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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
By: | Galasso, Alberto; Schankerman, Mark; Serrano, Carlos |
Abstract: | We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. Conventional wisdom associates the gains from trade with comparative advantage in manufacturing or marketing. We show that these gains imply that patent transactions should increase litigation risk. We identify a new source of gains from trade, comparative advantage in patent enforcement, and show that transactions driven by this motive should reduce litigation. Using data on trade and litigation of individually-owned patents in the U.S., we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strongly affect patent transactions, and that reallocation of patent rights reduces litigation risk, on average. The impact of trade on litigation is heterogeneous, however. Patents with larger potential gains from trade are more likely to change ownership, suggesting that the market for innovation is efficient. We also show that the impact of trade on litigation depends on characteristics of the transactions. |
Keywords: | capital gains taxation; litigation; market for innovation; patents |
JEL: | H24 K41 O32 O34 |
Date: | 2011–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8573&r=tid |
By: | KOBAYASHI Yohei |
Abstract: | Although numerous studies have evaluated the effect of tax credits on R&D, many have neglected the problem of selection bias. Furthermore, empirical studies have found that Japan's total factor productivity (TFP) growth has slowed since the 1990s, and Kim et al. (2010) have attributed this slowdown partly to low R&D expenditures among small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). Evidence suggests that enhancing R&D among small firms is essential for Japan's economic growth. This paper estimates the effect of R&D tax credits for SMEs using firm-level micro data from "The 2009 Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises." We use the propensity score method introduced by Rubin (1974), in which recipients of tax credits are matched with the most similar non-recipients. Empirical results show that R&D tax credits induce an increase in SMEs' R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effect of R&D tax credits on liquidity-constrained firms is much greater than on firms without liquidity constraints. |
Date: | 2011–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:11066&r=tid |
By: | James Bessen (Research on Innovation, Boston University School of Law, Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Harvard)); Jennifer L. Ford; Michael J. Meurer |
Abstract: | In the past, non-practicing entities (NPEs) — firms that license patents without producing goods — have facilitated technology markets and increased rents for small inventors. Is this also true for today’s NPEs? Or are they “patent trolls” who opportunistically litigate over software patents with unpredictable boundaries? Using stock market event studies around patent lawsuit filings, we find that NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010, mostly from technology companies. Moreover, very little of this loss represents a transfer to small inventors. Instead, it implies reduced innovation incentives. |
Keywords: | patent, litigation, litigation cost, non-practicing entities, software patents |
JEL: | O31 O34 K41 |
Date: | 2011 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:roi:wpaper:1103&r=tid |