innovative R&D, firms profits, consumer's surplus and social welfare. Finally, differences in investment in absorptive research and social welfare under the two regimes are in opposite directions according to the importance of the free spillover. |
| Keywords: | Innovative R&D; Absorptive R&D; Learning Parameter; Spillover; Research Joint Venture |
| JEL: | C7 C61 O32 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35326&r=tid |