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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Junichiro Ishida; Toshihiro Matsumura; Noriaki Matsushima |
| Abstract: | We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low-cost firms compete against less efficient high-cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high-cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low-cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high-cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low-cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high-cost firms. An implication of this result is far-reaching, as it gives low-cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high-cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know-how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0777&r=tid |
| By: | Francesco Bogliacino (JRC-IPTS); Marco Vivarelli (Università Cattolica, Milano; CSGR-Warwick University; IZA, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In this study we use a unique database covering 25 manufacturing and service sectors for 15 European countries over the period 1996-2005, for a total of 2,295 observations, and apply GMM-SYS panel estimations of a demand-for-labour equation augmented with technology. We find that R&D expenditures -fostering product innovation- have a job-creating effect, in accordance with the previous theoretical and empirical literature discussed in the paper. Interestingly enough, the labour-friendly nature of R&D emerges in both the flow and the stock specifications. These findings provide further justification for the European Lisbon-Barcelona targets. |
| Keywords: | Technological change, corporate R&D, employment, product innovation, GMM-SYS |
| JEL: | O33 |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:wpaper:201004&r=tid |
| By: | Toshihiro Matsumura; Noriaki Matsushima |
| Abstract: | Innovators who have developed advanced technologies, along with launching new products by themselves, often license these technologies to their rivals. When a firm launches a new product, product positioning is also an important matter. We consider a standard linear city model with two firms in which the licenser and the licensee negotiate on licensing and engage in Nash bargaining after they determine their product positions. We investigate how the bargaining power of the licenser affects the product positions of the firms. We find that the licenser more likely chooses the central position when its bargaining power is weak whereas the product position of the licenser accelerates price competition between the firms. We also discuss the welfare implication. We find that the inverse U shape relationship between the bargaining power of the licenser and total social surplus, i.e., neither too strong nor too weak bargaining power of the licensor is optimal. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0775&r=tid |