nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2010‒11‒27
three papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment By Tomaso Duso; Lars-Hendrik Röller; Jo Seldeslachts
  2. Regional Knowledge and the Emergence of an Industry: Laser Systems Production in West Germany, 1975-2005 By Guido Bünstorf; Michael Fritsch; Luis F. Medrano
  3. Cumulative Innovation and Competition Policy By Alexander Raskovich; Nathan H. Miller

  1. By: Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB)); Lars-Hendrik Röller (European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) and Humboldt University Berlin); Jo Seldeslachts (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing.
    Keywords: Research Joint Ventures, Innovation, Collusion, NCRA
    JEL: K21 L24 L44 O32
    Date: 2010–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:343&r=tid
  2. By: Guido Bünstorf (University of Kassel, Department of Economics,); Michael Fritsch (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena); Luis F. Medrano (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
    Abstract: We analyze the emergence and spatial evolution of the German laser systems industry. Regional knowledge in the related field of laser sources, as well as the presence of universities with physics or engineering departments, is conducive to the emergence of laser systems suppliers. The regional presence of source producers is also positively related to entry into laser systems. One important mechanism behind regional entry is the diversification of upstream laser source producers into the downstream systems market. Entry into the materials processing submarket appears to be unrelated to academic knowledge in the region, but the presence of laser source producers and the regional stock of laser knowledge are still highly predictive in this submarket.
    Keywords: Innovation, regional knowledge, laser technology, emerging industries, diversification
    JEL: L22 L69 R11 O52
    Date: 2010–11–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-079&r=tid
  3. By: Alexander Raskovich (Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice); Nathan H. Miller
    Abstract: We model a “new economy” industry where innovation is sequential and monopoly is persistent but the incumbent turns over periodically. In this setting we analyze the effects of “extraction” (e.g., price discrimination that captures greater surplus) and “extension” (conduct that simply delays entry of the next incumbent) on steady-state equilibrium innovation, welfare and growth. We find that extraction invariably increases innovation and welfare growth rates, but extension causes harm under plausible conditions. This provides a rationale for the divergent treatment of single-firm conduct under U.S. law. Our analysis also suggests a rule-of-thumb, consistent with antitrust practice, that innovation proxies welfare.
    Date: 2010–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:doj:eagpap:201005&r=tid

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