By: |
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN));
Persson, Lars (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN));
Tåg, Joacim (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
Abstract: |
Why do so many high-priced acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms take place in
network industries? We develop a theory of commercialization (entry or sale)
in network industries showing that high equilibrium acquisition prices are
driven by the incumbents' desire to prevent rivals from acquiring innovative
entrepreneurial firms. This preemptive motive becomes more important when
there is an increase in network effects. A consequence is higher innovation
incentives under an acquisition relative to entry. A policy enforcing strict
compatibility leads to more entry, but can be counterproductive by reducing
bidding competition, thereby also reducing acquisition prices and innovation
incentives. |
Keywords: |
Acquisitions; Commercialization; Compatibility; Entry; Network effects; Innovation; R&D; Regulation |
JEL: |
L10 L15 L26 L50 L86 O31 |
Date: |
2011–04–06 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0867&r=tid |