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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Alessandra Colombelli; Naciba Haned; Christian Le Bas |
| Abstract: | In the paper we wish to examine if the firms that innovate know a higher growth than the firm that do not. We use diverse waves of CIS for the French industries over the period 1992- 2004 and carry out different models and new econometric methods (quantile regression). Our main findings are that innovative firms produce more growth than non innovative firms. The estimates show that the results are robust to the different types of models that we have implemented. Process innovators are more productive in terms of growth than product innovators when OLS and Random effects models are used. The reverse is true for Fix effect model and quantile regression. In the three growth equations estimated by GMM the coefficients related to innovation product are always higher. Our study does not give definitive results with respect to the magnitude of the effects of the type of innovation on firm growth. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, process and product, firm growth, CIS |
| JEL: | L20 L60 O31 O33 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:07-2011&r=tid |
| By: | Néstor Duch-Brown (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); José García-Quevedo (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Daniel Montolio (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB) |
| Abstract: | The effectiveness of R&D subsidies can vary substantially depending on their characteristics. Specifically, the amount and intensity of such subsidies are crucial issues in the design of public schemes supporting private R&D. Public agencies determine the intensities of R&D subsidies for firms in line with their eligibility criteria, although assessing the effects of R&D projects accurately is far from straightforward. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether there is an optimal intensity for R&D subsidies through an analysis of their impact on private R&D effort. We examine the decisions of a public agency to grant subsidies taking into account not only the characteristics of the firms but also, as few previous studies have done to date, those of the R&D projects. In determining the optimal subsidy we use both parametric and non-parametric techniques. The results show a non-linear relationship between the percentage of subsidy received and the firms’ R&D effort. These results have implications for technology policy, particularly for the design of R&D subsidies that ensure enhanced effectiveness. |
| Keywords: | R&D, public subsidies, evaluation |
| JEL: | O38 H32 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2011/6/doc2011-12&r=tid |
| By: | Antonelli Cristiano; Crespi Francesco (University of Turin) |
| Abstract: | Public policy plays a key role in supporting R&D activities and a variety of policy tools have been applied to contrast the undersupply of technological knowledge including the provision of subsidies to private firms performing R&D activities. A large literature has identified the sources of ‘government failures’ in discretionary procedures in problems related to asymmetric information and the operation of interest groups. This paper explores the causes and effects of persistence in the discretionary allocation of public subsidies to R&D activities performed by private firms and elaborates a crucial distinction between vicious Matthew-effects and virtuous Matthew-effects. The latter identifies the role of dynamics increasing returns based upon accumulation of competence stemming from learning, learning to learn and knowledge cumulability. On the contrary vicious Matthew-effects lead to substitution of private funds with public ones and represent an additional source of ‘government failure’ which has not been specifically addressed by previous literature. The empirical analysis based upon Transition Probability Matrices, Probit regression and Propensity Score Matching tested the relevance of these arguments on a sample of about 750 Italian firms in the years 1998-2003. Our results show that the persistence in the discretionary allocation of public subsidies is relevant and that virtuous Matthew-effects prevail when a ‘picking the winner strategy’ is adopted by granting authorities. We conclude that while the decision to rely on discretionary incentives based on beauty context selection procedures may imply relevant costs, their benefits can be increased by pursuing a ‘picking the winner strategy |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201103&r=tid |