|
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Philipp Weinscheink (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We explore how the threat of entry influences the innovation activity of an incumbent. We show that the incumbent’s investment is hump-shaped in the entry threat. When the entry threat is small and increases, the incumbent invests more to deter entry, or to make it unlikely. This is due to the entry deterrence effect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry can no longer profitably be deterred or made unlikely and the investment becomes small. Then the Schumpeterian effect dominates. These results turn out to be very robust. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_17&r=tid |
| By: | Ullberg, Eskil (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We are well familiar with the economic analysis of a patent system in terms of a temporary monopoly on products, benefitting from marginal process inventions, formulated under conditions of certain future demands. This article develops an experimental and dynamic microeconomic model useful for studying the patent system as a trade system, where patented technology is exchanged in organized competitive markets, under uncertain future demands. An economic system design is developed to study transparent prices of patents, dynamic gains from using a patent in multiple industries and the coordination of invention, intermediary and innovation activities using a linear contract on patents (fixed fee plus royalty on revenues). A trader is introduced together with inventor and innovator agents in order to multiply the value (use) of the technology. Three mechanism designs and two levels of presumption of validity of the underlying patent right are proposed. The analysis differs from previous work on patents, trade and economics in that the focus is on the competitive pricing of the rights themselves, using demand side bidding. An informal theory is outlined to price the dual values of a patent (investing and blocking). Based on this proposition tentative hypothesis are outlined for two initial experiments using the outlined economic system design. |
| Keywords: | patents; organized markets; trade; licensing; technology |
| JEL: | D02 D23 L14 L24 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0239&r=tid |
| By: | Mili Shrivastava (Graduate College "The Economics of Innovative Change" and Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public policy group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Spinoffs firms are an important source of industry dynamics and innovation. While an emerging body of literature identifies strategic disagreements and ideas as determinants of spinoffs, neither of them can completely explain the spinoff process. Mere disagreements or brilliant flashes of ideas do not always lead to spinoffs. This study brings individual level determinants at the forefront in spinoff formation. Based on insights from the occupational choice theory, we argue that spinoff process is a distinctive class of entrepreneurial entrants and entrepreneurial talent is a major determinant in formation of spinoffs. Entrepreneurial talent modulates the impact of strategic disagreements and ideas on the decision to spi |
| Keywords: | Spinoffs, Entrepreneurship, Occupational choice, Disagreements |
| JEL: | D00 J24 L2 |
| Date: | 2010–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-059&r=tid |