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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Hall, Bronwyn (University of California at Berkeley, UNU-MERIT, and Maastricht University); Helmers, Christian (CEP, London School of Economics and Political Science, and CSAE, University of Oxford) |
| Abstract: | Global climate change mitigation will require the development and diffusion of a large number and variety of new technologies. How will patent protection affect this process? In this paper we first review the evidence on the role of patents for innovation and international technology transfer in general. The literature suggests that patent protection in a host country encourages technology transfer to that country but that its impact on innovation and development is much more ambiguous. We then discuss the implications of these findings and other technology-specific evidence for the diffusion of climate change-related technologies. We conclude that the "gdouble externality" problem, that is the presence of both environmental and knowledge externalities, implies that IP may not be the ideal and cannot be the only policy instrument to encourage innovation in this area and that the range and variety of green technologies as well as the need for local adaptation of technologies means that patent protection may be neither available nor useful in some settings. |
| Keywords: | climate change, intellectual property, innovation, technology transfer |
| JEL: | O19 O33 O34 Q54 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2010046&r=tid |
| By: | Lokshin, Boris (Maastricht University, and UNU-MERIT); Mohnen, Pierre (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University, and CIRANO) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of the R&D fiscal incentive program on R&D by Dutch firms. Taking a factor-demand approach we measure the elasticity of firm R&D capital accumulation to its user cost. Econometric models are estimated using a rich unbalanced panel of firm data covering the period 1996-2004 with firm-specific R&D user costs varying with tax incentives. Using the estimated user cost elasticity, we perform a cost-benefit analysis of the R&D incentive program. We find some evidence of additionality suggesting that the level-based program of R&D incentives in the Netherlands is effective in stimulating firms' investment in R&D. However, the hypothesis of crowding out can be rejected only for small firms. The analysis also indicates that the level-based nature of the fiscal incentive scheme leads to a substantial social dead-weight loss. |
| Keywords: | R&D tax credits; panel data; crowding out; user-cost elasticity |
| JEL: | O32 O38 H25 H50 C23 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2010040&r=tid |
| By: | Waśniewski, Krzysztof |
| Abstract: | The bulk of the global innovative effort takes place in 5 countries: USA, Japan and China as leaders, with France and United Kingdom as immediate followers, which all display, on the long run, a negative marginal value added on innovation. The present paper attempts to answer the following question: why does most of innovative activity takes place in markets apparently hostile to innovation, i.e. giving back negative marginal value added on innovation ? A model is introduced in which any market may be represented as a Selten’s extensive game, subgames of which are played as Harsanyi’s games with imperfect information, by a temporarily finite and changing set of players. The firms’ innovative activity is a Nash’s dynamic equilibrium in which innovating is rational though suboptimal, without premium on innovation being a real economic profit. The model is the theoretical framework for the study of six cases: Ford Motor, General Motors, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM, which allow to conclude that firms do innovation either because they have to or because this is their comparative advantage and they can do it in an exceptionally efficient way. As economic growth is grounded in efficient business patterns and in some countries those business patterns shape themselves in the context of a strong exogenous pressure on innovation. This leads to the development of economies which, regardless its pace of economic growth and balance of payments, come to a point when marginal value added on innovation is negative. At this point, however, incentives to innovate do not disappear and firms continue to apply the same business patterns and thus do create scientific input which gives back negative marginal real output. This pattern of global technological progress seem to be quite durable, with financial markets that allow to compensate, by successful financial placements, the downturns of innovative projects. |
| Keywords: | innovation; technology; technological progress; corporate strategies |
| JEL: | E22 L71 D20 D40 L60 B52 O3 L25 D21 D81 L10 C70 L16 L21 D52 D01 D00 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25186&r=tid |