|
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Maria José Gil-Moltó; Joanna Poyago-Theotoky; Vasileios Zikos |
| Abstract: | We examine the use of subsidies to R&D in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production, however, it does not lead to the equalisation of per fi?rm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided. |
| Keywords: | Keywords: mixed duopoly, process innovation, R&D subsidies, privatization, spillovers. |
| JEL: | L31 L32 O38 L13 L50 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:crieff:1008&r=tid |
| By: | Klaus M. Schmidt (University of Munich) |
| Abstract: | Technolgical standards give rise to a complements problem that affects pricing and innovation incentives of technology producers. In this paper I discuss how patent pools can be used to solve these problems and what incentives patent holders have to form a patent pool. I offer some suggestions how competition authorities can foster the formation of welfare increasing patent pools. |
| Keywords: | Patent pools, standard setting organisations, innovation, complements problem, patent thicket |
| JEL: | L15 L24 O3 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:342&r=tid |
| By: | Gastón Llanes; Stefano Trento |
| Abstract: | We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes -patents, no-patents, and patent pools- and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length. |
| Keywords: | Sequential Innovation, Patent Policy, Patent Pools, Anticommons, Double Marginalization, Complementary Monopoly |
| JEL: | L13 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:856.10&r=tid |
| By: | Carlos Carreira (GEMF/Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal); Paulino Teixeira (GEMF/Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the impact of newly created firms on industry productivity growth. Our central hypothesis is that there are two potential effects of new firms on productivity growth: a direct effect, as entrants may be relatively more productive than established firms; and an indirect effect, through increased competitive pressure that stimulates incumbents to elevate their productivity in order to survive. The results of the decomposition exercise of aggregate productivity growth suggest that the direct contribution of entry is small. In turn, the regression analysis on the effect of entry on productivity growth of incumbents indicates that the higher is the former, the higher is the latter, which is equivalent to say that the greater is the competitive pressure generated by new entrants, the higher is the expected aggregate productivity level. |
| Keywords: | Entry, Firm dynamics, Productivity growth, Competition effect |
| JEL: | L11 L16 L25 O12 O47 L60 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2010-20&r=tid |
| By: | Chiara Franco; Manuela Gussoni |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the issue of ?rms’ R&D cooperation strategies, examining the topic from the point of view of the partner choice. Literature has deeply analyzed the motivations inducing ?rms to form research joint ventures, instead, the investigation of partner selection strategies is disregarded even though it is one of the most critical decisions for a ?rm when forming an alliance. For this reason, by making use of data coming from the fourth Italian innovation survey (2002- 2004), we contribute to the the literature by estimating, through the use of a multinomial logistic model, the determinants that a?ect the ?rms’ choice among di?erent types of potential R&D cooperation partners. We di?erentiate among three cooperation strategies that are: (i) cooperation with only market partners; (ii) with only science partners; and (iii) with both of them. Our ?ndings provide support to the hypothesis that di?erent variables determine di?erent partner choices according to the sector analyzed. In the manufacturing sector, for example, foreign multinational companies or export oriented ?rms prefer to cooperate only with market partners. In the services, ?rms receiving public subsidies for innovation prefer science cooperations to all the other cooperation arrangements leaving room for policy implications. |
| Keywords: | R&D cooperations; partner selection; industry-university linkages;service sector. |
| JEL: | O32 L10 L8 L6 D78 |
| Date: | 2010–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2010/104&r=tid |
| By: | Ivan Ledezma (Université Paris Dauphine, LEDa UMR 225 DIAL, IRD) |
| Abstract: | (english) This paper analyses the potentially defensive behaviour of patent race winners and its effect on aggregate R&D effort. It proposes a quality-ladders model that endogenously determines leaders technology advantages and who innovates. Product market regulation can have either a positive or a negative effect on R&D intensity. The negative effect is likely to be observed in highly deregulated economies. The positive influence arises in more regulated environments and it is stronger for larger innovative jumps. These steady-state equilibrium outcomes are consistent with puzzling and contrasting patterns stemming from data on manufacturing industries for 14 OECD countries during the period 1987-2003. _________________________________ (français) Dans cet article nous étudions le comportement potentiellement défensif des innovateurs et son effet sur l’effort agrégé d’innovation. Un modèle à échelles de qualité est proposé afin d’analyser l’émergence d’avantages technologiques qui, in fine, déterminent qui innove (le leader ou ses concurrents). Dans ce contexte, la réglementation de marché peut avoir un effet positif ou négatif sur l’intensité en R&D. Elle peut être négativement associée à l’effort d’innovation dans des environnements hautement dérèglementés. Par contre, en économies qui dépassent un certain seuil de réglementation, susceptible de limiter effectivement la construction de barrières stratégiques, la réglementation induit des incitations à innover. Ces prédictions sont cohérentes avec des tests empiriques menés sur un échantillon d’industries appartenant à 14 pays de l’OCDE durant la période 1987-2003. |
| Keywords: | Innovative leaders, quality ladders, product market regulation, R&D, Leaders innovants, modèle à échelles de qualité, réglementation. |
| JEL: | L13 O31 O33 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt201011&r=tid |
| By: | Bos Jaap; Lamoen Ryan van; Economidou Claire (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether large U.S. banks have become ''too big to innovate''. We extend the theoretical work of Aghion et al. (2005b) by relaxing their assumption that unit costs are independent from output levels in order to investigate the effect of scale (dis)economies on the competition-innovation nexus. With our model we can derive conditions under which the innovation behavior of firms with scale diseconomies becomes more or less responsive to competitive changes. Our empirical results show that decreases in thelevel of competition lead to very large drops in innovation. Large banks, already operating beyond the minimum efficient scale, have indeed become ''too big to innovate''. |
| Keywords: | Industrial Organization; |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010054&r=tid |